CONFLICT CRIMINOLOGY
"History without sociology is like hard work with the brains taken out, and sociology without history is like brains with the hard work taken out." (Raymond Michalowski)

    Conflict criminology is best understood by reference to the various domain and background assumptions behind the various traditions (Gouldner 1970).  All conflict theorists have in common a conflict view of society, that is, that society is held together, not by consensus, but by competition and conflict between incompatible values and interests.  One implication of this idea is that people with less power are more likely to be defined and processed as deviants and criminals.  We'll see why in a minute, but it is important to realize there's a variety of conflict theories that can be classified in various ways.  Although some would argue it's unimportant how conflict theories can be classified, for learning purposes, this lecture classifies them by their affinity, or closeness, to the ideas of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920), and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), three of perhaps the greatest dead sociologists.  It was Marx (1867) who said "There must be something rotten in the very core of a social system which increases its wealth without diminishing its misery, and increases in crime even more than its numbers."

THE MARXIST TRADITION

    Regardless of whether it's called "radical", "new", "materialist", "dialectical", "socialist", "critical", or "conflict" criminology, there is a fundamental if not partial adherence to Marxism (Garofalo, 1978; Bernard, 1981; Bohm, 1982; Hawkins, 1987).  While in the popular imagination, Marxism is associated with communism, Marxism as a scientific tradition is best distinguished by a particular ontology (view of human nature) and epistemology (way of knowing). The various adherents can then be distinguished by methodology and models. The closer one gets to models of society and crime, the more theoretical differentiation can be made.

    Marx held to an ontology of homo faber, not homo sapiens (Engels, 1845). Quinney (1965) elucidates this conception best as the idea of human nature being essentially unfinished and constantly realizing its potential. Explanations of crime based on socialization experiences, normative structures, and cultural demands are therefore incompatible with Marxism because humans are never completely socialized, claim higher loyalties than societal norms, and are culture-builders not culture-products. This ontology, like Rousseau's conception of native goodness, is a rejection of both classical (free will) and positive (determinism) traditions. It's also part of the deep structure of romantic thought in Western philosophy (Gouldner 1970).

    Marxian epistemology is realism, not the philosophical kind like Plato, but the skepticism or disenchantment of the legal realism tradition that exists in jurisprudence. It's a mature coming to grips with the facts of constant change and the inevitable loss of idealism.  Think of it at a kind of skepticism, if you will.  In many ways, it's the basis of the idea that nothing is morally neutral, that people retain the right to critique, expose, pass judgment, and demystify (Quinney 1974).  Critique for the sake of critique is important to followers of Marx.

    The methodology of Marxism is dialectical historical materialism. Hegel was the idealist philosopher who first popularized this method, and it is sometimes said Marx turned Hegel on his head. Hegel was interested in looking forward to a progressive future when thesis and antithesis would result in synthesis.  Turning Hegel on his head means that the starting point for Marxian analysis involves looking backward, and tracing the centuries-old conflict between the group that produces the means of material survival and the group that lives off that production (Chambliss 1976; Reiman & Headlee 1981). This methodology attempts to discover the total, fundamental, and indispensable source of conflict -- economic relations. Such economic reductionism is at the heart of the Marxian tradition. The invention of capitalism is often taken as a starting point in Marxism because capitalism is believed to be inherently contradictory, and the point in history where the forces of production (equipment, technology) increased while the relations of production (means of distributing produced goods) remained fixed (Marx 1859).

    Lastly, the evolving, non-organic whole model of society and criminal behavior in the Marxian tradition is utopian and revolutionary. Social institutions such as laws and the state as well as ideologies are only reflections of economic realities. Because the surplus population created by an increasingly efficient capitalism is seen as a threat, the economically powerful use the laws and state to protect their interests.  Economic powerlessness translates into political powerlessness.  In response to the expropriation of their labor and the exploitation of their potential in commercialized relationships, criminals come to recognize their true objective interests and engage in protorevolutionary action to bring about the end of capitalism and the start of socialist or guaranteed freedom from want and misery. Marxist scholarship is strongly committed to age-old as well as new, as-yet-undiscovered humanistic values (Kramer 1985), keenly aware of the dangers of having ideas co-opted by other reformists (Platt 1974), and thoroughly partisan inasmuch as theorizing is intended to bring about the politicization of criminals who have not yet recognized their rightful place in history (Quinney 1977). Treating criminals as protorevolutionaries is sometimes called the primitive rebellion thesis.  Here's what Marx (1867) said about criminals on page 734 of Volume One of Capital:

Conflict Criminology in the Marxist Tradition

    There are many interpretations about what Marx said or meant.  The two-class model of social stratification, while still popular as an explanation of fiscal crisis (O'Connor 1973), is today seen as a form of vulgar Marxism (Poulantzas 1969). Similarly, only instrumental Marxism views law as a tool of the ruling class (Chambliss 1989). Structural Marxism denies deliberate intention to the ruling class and believes it rules by ideas (Althusser 1966) or conspiracies (Mills 1956).  The Frankfurt School (Jay 1973) incorporated Freudian psychoanalysis into Marxism. In addition, neo-Marxism (Friedrichs 1980) makes use of the fact that Marx implied most criminals were lumpenproletariat who could not be counted on for revolutionary purposes.

    Bonger (1916), a traditional Marxist, saw capitalism as breeding social irresponsibility. The dialectical interplay between capitalist business cycles and crime rates was his focus. Using a two-class model, Bonger saw conflict as likely to continue indefinitely because capitalism creates a climate of motivation for crime. Offenders are motivated by self- rather than social interests.  Criminologists today regard Bonger's ideas as too psychological.

    Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) took a broader historical focus to examine imprisonment rates and the fluctuations of capitalism.  It is indeed both a historical and statistical fact that imprisonment rates vary in synch with the booms and busts of capitalism, adding some element of truth to the surplus labor hypothesis.  Marxist penology (Adamson 1984) pays little attention to the abolishment of crime, but very definitely wants to abolish prisons. Rehabilitation of prisoners is rejected as a strategy because it would only serve bourgeois interests (Scull 1977).  Almost all criminologists today regard the Marxian focus on prisons as appropriate, and prison and punishment studies is where you'll find most Marxist scholarship.

    Gordon's (1971) theory sees crime as a rational response to the political and economic structure of institutions. He claims that what are traditionally viewed as noneconomic goals (status, respect) are tied to chances for material survival. Taking an instrumentalist view of the State, he argues that token enforcement of upperworld crime, a major concern of conflict criminology (Pearce 1976), is explained by protection of power and profits, and more violent street crime is explained by protection of self from greater risk of arrest and incarceration.  Almost all criminologists today regard the Marxian focus on upperworld (white collar, corporate, state) crime to be an appropriate application of Marxism. 

    Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973) had substantial impact with their call for a "new criminology." Their revisionist account of criminology even made Durkheim out to be a radical. They were strongly committed to a non-atomistic view of humans, instrumental as well as expressive rationality, a dialectic of resistance and control, and the elimination of all crime. They were dedicated to decriminalization of lifestyle diversity, and claimed that micro-processes of interaction are conditioned by macro-structures, particularly the social totality, or political economy. Their points gave rise to what might be called social psychological or marginalization theories of Marxism, starting with ideas that mode of production determines mode of self-formation (Michalowski & Bolander 1976; Michalowski 1985), gender differences (Balkan, Berger, & Schmidt 1980; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1983; Messerschmidt 1986), peer group formations (Greenberg 1977; Schwendinger & Schwendinger 1985), and opportunities for social bonding (Colvin & Pauly 1983). Certain offshoots of labeling theory, such as controlology (Ditton 1979) and amplification theory (Cohen 1980) were inspired by new criminology insights.  Many criminologists like this approach because it allows the study of micro-structure (how the ruling class uses covert discrimination by look and gesture) as well as macro-structure (how the ruling class lobbies the legislature for tougher laws).

    Chambliss (1975) formulated a theory of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement based on ideas that law expands as class gaps widen and both crime and crime control divert attention from real economic problems. His theory, elaborated in Chambliss & Seidman (1982) and to some extent encapsulated in Reiman (1984), presents a picture of confused humans pretending to think in terms of living law while the logic of capitalism curtails any new institution-building. The view is one of the State presenting images and ideologies that function as bread and circuses for the population.  Erikson (1966) had a similar idea in Wayward Puritans when he said societies only really debate their norms and values through celebrity cases of some notoriety.  In any event, the net result of anything like this is that the status quo is constantly maintained, and only laws that protect the system as a whole are passed.  Within criminology, most of these ideas are referred to as behavior of law studies, or sometimes as a form of structuralist or constitutive criminology (Krisberg 1975; Pepinsky 1976; Platt 1977).

    Spitzer (1975) focuses upon surplus populations created by capitalism. Skid-row alcoholics and others who do not pose a threat to the system are called social junk. Dangerous acts and people who do pose a threat are called social dynamite. The contradiction is that the more capitalists try to control these populations, the more exposed becomes the fiscal crisis. Social dynamite are seen as protorevolutionary.  Spitzer's analysis has led to a variety of loosely-connected studies on the safety net of capitalism, including welfare and mental health reforms (Liska 1992).  Sometimes, you'll see Marxist criminologists study the medicalization of deviance, which takes them into such topics as the insanity defense and so forth.

    Quinney's writings (1974; 1977) tend to center upon the notion of class fragmentation, or how the ruling class gets the lower classes to fight amongst themselves.  Quinney is critical of the increasing efficiency of repression. Increased repression brings increased resistance. Repression also results in manipulation of consciousness, another of Quinney's (1974) main concerns. Resistance can also be accommodating, a concept Quinney (1977) uses to argue that all working class crime is more-or-less conscious rebellion. Politicization of prisoners will pave the way for a crime-free socialist future.  Pepinsky & Quinney (1991) have recently suggested that new ideas, like peacemaking, and religious or moral thought, may bring about desired change.

THE WEBERIAN TRADITION

    Weber held to an ontology of homo sociologicus (Rheinstein 1954) where humans are seen as benevolent and brotherly. Flesh and blood (realpolitik) individuals are both actors and agents of society. They pursue a variety of ends, not always in a rational manner. The most important of these ends is the power to affect decisions of authorities. Norms and values are internalized to the extent that authorities have legitimacy. Legitimacy can be obtained by personal charisma, an appeal to past tradition, or by what Weber (1964) considered the most important, rational-legal authority, appeal to value systems or practical consequences. He believed bureaucracy to be the finest example of rational-legal authority. The Weberian tradition squarely implicates authority structures and how they act in socialization and social control processes.

    Weberian epistemology is neo-Kantianism, defined as the use of a priori categories to make sense of the multiplicity of matter leaving behind only the residual explanation of spirit. This is illustrated by Weber's way of writing in which he retains ideas "in solution" until fully matured. As a formal model-builder, Weber attempted to devise concepts that would supply regulative unity to phenomena, and these are called ideal-types. He also believed in value-free science, the exclusion of ideological or nonscientific assumptions from research. Facts should not speak for themselves. Ideal types should provide a basis for interpretation.

    Ideal-type methodology involves being completely holistic with respect to examining every phenomenon, even anomalies, that bear on the subject at hand. In fact, Weber's central questions concerned anomalies, why one form of social organization would develop here and not there. Rigidly historical and comparative, Weber attempted to develop ideal-types that were abstracted from different contexts to get at the essential elements of a concept. This often involved highly particularistic analyses followed by probabilistic statements about the tendencies of human action. Weber was no determinist. He did not look for universal laws. He was interested in finding the historical or situational contingencies for the origins of conflict, power, and success.

    Weber's model of society and its implications for criminal behavior is pluralistic and pessimistic. Societies develop in episodic ways conditioned by historically contingent circumstances, the most important of these being inward- or outward-worldly orientation. To be sure, Weber (1964) held structuralist ideas about political and economic stratification, distinguishing between class, party, and status, the last being most strongly related to perception of life-chances. Conflict is not limited, however, to these structural features, as humans also fight over ideas and values. This focus opens the door to socialization and motivational explanations based on resistance to the iron cage of rationalization, the master trend where every area of life becomes subject to calculation and administration. His emphasis on the behavior of authorities makes struggle over political, especially legislative, power (to improve the life chances of one's status group) his central contribution to conflict criminology.  Weber's approach is pessimistic in the sense that capitalism can only try to remain flexible in face of the permanence of conflict and its tendency to become routinized.

Conflict Criminology in the Weberian Tradition

    Although consensus theorists at heart, Shaw and McKay's (1942) work has some affinity with Weber's ideas, as others have pointed out (Meier 1977). Another group of look-alikes would be the elite theories of Veblen (1934) and Mills (1956). Elite theorists tend to analyze the struggles between authorities as these impact on the maintenance of authority-subject relations. 

    Gerth and Mills (1953) take a Weberian approach that ties not only motivation but character development to symbol manipulation by authorities at the institutional level of society (polity, economy, religion, military, and kinship). People are seen as adding and dropping roles in response to increasing compartmentalization of life. Weber (1930) had much to say about personality characteristics, and one can easily find more clinical treatment of his Protestant Ethic idea (Mirels & Garrett 1971).

    Dahrendorf (1959) presents a theory of interest group formation which is quite consistent with the Weberian tradition. His approach relies on concepts such as "quasi-groups" and "imperatively coordinated associations" (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 167 & 173). The former concept describes a fragmented and multidimensional stratification system, and the latter describes if and when classes would form. Dahrendorf uses Weber's concepts of power and authority to state the conditions when interest groups form. These include sharing a culture and the requirement of a liberal State. Conflict is inevitable given competing interests and occurs systematically in the struggle to obtain the prize of State power. Norms are simply reflections of these power struggles, not of consensus (Dahrendorf 1958b). Mobility systems de-intensify conflict, and the absence of conflict is due to effective coercion. 

    Turk's (1966) theory of criminalization is an account of how people are conditioned into roles of domination and deference and capable of more-or-less conscious disagreement with laws or the way they are enforced. Turk's focus is on realistic conflict with moves and tactics increasing chances for success. Conflict between authorities and subjects leads to the opening up and closing off of probabilities for success, and in a later work (Turk 1969) examines the anomalous category of mental disorder as a substitute for criminality. He adds the concept of sophistication to his theory which increases conflict when either subject or authority is less sophisticated. Criminalization is explained by a pluralist conflict model of statuses and norms rather than class (Turk 1977).  These ideas are similar to the notion of status contests or stigma contests in labeling theory.

    The sociologist Collins (1975) offered a Weberian theory of social organization. People are seen as preferring to give rather than receive orders, with prestige being their main interest, and conflict is inherent in competition for scarce resources. Collins makes use of game theory, especially zero-sum, negotiated, and compliant relationship games. A pluralist, non-utopian model of society is presented which is based on factional fights between occupational, educational, and political groups. The analysis of ideology and symbol manipulation is similar to Weber's conception of worldly outlook. Rational-legal authority is analyzed in terms of ritual, which stabilizes conflict, but at the individual level, people tire from receiving too many orders, and credential inflation results (Collins 1979). Cosmopolitan outlooks are assumed and everyone is treated as belonging to a large-scale, bureaucratic organization.

    The Weberian tradition also gave rise to a number of behavior of law theories. The most well-known of such theorists is Black (1976) whose theory of social control styles is an elaboration of Weber's charismatic, traditional, coercive, and rational-legal typology. The model is one of a planned and increasingly organized society similar to Weber's with an emphasis on respectability, which explains criminal offenders as status and power seekers. Law is seen as a quantitative variable, so there can be more or less of it at different times and places.  Law can be penal, compensatory, therapeutic, or conciliatory.  One of Black's hypotheses is that penal law is greater in a direction toward less culture than more culture. Hence, the law will be used more severely against the poor and uneducated. Law is also greater where other forms of social control (like etiquette, custom, folkways, and ethics) are weak.

    Hagan's (1989) power-control theory and structural criminology focus on the fact that criminal acts as well as the defining of crime represent power relations.  People are seen as conditioned to be more-or-less risk-takers, perceiving better chances for pursuing their interests the more egalitarian the power structures they find themselves in. According to this view, juvenile delinquency is more likely to be found in homes where the parents are lenient, but sometimes also when parents are strict, for the same reason that it is the consistency in power structure which matters.

    McGarrell and Castellano (1991) provide a theory of differentiation consistent with the Weberian tradition.  Differentiation is defined as a societal condition where people are vastly different in race, ethnicity, religion, urbanization, and inequality.  Greater differentiation is associated with greater interpersonal and intergroup conflict.  The higher the level of conflict, the greater the use of criminalization as a method to deal with the conflicts.  Media accounts of this criminalization result in more fear and vicarious victimization within the population, leading to more repressive police measures to stem the fear, and a more unstable political arena in which any vocal opportunist can trigger events to enact crime policy.  This approach provides a good example of how fear of crime studies are tied in with conflict criminology.

THE SIMMELIAN TRADITION

    Simmel (1908) wrote extensively on the sources of conflict, and is a neglected founding father of sociology (Frisby 1984). Some of his approaches became part of the basic underpinning for symbolic interactionism, but he also fostered a conflict tradition unique for its idealistic tendencies and intuitive proclivities.

    Simmel held to an ontology of homo homini lupus, where people are seen as wolves to others (Wolff, 1950). Their true selves are only visible as fragments that come out in the course of group involvement, that is, when they want something from somebody.  The self is always situated, and there are as many selves as there are layers of situations or groups in society. Because the self is social, there can be no antisocial interests because this would be self-destructive. People experience feelings like love and contempt at the same time. Anytime they think they are being a loner, they are really thinking of others. These insights led Simmel to focus on group conflicts where envies, wants, and desires are expressed. Groups provide more-or-less enduring interaction and relative constancy of pattern, but they do not exhaust all there is about an individual.

    Form, rather than content, is important for Simmel (1900) who studied money and found that comparison of quite different contexts yielded a number of stable and recurring social types, such as the stranger, the enemy, the criminal, and the pauper.  Strangers, or immigrants, are often societal scapegoats. Content varies, but forms are the stable, permanent patterns of interaction. Intuitionism is used to find the inner nature of things without being distracted by sensory observation of what goes on in the contexts being drawn from. Units of analysis did not matter to Simmel as the forms of interaction open to three nation-states were the same options open to three people. He was also fascinated with numbers, providing excellent analyses of dyads and triads (Simmel 1908).

    Simmel believed that aesthetic appreciation would avoid a static picture. Everything from Simmel's perspective was dynamic. This appreciative stance is a form of phenomenology, detaching the scholar from value judgements and positions on public issues. A scholar would do well to look at the empty space in the boundaries between antagonistic social groups (Simmel, 1908, p. 18). The forms he said you would discover there are: super/sub-ordination, competition, conflict, imitation, parties, division of labor, art, fashion, ritual, and secrecy. The origin of power is skill at spontaneity, and it cannot exist without the complicity of the powerless.

    Sociation, the real object of society, is viewed as an art, a game, or play. Social groups are everywhere in (internal) conflict because no one group would exhaust one's individuality, and constantly in (external) conflict because of cross-cutting allegiances. Collins (1988, p. 123) has not so charitably called this "the grid-lock model of social conflict".  However, it's best seen as the ongoing expression of selves, and not a conception of conflict as the opposite of consensus or order. Because people deceive themselves and others every time they try to express their individuality, social structures are distinguished by their relative permissibility of lying, and society itself is a lie, a fiction (Simmel 1906) A criminal offender is one who has given up too much integrity and lost their real self, or on the contrary, one who is seeking too much individuality or anonymity; i.e., the criminal social type (Simmel 1900). 

Conflict Theories in the Simmelian Tradition

    There are few successors to Simmel's tradition.  Symbolic interactionists borrowed extensively from him, and conflict as an identity characteristic is most closely associated with identity theory (Strauss 1959; McCall & Simmons 1978), social worlds analysis (Shibutani 1962; Unruh 1980), labeling theory, and role theory (Biddle & Thomas 1966). Theories, in particular, that make use of the model of society as play and game and/or crime as fun tend to be consistent with the Simmelian tradition.

    Sellin's (1938) culture conflict theory falls in the Simmelian tradition because of an emphasis on group codes or rules for behavior in certain situations. While not the first to extract the concept of culture conflict from Simmel's interests in assimilation and ethnicity, Sellin (1938) differed from Wirth's (1931) emphases on psychological reactions and vision of a homogeneous, crime-free future by saying that conflicting cultural norms just simply give more occasion for crime and deviance to occur. This was largely a sociological re-expression of the Simmelian idea that society exists as a fiction in people's minds. Sellin's key concept was conduct norms, certain rules about what a person is supposed to do if they find, for example, their wife in bed with another man. While a few less modern societies might specify exactly what you're supposed to do (kill your cheating wife and the other guy), more modern societies offer less by way of guidance.  This state of confusion and contradiction is what causes crime in modern societies.

    Coser (1956), a functionalist, also comes close to Simmel's position. Several of Coser's propositions have to do with the intensity of conflict which is increased when conflict is suppressed, when fighting is on behalf of a group, and when parties are in close proximity. Closeness begats intensity because that is when love and hate occur together, clearly a Simmelian insight. Other propositions have to do with constructing social forms, like stability and rigidity, which are drawn from comparing cross-cutting group memberships. Nonrealistic conflict is found to have safety-valve functions. Coser's necessity for hierarchy is drawn from a need to manage group size and complexity. The image of the ever-present and always-emerging offender is also consistent with the ideas of Simmel, except that Coser follows a more "crime is functional" approach.

    Vold's (1958) group conflict theory consists of the idea that continually competing interest groups come into conflict with one another, and those that oppose the interests of dominant groups are more likely to violate the law.  Groups are continuously being formed and at risk of displacement by other groups. Group contact is described as the expression of force-ratios between dominant and minority interests. Law formalizes these ratios as positions of strength to positions of weakness. Society is seen in uneasy equilibrium. Vold model of offending is "minority group behavior out of sympathy with and in more or less direct opposition to dominant groups" (Vold 1958, p. 211). Crime is always in defense of one's group interests, and Bernard (Vold & Bernard, 1986) presents a unified conflict theory of crime, unified because it attempts to explain law as well as behavior. It substitutes vicariously learned reinforcement schedules for person-to-person interaction, and explaining law enforcement by the principle of least effort.

    Quinney (1969; 1970) provided important group conflict ideas. His social reality of crime model (Quinney 1970) builds on Simmel's psychic nature of society. The social types of "villain", "hero", and "anti-hero" are analyzed in terms of "reactive norms" and rules on spontaneity. Segments or socio-demographic aggregates are seen as providing conflicting normative systems, behavioral learning opportunities, and self-conceptions. Crime is explained by the conceptual conflict inherent in these competing definitions of behavior, realities, and self. The powerless will have their definitions labeled criminal by agents of social control, and law enforcement is seen as an extension of law enactment. The image is of an innocent offender who happens to conform too much to the belief system of the "wrong" social group. This is exactly the thrust behind Simmel's lament that secrecy, strangeness, marginality, and deceit were likely to be our collective fate.

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Last updated: Nov 30, 2006
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