SECURITIZATION: WHAT MAKES SOMETHING A SECURITY THREAT
"Without security, equality could not last a day" (Jeremy Bentham)

    All sorts of questions might be asked about the word security.  What does it mean to be secure?  Who is doing the securing?  Who or what is being secured?  Dictionary definitions are of no help.  Dictionaries tell us that security involves something (anything) which promotes safety or protection.  But, from what?  And, toward what end?  Perhaps security exists on a spectrum, from some nominal, taken-for-granted level to some extreme, high-alert level.  Perhaps it is a process (more or less of it exists), and further, perhaps it is normative (good and bad forms of it exist).  When security is considered a process that is subject to moral evaluation, this is the idea or concept we call SECURITIZATION.

    Securitization, as a concept, originated from the writing of Ole Wæver (1995), a Danish professor of the Copenhagen School of international relations which is part of the constructivist perspective in social science, which holds that some things don't really exist in hardened, material reality, but only exist as social constructs in peoples' minds because people tacitly agree to act as if something existed.  Although Wæver wrote and co-wrote more later, e.g., Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998), a classic piece which does a good job explaining the constructivist perspective is Wendt (1992) for which Harvard Univ. provides an excerpt.  Most constructivists analyze international relations by looking at things like goals, threats, fears, cultures, or identities -- in short, the kinds of things which exist subjectively in peoples' minds.  Another good read on the subject is the edited volume by Katzenstein (1996), which uses constructivist critique, like McSweeney (1999) to attack notions of national security and national interest as being too closely based on a state-centric approach.  Most constructivists hold that anybody can put the adjective "national" in front of something for rhetorical purposes, and government officials often do so for rallying people behind some foreign policy.  Constructivists hold that state interests are not "discovered" but constructed.  National security policy is not "formulated" by rational actors, but is instead shaped by contested identities and other social factors such as the norms and cultures within a society.  Balzacq (2005) has called these three things (identities, norms, and cultures) the "three faces" of securitization (agency, audience, and context).  Let's give them some definitions, as follows:

    It may be important to note that, within any society, not all norms involve moral evaluation (good or bad).  Most "mainstream" constructivists say they are only interested in two types of norms: (1) regulatory (written standards of appropriate behavior); and (2) constitutive (those that help define actors' identities).  This may be sociological hair-splitting, but there are many types of norms besides these ones, according to sociology, and what constructivists are after might be the kinds of things based on rites or rituals long since forgotten.  Sooner or later, one has to examine the more evaluative norms that exist within the concepts of structure and culture (deviance within the structure concept and "deeper" phenomena like values, or what people regard as important, within the culture concept).  One can be sympathetic to the constructivist project all they want as it opens up new vistas and theoretical insights, but (and this is an important "but") constructivists often overlook the importance of things such as "veridicality" which in social psychology refers to a subject's correct perception of an object (security is one such object, and if it only exists subjectively, then there's little to study).  This may be a little complicated, but here goes anyway.  Psychology tells us that people normally assess the "truthfulness" or "correctness" of something via social comparison processes and attribution processes.  Both processes are subject to error and bias, and indeed, there may be some perception of "agency," empowerment, or enlightenment in overcoming such error and bias, but quite often, especially when dealing with rational, realpolitik phenomena, structures are there for a reason, stereotypes may be more or less spot on, and identities may be exited, passed, or absorbed by regularized consensus-based processes in a society (e.g., assimilation).  The work of Keohane and Nye (2000) illustrates processes whereby personality traits like empathy, doing one's duty, and desire for integration are more often triggered by a security crisis than a quest for more culture or identity.  In other words, what Sherif (1966) called "super-ordinate goals" often emerge out of seemingly trivial conflicts, resulting in "hardened" personalities as well as states.  

    The field of cross-cultural psychology may offer additional insights.  The work of Walter Stephan (2000) is particularly significant since he is the developer of integrated threat theory.  This theory is intended to explain prejudice, but easily enough, any enmity toward a common enemy can substitute for the dependent variable.  According to the theory, four types of threat (realistic, symbolic, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes) cause prejudice, and these threats are thought to be caused beforehand by the amount and quality of intergroup contact.  The integrated threat model (Stephan, Stephan & Gudykunst 1999) can be diagrammed below:

Intergroup Knowledge and Contact

====>

 Realistic threats

====>

Prejudice

====>

Behavior
Symbolic threats
Intergroup anxiety
Negative stereotyping

     In the above diagram, we should be primarily concerned about the intervening variables, the threats.  Realistic threats are perceived threats to the welfare of a group or its members according to knowledgeable assessment of security needs.  Symbolic threats are associated with values, beliefs, attitudes, and the worldview of a group (in short, irrational fears).  Intergroup anxiety is a type of threat which arises in response to fears of diminished self-concept and negative evaluations by others (possible identity threats).  Negative stereotyping refers to elements of threats which anticipate negative events or interactions (again, more fears).  It appears that the kinds of irrational threats that constructivists focus upon only make up a fraction of the threat universe, and even the symbolic ones are still affected in some way by knowledge.  It may be noted that the integrated threat model has enjoyed substantial empirical support in the academic literature (Landis et. al. 2004).

    A constructivist approach, however, has both advantages and disadvantages.  The main advantage is it opens up new vistas for ways of seeing things, particularly new types of fear-driven and anxiety-laden threats.  The main disadvantages include downplaying of the importance of realistic threats, casting negativity over any attempts at generalizing, and seeing culture conflict where integration is the pattern.  However, constructivism forces us to not only consider a wider variety of threats, but gives us ways to better understand the concept of securitization.  The very concept of securitization, along these lines, refers to a process whereby actors compete, fairly or unfairly, good or bad, for the right to "declare" something a threat.  This notion bears remarkable similarity to the "medicalization of deviance" model (Conrad & Schneider 1992) from the sociology of social problems, and for that reason, let's examine that model in full.  It is a five-stage, sequential model, which can be portrayed as follows, with the security equivalents added for clarification:

    This model of SECURITIZATION is as good as any other.  It describes the process of real-life actors "interpreting" and "re-interpreting" things so that some audience becomes convinced, in a particular context, that what was once a non-security problem must now become a security problem.  In many ways, it makes sense to borrow from the sociology discipline in this regard since all security problems can be seen in some sense as social problems and/or instances of deviance from some norm.  Granted, the model doesn't help explain which came first -- the deviance or the fear -- and the matter of cultural baggage is left open (past history of "declared" yet unresolved problems), but the model does pinpoint some discrete stages in an otherwise amorphous process.            

HIGH AND LOW SECURITY THREATS

    As Hough (2004) points out, there is the "high" politics of state security (those things which ordinarily require military action) and the "low" politics of health, welfare, and other issues (which don't ordinarily require military action).  Other than describing variable access to the ear of a Commander in Chief, this distinction is mostly a matter of relative prestige among and between policymakers and policy advisors.  Far more useful may be the distinction Hough (2004) makes between "wideners" and "deepeners" because this distinction assumes the broadened conception of security that the Copenhagen School or constructivists take for granted.  Not all security threats are military threats.  Not all security threats involve nation-states.  Not all security threats are political or ideological, as with "haves" exploiting the "have-nots."  Indeed, more people have been killed in human history by things which don't involve nation-states or military conflicts at all.  It may seem unorthodox to think of security this way, but it's exactly how the "wideners" of the Copenhagen School see it -- hurricanes and earthquakes as being pretty much a threat in the same sense as a military attack.  A typical "widener" definition of a security threat is as follows:

A "Widened" Constructivist Definition of a Security Threat
     "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state; or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within a state." (Ullman 1983: 133)

    It may be noted that there are "traditionalists" who oppose this widening of what constitutes a security threat.  Walt (1991: 212), for example, who has been discussed previously, holds to a state-centric and militaristic definition whereby a "threat" constitutes anything  "that makes the use of force more likely ... in ways that make states adopt preparations for war."  Sadly for the traditionalists, they are somewhat of a minority nowadays, although their cry is often heard that the field of security studies ought to go back to basics and focus upon high politics.  Traditionalists often say they miss the Cold War, and that it is not really over anyway, but the constructivist counterargument is just as arguable since it rests upon imaginary benefits that a peace dividend might supply.  Speaking of that, let's examine the question of whether a peace dividend really exists or not, as the following excerpt guides us:

Peace Dividend: Slogan or Reality?
     One would have to be an accomplished econometrician to factor in the unavoidable recession effect that societies typically go through after a major conflict, but the idea of a peace dividend refers to a presumed economic benefit and boost in social programs as budgets for defense spending are redirected during post-conflict eras.  Some nations, particularly Russia and those in Western Europe, have indeed experienced a peace dividend, but some would say as "free riders" on the backs of American defense spending (which has never gone down since the end of the Cold War).  The U.S. has never experienced a post-Cold War peace dividend since it has had to deal with scattered conflicts, a war on terrorism, and global insurgencies.  Essentially, the whole world enjoys a "free ride" because of U.S. efforts.  Most research (see IMF Report on The Elusive Peace Dividend) also suggests that even while fighting such conflicts, the rise in American GDP is such that it offsets any undermining of economic performance due to not having a peace dividend. 

    It's not exactly clear when the constructivist definition of a security threat became ascendant.  Ullman's (1983) article was an early contributor, as was Matthews' (1989) article on ozone depletion and global warming, but so were dozens of other books or articles all entitled along the lines of "Redefining Security."  It is only clear that by the late 1990s, the field had accepted a conventional wisdom that threats and vulnerabilities can arise in non-military contexts, or as Buzan et. al. (1998: 5) put it: "as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who generates endorsement of emergency measures."  Exactly what constitutes an "existential threat" is anyone's guess.  Hard threats exist that need little "redefining."             

    Beyond the "wideners," the 1990s saw contributions by the "deepeners" who advocated a notion of human security (Falk 1995).  This notion directly attacks the line that only the state can be a securitizing actor.  Security is a human condition, and (as it is argued) the people, not their elites, should be the ones who say when their insecurities are being addressed.  In what is now a popular buzzword, "human security" holds that a people-centered view of security is necessary for global stability.  The United Nations embraces this view in the form of their United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the largest multilateral source of development assistance in the world (and often criticized for its sloppy financial record-keeping).  The basic idea of human security is sound.  Today's security threats do go beyond defense threats and include poverty, economic inequality, diseases, human rights abuses, environmental pollution, and natural disasters.  However, achieving goals like "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all people may be over-idealistic, absent good ideas for things like global safety nets.  The human security agenda may be nothing more than a way for activists to champion some particular cause in some particular context.  Advocates have some rather "deep" ideas about the problem are presented below:

"Deep" Constructivist Definitions of Security Threats

  • On terrorism -- people-centered interventions are needed to address underlying problems, get at the root causes, and make concessions as to rebuilding infrastructure, redirecting investment, and setting up programs for inclusion and reconciliation

  • On disease -- empower public-private partnerships and other global actors to take a role in prevention, education, and communication, eliminating states from the picture who only want to protect their economies and tourism industry

  • On global warming -- climate changes are a "threat multiplier" and activism is needed to change peoples' attitudes from apathy into action

  • On poverty --  address gender asymmetries in livelihoods and support microcredit initiatives to enable poor people to participate in economic activity

  • On natural disasters -- utilize more humanitarian intervention, even if it violates principles of state sovereignty

    Human security, with its "deep" approaches to the root sources of threats, obviously has more meaning in a local rather than global context.  For instance, opinion polls of Europeans by the EU show that most Europeans feel more frightened by organized crime and the possibility of nuclear power plant accidents than terrorism.  U.S. policy officials involved in the war on terror should not be surprised when other nations (in other contexts) don't seem to "get it" in the same way the U.S. does.  Those who agree that terrorism ought to, indeed, be a priority threat for all nations often charitably use the word "strategic" to describe such prioritization, but the question remains -- is that enough?  In all fairness, human security is an emerging field and has yet to develop ways to prioritize threats.  What we urgently need are paradigms which allow us to prioritize threats now.

IN DEFENSE OF REALISM

    Those who defend the traditional nation-state approach to security are called realists.  It is important to understand their position and (shall we say) "old-fashioned" way of declaring something a security threat.  Using the word "strategic" is old-fashioned in this sense, and it references not just the need for a military definition (security studies being the study of the threat, use, and control of military force), but the idea that a threat is something which threatens national security interests.  The conceptual merger of "national interest" and "national security" took place in the 1940s (when realists dominated).  Famous people like Lippmann (1943) and Morgenthau (1972) -- (some claim that Morgenthau is the "father of international relations") -- spoke for the realist position by saying the following:

Realist Positions on Security Threats
     "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war." (Lippmann 1943: 32)
     "The statesman must think in terms of national interest, conceived as power...There is no fixed formula, no technical problem to solve...only power among other nations and the preservation of sovereignty as the foremost concerns in international affairs. The nation state is the predominant source of an individual's moral and legal valuations and the ultimate point of reference for his secular loyalties." (Morgenthau, paraphrased, but mostly 1972: 32)

    Historically, it is a very old idea that a state should protect its citizens from threats, and in return, citizens should provide their loyalty.  You may know this idea as a popular version of what is called the SOCIAL CONTRACT, an idea in political philosophy which can be traced to the 1651 book, Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes.  Realists tend to think anarchy would result if this contract were violated, but realists have had many defectors from this position.  For example, what is sometimes called the Welsh school of critical security studies, and best represented by Booth (1991: 539), holds that "security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin; both are needed, in both theory and practice, to create stable security."  By comparison, the Copenhagen school, best exemplified by Buzan et.al. (1998) strictly rejects the idea of nation-state military solutions for almost any threat.  As discussed in a previous lecture on the Academic Field of Security Studies, many realists today have formed, or are forming, their own departments of "war studies" or "strategic studies."  The neorealist Mearsheimer (1995) holds that the only proper subject matter of security studies ought to be the safeguarding of "core values" that a state holds dear.  The neorealist Walt (1991) regards the proper subject matter as anything which leads a nation to prepare for war.

    Not all realists hold hard-line views.  Some have a more widened orientation. Nye's (2004) "soft power" approach, for example, represents a kind of mix between realist and constructivist (widened) views.  Soft power denotes the non-military dimensions of state power, particularly the kind rooted in information technology, or "keeping on top" of the Internet-driven information age.  Some countries, like Canada, for example, have embraced a different constructivist (deepened) view, and set for themselves such goals as to become the world's leader in land mine removal and reform of the U.N.  These are laudable goals, and they appear to be catching on.  The Human Security Network, an influential organization, is a Canadian initiative that now includes at least ten other states.  Land mines are indeed a serious global problem.  EVERY 22 minutes, a land mine goes off someplace on earth [see YouTube Video of U.N. Land Mine Removal Commercial].

NATIONAL SECURITY AND VITAL INTERESTS

    The following is presented as a mini-primer on what, from a traditionalist viewpoint, constitutes a national security threat. A number of items fall under the definitional umbrella of national security, but what exactly does the term mean?  The U.N. Charter defines it as "safety from foreign coercion or intimidation."  The Federalist Papers define it as "safety from a variety of circumstances and protection of freedom-loving people everywhere."  The Constitution mentions it within the international law of maritime regulation and law of the sea.  History is replete with precedents, both legal and otherwise, where the scope of America's definition of national security has evolved over the years.  For better understanding, let's start with the classic statement of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) where President James Monroe said:

THE MONROE DOCTRINE
"It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. The movements in this hemisphere are intimately connected. We owe it to the world to declare that we should consider any attempt to extend injurious systems to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 

    While true under the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. lays claim to all the Western Hemisphere, it is further true the U.S. regards its security tied to world peace as a whole. The classic statement of this is the Truman Doctrine (1947), which created a policy of containment when President Truman asked Congress to fund Turkey and Greece in their fight against communist insurgents:

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
"Although the UN plays a leading part in making lasting freedom possible, the US shall not realize its objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people everywhere to maintain their free institutions against aggressive movements. Totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, directly or indirectly, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the US."

   Numerous other treaties and alliances spell out the nature and character of American national security.  Regional treaties, like NATO, SEATO, and CTO, consider an attack against one to be an attack against all, and it was SEATO that provided the basis for unilateral "police action" in Vietnam, as well as NATO and CTO which provided the basis for multinational force against Yugoslavia and Iraq. Territorial-based notions of national security tend to operate under a "domino theory" that if one country falls, neighboring countries will be next.  Modern versions of domino theory exist involving esoteric fields like geostrategic economics, which takes into consideration airspace, water currents, meteorological uniqueness, as well as a number of other globalization factors.

    Another approach to national security relies upon claims to indispensable resources, "strategic resources," or vital interests, in other words. It is historically apparent that what America considers "vital" is any resource, mineral or otherwise, for which shortage has military or economic implications.  These ideas are often expressed in the Inaugural Addresses of incoming Presidents, such as with Kennedy (1961) and Carter (1980):

THE KENNEDY DOCTRINE
"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."

THE CARTER DOCTRINE
"The overwhelming dependence of Western nations on vital oil supplies from the Middle East, and the pressures of change in many nations of the developing world constitute a threat to global peace, to East-West relations, and to regional stability and to the flow of oil."

    More recent Presidents have expressed their own doctrines. President Reagan, for example, declared the support of backing anti-guerrilla forces throughout the world, President Clinton advocated a doctrine of isolating enemies from participation in the world community, and President Bush advocated a number of doctrines.

THE BUSH DOCTRINES  
   PREEMPTIVE PREVENTION:  The idea that the best defense is a good offense, or under international law, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or a preemptive war that arises when one side decides there is a very great risk its adversary will attack within days or hours, and that the attack will cripple its ability to defend itself or retaliate.
   SPREADING DEMOCRACY: The idea that the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny and dictatorships in every nation and culture.
   NON-NEUTRALITY:  The idea that today's terrorists threaten all nation-states as well as international justice, and no neutrality can be permitted (you are either with us or against us); that states who support or host terrorists are the de facto enemy of the United States and can face American military action. 

    It's far too easy to dismiss these doctrines as rhetoric or excuses for American imperialism or exceptionalism.  Parts of the Bush Doctrine go back to the Truman and Kennedy Doctrine (spreading democracy and freedom), and other parts (preemptive prevention) are established parts of international law.  There are fundamental values and ideals at stake.  Although the doctrines come from the guiding vision of chief executives along with their elites, in a very real sense, what matters most are the principles espoused, and the actions carried out in the name of principle.  The hard part is figuring out a principled response to the degree of threat, which might be referred to as national security dangers.  For classification purposes, such dangers can be grouped as follows:

A Rank Order of National Security Dangers
Annihilation

destroying whole societies
Devastation mass destruction or death
Domination controlling whole populations
Subversion making weak or corrupt
Intimidation aggressive movements 
Deprivation forcing industrial shortages
Manipulation lowering morale
Humiliation embarrassing leaders
Aggravation differences of opinion

    No one would seriously advocate military attack in retaliation for embarrassment or differences of opinion.  However, no one wants to wait stoically for annihilation while weapons of mass destruction are stockpiled.  Each nation is expected to use negotiation via its diplomacy system to prevent aggravations, humiliations, and grievances from escalating, but only democracies tend to honor this system, and a variety of other political systems ignore it.  Some nations tend to take action in the face of humiliation; and other nations are notorious for acting militarily on differences of opinion.  There is also the matter of dissuasion (a subtype of deterrence) which applies when there is one remaining superpower in the world (a hyperpower).  Additional burdens and responsibilities befall such a power.  The current US-UN regime (if it could be called that) is based on a preference for alliances or coalitions, but America's history of unilateral action has also displayed a reliance upon strategies of destabilization, deterrence, and dissuasion.  In real politics (realpolitik), there is an inherent connection between the notion of "threat" and the notion of "vital interest."  The following are the standard vital interests of any country, particularly the United States:

THE PRIORITIZATION PROBLEM

    Neither constructivism nor realism offer any real solutions to the prioritization problem, which in many ways can also be called a misappropriation problem.  "Putting your money where your mouth is" is the only and best way to approach the practice of prioritizing which threats are most important.  However, many security issues are not easily compartmentalized in terms of whom is the most threatened, or whom exactly benefits.  At the individual level, perceived threats may seem as real as the "life or death" threats that governments say are realistic.  Humanitarian intervention by governments may be more an act of charity than a response to a security threat.  Military threats are, of course, readily apparent most of the time.  What's needed is some way to measure what nation states allocate their money on.  As far as is known, no systematic study exists which offers such quantifiable comparisons, but Hough (2004:15) provides some glimpse with the following:

    The fact that, on average, governments spend more on health than on military is a good thing.  It appears that, on average, protecting people from disease and invasion are the two main priorities of government.  Preventing premature death appears to be the common denominator.  However, over a third of the world's health expenditures are in the private sector, and since governments are sometimes in the habit of counting these as public health expenditures, the figure for health can probably be cut back to 6%.  Nonetheless, this means that governments spend twice as much on health as on military.  Very little money is specifically allocated to other related categories, like crime control or natural disaster management.  Despite this, preventing the preventable deaths of citizens (for whatever reason) is a robust enough category to subsume the incorporation of new, emerging threats, whether they be the kinds of threats determined subjectively (as the constructivists would have it -- by those who shout the loudest) or the kinds of threats determined strategically (as the realists would have it -- by those elites who understand power).  As Krause and Williams (1996) point out, questions about what is to be secured and by whom and how are likely to continue in debates over the construction and practice of "securitization."

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Lecture Note on the Medicalization of Deviance
Complex Systems Studies and the Securitization of Terrorism (pdf)
Immigrants as a Convenient Security Threat
Is Global Poverty a Security Threat? (doc)
USAID Article on New Definitions of Security Threats
Wikipedia Entry on Human Security
Wikipedia Entry on Securitization

PRINTED RESOURCES
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Conrad, P. & Schneider, J. (1992). Deviance and medicalization. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press.
Falk, R. (1995). On humane governance: Toward a new global politics. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Hough, P. (2004). Understanding Global Security. NY: Routledge.
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Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (2000). Power and interdependence, 3e. NY: Longman. [sample excerpt]
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Stephan, W. (2000). "Intergroup relations." Pp. 333-336 in A. Kazdin (ed.) Encyclopedia of psychology. Washington DC: APA.
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Wood, J. & Shearing, C. (2006). Imagining security. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing
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