THE ACADEMIC FIELD OF GLOBAL SECURITY STUDIES
"Freedom consists of the opinion one has of one's security" (Montesquieu)

    Scholars have taken diverse approaches to establishing new disciplines.  This is especially true in the field called "security studies."  Various pockets of work have been undertaken in nearly complete isolation from one another and with little apparent regard or awareness of relevant developments in other fields.  Why is this so? And what can be done about it?  Well, Beier & Arnold (2005) advocate a "supradisciplinary" approach which will allow thinking across a range of discourses without giving rise to some interdisciplinary hybrid.  Their anti-hybrid reasoning is as follows:  interdisciplinarity means "between disciplines" with interdisciplinary construction of a new discipline implying the contributing disciplines have significant and unique things to offer, and once the new interdiscipline is constructed, the same spatial tendencies which affected the contributing disciplines now affect the new discipline, causing it to become more separate than connected.  Hybridity is, of course, only a small part of the many problems which befall scholarly disciplines, but it fairly accurately describes the problem with an interdisciplinary approach to creating a new discipline.  This essay will explicate some productive approaches to establishment of the new field of global security studies.  But first, some explanation of how college and university programs work is in order.      

    Creating a new social science discipline is no easy task.  Like with writing a dissertation, one usually looks for "cracks" or "voids" in existing fields (Dogan 1997), but there are many other issues, like what the "writing" should look like (Campbell 1998), and what the mainstream methodological techniques should be.  Ashley & Walker (1990) further point out that different "voices" need to be included (for ever-growing identity purposes), otherwise a new discipline "marketizes" and goes thru unusual growing pains, such as the urgency of placing graduates into jobs, where the discipline performs little more than a "gatekeeping" function and loses whatever academic credibility it once claimed to have.  This is not an unimportant issue, as the new field of homeland security is at risk of this also.  Criminal justice has been long snubbed by other disciplines as being too voc-tech, and similar charges have been leveled against the field of international relations for years (Cox 1981).  What saved international studies was that it resurrected an idea that the field of history used to rely on, that students must "major" if you will, in a certain geographic area. 

    It is also the case that curriculum concerns are not unimportant.  Traditionally, but not without debate, academic institutions usually handle emerging disciplines as options, tracks, concentrations, specializations, minors, or cognate fields.  "Options" and "tracks" typically refer to different ways of earning a degree, requiring slightly different amounts of credit, with little or no presumption of content differentiation.  "Concentrations" and "specializations" usually refer to a coherent set of courses (usually the same number as a minor) within a discipline, or the reference is to an interdisciplinary program "contained" or subsumed within some discipline, an example of the latter being sociology's claim over criminology as a subsumed subfield.  A "minor" is usually some coherent set of courses (at least three) which recognize or encourage expertise in an area closely related to a particular degree program.  "Cognate fields" are the same as electives, or more specifically, guided electives, referring to recommended "outside" courses in related disciplines.  While cognate fields may be defined within certain units, they are theoretically also designed to allow individualization by students based upon their particular interests.  Of course, curriculum practice and doctrine vary widely from place to place, with curricularization being more an "art" than science in higher education.

 SECURITY STUDIES OR SAFETY STUDIES?    

    There are no concise definitions.  The closest counterpart is "strategic studies."  It is an oversimplification, but the terms "strategic studies" and "security studies" can be roughly distinguished by the former being devoted to anything "forward looking" and the latter being devoted to anything "backward looking," which is to say security studies as a field is more comfortable with historical methods. This is a rather anachronistic distinction, however, but one that is frequently fallen back upon.  Other conceptions exist. The oldest security studies organization in the world, RUSI, which was founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, had an original mission to develop itself out of military science by going beyond the latter, asking questions like "What is military? How does it affect security for good and bad throughout the world?"  RUSI's contemporary mandate of global security studies includes all issues of defense and security, including terrorism and the ideologies which foster it, as well as the challenges faced from man-made or natural disasters, and the linkages between government, law enforcement, and private security sectors or industries involved in the homeland security market.  So, what happened to "growing out of military science?"  How did such a broad mandate come about?

    The answers are found in how the traditional security paradigm was "stretched" after the Cold War ended.  Before then, and for a brief time in the mid-1990s, the traditional security paradigm was realist or neorealist (Waltz 1993), based upon an anarchistic conception of each nation-state entrusting its security to a balance of power between nation-states, or in the case of neorealism, soft balancing between regimes, coalitions, and other entities.  Under these conceptions, global stability can be assumed to take care of itself while nation-states or regimes seek to optimize their own security.  It's like some kind of economic "invisible hand" theory writ large where the security of individual citizens necessarily follows from the security of larger entities.  Security in this collective sense is undoubtedly the same as protection from invasion where the meaning of "security" is the same as "protection."  When the Cold War ended and the U.S. awakened to the risk of terrorist attack, two things became apparent: (1) that the international system was far too complex and interconnected for each state or regime to continue pursuing their own security needs, which amounted to some sort of collectivist isolationist policy anyway, and it became immediately apparent that some sort of multilateral "responsibility to protect" would be needed to replace outmoded notions of security as protection; and (2) that people are subject to a wide range of menaces, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases, economic deprivation, and transnational terrorism, to name a few, which have global implications referencing the more human, subjectivist, or non-collective realm of perceptions, and further necessitating a reconceptualization of security toward such referents as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want."

    Freedom from fear is the dominant conception of security among Americans and Canadians, and it makes sense in a post-9/11 landscape.  It's basically a conception of "safety."  Indeed, there is a field called safety studies, but no one is suggesting that OSHA inspectors be put in charge of global security.  Likewise, no one is suggesting that insurance companies expand upon their notion of "safety" with particular attention to idea of a guarantee, but like a standard of insurance, where things work the way they're supposed to, there is some of this kind of thinking involved, especially in the field of homeland security.  There is, further, some connotation of predictability in global security studies, but it is not a priority consideration, perhaps because the field is ambivalent about Weber's "iron cage of rationalism."  Certainly, "safety" has broad meaning, as almost any dictionary definition would show: "safety being the state of being safe, the condition of being protected against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, psychological or other types or consequences of failure, damage, error, accidents, harm or any other event which could be considered not desirable."  A couple of obvious points can be made about safety under the new security conception.  Firstly, it's decidedly inclusive, global in scope, and reaches out to each and every person on the planet.  This is not so much because it's chic, but because the scholarly search for the true meaning of "security" is rigorously empirical, reflecting a holistic rather than anarchistic conception of protection.  In other words, it's a "bottom-up" approach.  Secondly, the field appears to be decidedly positivistic, attempting to get at the root causes of things, even though sometimes it's the consequences, or mishandling of the causes, which are the problem.  It may be argued that it is this hindsight -- the backward-looking aspect -- when combined with the forward-looking aspect (the global connotations of terms) -- which describes security studies "growing out" of military science.  To elaborate on this argument further, let's examine some specific subfields.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

    Strategic assessment more commonly goes by its DOD name "net assessment" (Rosen 1991), and is commonly associated with its principal developer, Andrew Marshall, who heads the DOD Office of Net Assessment.  However, the idea goes back to Sun Tzu's "calculations" [in the temple] and Clausewitz' "gauge" [of capacities, sympathies, and weaknesses, particularly the "center of gravity" concept].  The center of gravity concept is a key term taught in war colleges as the best place to strike a blow against an enemy for maximum effect.  It is also normally conceived of as the level of population support for a side in conflict, support being for both moral and physical reasons.  It may be important to note that the 2007 surge strategy in Iraq was successful, in part, because it calculated the center of gravity being a desire among the population for safety and security.  Such concepts often make warfare look like it is being conducted by opinion polls.  Likewise, strategic assessment in practice often involves quantitative techniques of polling, counting, estimating, weighing, and modeling (May 1986).  This quantitative emphasis has not gone without criticism, however.  Bracken (2006) writes, in Net Assessment: A Practical Guide that game theory, for example, has never really proven itself useful in net assessment, and further the practice (as practice, not an art or science, but a skill set which needs continual improvement) is not the same as systems analysis, operations research, or strategic planning.  As Biddle (2004) points out, standard measures of capability (How many troops and weapons does each side have? How good is their equipment?) are limited, and should be supplemented by holistic assessments (e.g., of strategy, tactics, morale, motivation, leadership).  Nonetheless, military balance estimates play a pivotal role in war causation, arms racing, alliance formation, conflict duration, and crisis escalation; and likewise, good analyses of deterrence, power distribution, and polarity rest upon good measures of capability.  During the Cold War heyday, national intelligence estimates (NIEs) often were little more than military balance estimates, but today, strategic assessments ought not to be confused with intelligence reports.  The major difference is that intelligence estimates are one-sided, focusing upon an enemy or potential enemy only.  Strategic assessment, by definition, always involves an analysis of the interaction of two or more security establishments both in peacetime and war.  A more Clauswitzian definition is given by Rosen (1991: 286) of strategic assessment as: "a forecast of peacetime and wartime competition between two nations or two alliances that includes the identification of enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses in comparison to the strengths and advantages of one's own side."  In retrospect, it would appear that strategic assessment has not fully grown out of intelligence analysis yet, or vice versa since neither field seems to be better than forecasting or futurology in preventing estimates or predictions which turn out terribly wrong.  To highlight this problem even more, let's look at failure in assessment and analysis. 

    Errors or miscalculations in strategic assessment are frequently the cause of failures in war.  In fact, it is often the case that, in hindsight, failures can be attributed to mistakes in strategic assessment.  Such errors include making too much out of training exercises or published military doctrines; assuming a specific use of certain weapons or units; and failure to define correctly who will be a friend and who will be a foe.  Failure to anticipate the budgetary challenges of peacetime management problems might be added to this list, as would misinterpretations of the center of gravity where, for example, it is assumed a population just wants security, but in fact, have greater desires.

    Errors and failures are common to many kinds of endeavors, but there are some similarities between the kind which can occur in intelligence analysis and global security studies.  The following list may illustrate:

    Notwithstanding what has been said so far, strategic assessment should be considered a subfield of security studies.  Toward that end, some clarification about what that subfield does is in order.  Doctrinally, there are at least six ways to do strategic assessment: (1) by forecasting 20-year trends in various military balances, particularly maritime, power-projection, and nuclear balances; (2) by estimating combat effectiveness from an analysis of what each side considers important in combat; (3) by analyzing past performance of weapons used in the context of specific conflicts; (4) by analyzing the role of perceptions and decision making in leaders and decision makers; (5) by developing newer analytic tools to examine the possible outcomes of different scenarios; and (6) by appraising existing strengths and weaknesses in light of both short-term and long-term shifts in the security environment.  The outcomes or products produced by good strategic assessment include the following:

• foreseeing potential conflicts

• predicting outcomes in given contingencies

• being alerted to developing problems

• warning of imminent danger                    

OTHER SUBFIELDS AND CENTRAL CONCERNS

    Noted scholars have pointed out the central concerns of security studies.  Walt (1991:212) wrote that the field "explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war."  Nye & Lynn-Jones (1988:6) wrote that security studies is "centrally concerned with international violence."  Lansford et. al. (2006) likewise have directed attention to the central role and place of VIOLENCE in security studies.  These latter authors go further, asserting that there are only two subfields in security studies:  strategic studies, which explores the use of force in the policy context; and military science, which studies use of force in the tactical context.  It is clear from this distinction that security studies is more closely aligned with a concern for violence in the policy sense (which makes it somewhat indistinguishable from strategic studies).  But, what is one to make of this limited perspective of violence?  After all, disciplines like criminology have made significant inroads into understanding violence (e.g. Archer & Gartner 1984; Reiss & Roth 1993;  Zahn, Brownstein & Jackson 2005), but security studies seems uninterested in the breadth of perspective found there (from functional to constructivist approaches; from microtransactional to macrostructural levels).  Criminology would seem a fine field of preparation for security studies, as would criminal justice for that matter.  Take, for example, the justice standard of "something ought not to be happening and somebody ought to do something about it now."  The point is there is plenty of room under the banner of violence.

    Security studies rejects a purely functional or Hobbesean notion of violence as inevitable, just as it simultaneously rejects any constructivist or utopian notion of lasting peace.  In some ways, this is good since it means the field can avoid the whole metatheoretical stumbling block of pessimism vs. optimism.  In other ways, this is unsatisfactory, since like the disciplines of foreign affairs or foreign policy, far too many variables are seen as continua without endpoints, leading to a certain amount of elasticity in any conclusions drawn (other than the traditional endpoints in these fields where leaders must sell their domestic audience on international goals).  There is additionally some degree of phenomenological intersubjectivity in security studies.  Not guesswork, but disciplined self-reflection.  This is most apparent when scholars write about violence being a possibility which actors understand the need for.  The self-reflection emphasis, of course, receives limited treatment as critique or dialectic in the hands of Marxists, but intersubjectivity also serves as an invitation for feminists (e.g., Tickner 2004), both groups (Marxists and feminists) wishing to seize on any weakness or illogical inconsistency in the field.  Witness the creation of the field called critical security studies, which primarily consists of feminist, constructivist, and postmodern approaches (Krause & Williams 1997).  Critical security studies seeks to question (though not always do away with) the foundations upon which the dominance exists for state-centrism and military-centrism.  One might as well question the existence of polity and power. 

    Critical approaches nonetheless add some needed corrective, but not so much as the contributors think in terms of bashing "power" as some androcentric concept, pointing out the obvious that policy is not always "rational," or boasting about their abilities to reflect critically upon the times they live in.  Instead, critical security studies emphasizes the importance of "praxis" or agency, which is associated with the so-called Welsh or Aberystwyth School of international security studies, as represented by the likes of Jones (1999) and Dunne & Wheeler (2004).  A focus on praxis, or technically theory-praxis, helps address the metatheoretical issue of macro vs. micro (how society influences character) as well as highlights the significance of human rights as indivisible from security considerations.  Further, it opens up theoretical doors for the study of agency and structure.  Human rights theory becomes a welcome addition to security studies in this way.  To mention the most fundamental building block, it brings in the subject of norms -- a topic that disciplines like sociology have learned they can't do without.  Norms, of course, consist of unwritten expectations for behavior, but at least they provide benchmarks for conformity and deviance.  One can even realistically talk, as Lansford et. al. (2006) do, about cooperation norms and threat norms in the context of cooperation over issues of polity and power, and further, how threats, like terrorist threats, mutate or transform.  However, there is a distinct difference between the objective study of norms and the kind of praxis-driven normative social science that critical security studies represents.

    Another approach exists, this time again named after a certain "school" of thought -- the so-called Copenhagen School, as represented by the likes of Buzzan, Weaver & de Wilde (1998).  The Copenhagen School is most known for bringing in the concept of "human security" for which there is a nicely-developing Wikipedia entry.  The concept is based, in part, on the idea that most war nowadays takes place within, rather than between, nation-states.  Scholarly thought is also directed away from an interest-based approach to security, and towards what is called "securitization" which describes security as a process.  Copenhagen approaches are subject to a number of criticisms, not the least of which come from the Welsh School for being overly constructivistic.  Examples of being overly constructivistic are also frequently found in the homeland security or emergency management literature where writers talk about "risk" or insecurity in terms of those phenomena being globalized or transmuted into some kind of generalized culture of fear or insecurity.  In many parts of the world, terrorism is a way of life.  The message to America from these parts of the world, in the wake of 9/11, is to "just get used to it."  American public opinion, by and large, rejects that message, but international relations scholars still find theoretical promise in constructivist approaches to the global "risk society" (Checkel 1998; Bilgin 2003).

A NOTE ON THE MEANING OF GLOBAL SECURITY STUDIES

    The definition used by the Austin Peay Institute for Global Security Studies (a minor at APSU with course prefix GSS) is that the field involves the study of transnational issues with global implications that can only be solved by collaborative effort.  Among the issues covered are conventional and critical security, national security and homeland security, international law, economic security, population movement, environmental security, energy security, gender and age, infectious disease threats, transnational crime, intra-state conflict, terrorism and insurgency, and American global power.

    It's obviously too tall an order to examine each and every one of these definitional terms and issues, so let's see if we can collapse the discussion a bit, keeping in mind some of the more sensible things we should remember about "security studies" -- like taking a broader view toward state-centrism without abandoning the need for predictability; not confusing safety with security; maintaining benchmarks for human rights purposes; and seeing certain human and natural threats connected.  It may be useful to begin with a reminder about the U.S. Declaration of Independence which connects the security of the U.S. to global security in an explicit way, making certain value judgments that freedom and security are intrinsically good and compatible.  Of course, other value judgments could be offered (e.g., a dictator might argue in favor of incompatibility between freedom and security), and the only proof the American founding fathers gave was that such truths were "self-evident."  At base, this is wishful thinking because ideals do not connect us as globally as we would like.  Things like commerce and communication connect us more immediately, and always have as a factor in development.  Yet, commerce and communication involve by necessity the exchange of ideas.  American global power rests among those ideas, which might be called "values," consisting primarily of the belief that things can be better for every person, everywhere -- which is the prospect of universal security.  There are multiple ways to get to this belief, but the American value system puts it foresquare out front.

    Within the global context, goods, services, and people move frequently.  They compete, as they always did, for prices, access, and wealth, but equally significant is the competition for "culture" -- those cherished beliefs and traditions which tug at us generationally and emotionally for preservation, stewardship, or celebration, but often self-admitted as more superstitions than rights.  Freedom, not security, becomes critical under such culture conflict conditions.  The culture conflicts created by globalization do not call so much for peace and order as they do for amity, equity, and justice.  America has pursued the latter primarily through procedural methods, as if constitutions, elections, and trials could somehow guarantee no one having access to such democratic procedures would ever choose undemocratic outcomes.  Procedure is necessary for predictability and benchmarks, but little else.  Like the institution of a good military, procedure helps ensure a certain baseline of stability and political freedom which makes possible aspirations for higher forms of freedom.  Unfettered aspirations can be bad, however, resulting in anomie.  Something substantive is needed.  What usually cements satisfaction or happiness to freedom is security, and the best security in this regard can be said to be security from fear -- not necessarily fear of the unknown (as with safety) but fear of having one's gains wiped out, of success, of getting ahead, if you will.  Security of everything is futile, and there can definitely be such a thing as too much security.  What is and should be cared about are the gains or progress made -- what each individual feels has made their life more enjoyable.  Different people from different cultures are going to have different ideas about this -- about their freedoms and rights, but they can all agree on the basic idea of progress thru security.  Progress is all the more achievable when collaborative efforts are made.                                             

    Regarding the kinds of issues that global security studies covers, it can be seen that some issues involve more "intractable" problems than others.  It is customary for scholars to use terms such as "intractable" or "protracted" to describe conflicts which can never be solved or effectively managed (Azar 1986), but in many ways, a far better definition is provided by Crocker et. al. (2004; 2005) as conflicts which are stubborn or difficult to manage.  Harm-producing intractable conflicts are essentially prolonged wars where the elites in the region aren't hurting enough to change; political extremists exist on all sides, thwarting any attempt at nonviolent resolution; psychological wounds, grievances, and a sense of victimization run deep among the population; and there simply aren't enough of the right mechanisms in place, particularly security mechanisms, which build confidence in the expectation for anything other than failure.  Ignoring such conflict zones (i.e., letting them burn) is the same as creating a breeding ground for a whole host of ills and bad things -- such as terrorism and disease -- which will be eventually exported around the world.  The critical criteria for the selection of issues that the field of global security studies must face should be the determination of the extent to which exportation of "global bads" (Crocker et. al. 2004:5) may occur.

STRATEGIC AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

    Aside from the moral basis for humanitarian intervention, which is not without its merit but can be overdone in the form of "missionary democracy" (Anonymous 2004), there are perfectly good strategic reasons why the world's major powers ought to intervene in intractable conflict zones.  There are many roles possible -- from global policeman to honest broker to mediator -- and each role should be selected on its merits, applicability, and resonance with foreign policy.  The main security goals, as Hamre & Sullivan (2003) point out, should be establishment of regional stability and reestablishment of territorial integrity.  Sometimes, these goals can be accomplished via conflict freezing or containment.  Sometimes what is called for is old-fashioned imperial policing.  However, to be truly successful, something must be done about the underlying grievances.  Like with relief operations, something must be done to ensure that people can sustain and develop themselves afterwards. 

    Resolving underlying grievances requires a justice and/or reconciliation approach.  Fair laws and humane punishments go far, but often take on overtones of trying to implant American-style justice abroad.  A certain amount of reconciliation with local custom is necessary, but in return for this (or maybe in spite of it), effective foreign policy requires that any settlement be shaped, or steered if you will, in a direction favorable to American or collective security interests.  This is what makes a region "strategically sensitive."  The timing and extent of policy options are important.  Re-escalation of the conflict must be avoided along with any perception that humanitarian motives are nothing more than a front for strategic motives.  It is not that humanitarian motives are in reality thinly disguised versions of foreign policy motives; it's that strategic interests are only natural and to be expected. Regional and global security considerations can be added to this, but such motives themselves are subject to new world order complaints.  For geopolitical reasons, it is always better to have the involvement of major players who are geographically close to the conflict zone rather than governance from a distance.  In the final analysis, it is this "closeness" or propinquity which matters the most, whether for good or bad.

UNIPOLARITY, BIPOLARITY, AND MULTIPOLARITY

    Unipolarity refers to a US-centric world order (technically the American-Britain axis), bipolarity brings in a second rival (the Russia-China axis), and multipolarity assumes multiple rivals for global domination.  Those multiple rivals may involve emerging superpowers, like India (producing a South/Southeast axis), the Middle East (in the form of a de facto Shi'ite caliphate anchored in Tehran), Venezuela (a possibility once the oil runs out in Saudi Arabia), or any mix of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) consisting of 116 developing nations.  It's important to be very clear about exactly what is meant here by phrases such as "global domination."  It means leadership in terms of power and influence, not military domination.  It further means control over global strategic energy resources (technically a lever for global influence).  Energy is significant as a barometer.  For example, if and when the world dispenses with the US dollar for international energy transactions, the American-British axis will have lost its dominance.  

    The idea that poles, axes, or centers of power have gravitational effects on the social fabric of the global order is an idea often associated with regime theory, a subfield of international relations which grew out of the neoliberal perspective (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984; and for a good review of regime theory, see Rittberger et.al. 1996).  Regime theory shares with constructivist approaches the notion that agents (states) not only produce institutions and rules, but generate collective understandings (or norms) which make some behavioral claims.  Regime theorists do not quite go so far as constructivists in saying these "norms" affect identities and interests, but they do claim that things like "epistemic communities" and/or "transnational policy networks" are the effects of deeply-held regime norms (Checkel 1998).  Regime theory's claims along these lines seems to come from the domestic norms argument of democratic peace theory (Maoz & Russett 1993) which holds that  democracies tend to externalize their internal norms when cooperating with each other.  Allies of all kinds would likely be caught up in the same effect, whereby power asymmetries would be downplayed and replaced by norms of more democratic-like decision-making.  The hope is that regime theory might become the basis for achieving some kind of community of equals emphasizing persuasion, compromise and the non-use of force or coercive power.

    Realistically however, any pole or center of power that achieves influence will pull or attract other centers of power toward itself.  This is especially true when centers of power are in close proximity to one another, and this "proximity" can be geographic, economic, or geopolitical.  Regime theory has its limitations, but it would be good for the student of global security to be familiar with it.  Regimes are often thought of as formal and treaty-based, but researchers have long pointed out their informal characteristics (Lipson 1991).  The following should provide a basic introduction to the topic:

NOTES ON CURRICULUM ISSUES

    It is somewhat typical, as are most programs of study in this area, including the relatively unorthodox Wikiversity School of Strategic Studies, to have more electives than core courses.  For example, the Austin Peay St. Univ. minor in GSS is as follows:

    In addition, APSU also offers a graduate Certificate in Security Studies.  It is housed within the Department of History and Philosophy as part of the Master of Arts in Military History.  Undergraduate preparation can be in any major, and online studies are possible.  The certificate involves the following:

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Concept at the Crossroads: Center of Gravity
Beyond Intractability
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Disciplinary IPE and Its "Others" (pdf)
Ghoukassian's article on The Evolution of Security Studies
Globalist
Human Security: Relevance and Implications
International Institute for Strategic Studies
International Strategic Studies Association
John Pike's GlobalSecurity.org
Lecture on Humanitarian Intervention
Military Doctrine and the Center of Gravity Concept
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)
SSRC Global Security and Cooperation Forum
UN Foundation Global Security Initiative
Wikipedia Entry on International Security & Human Security

PRINTED RESOURCES
Anonymous (Mike Scheuer). (2004). Imperial hubris: Why the west is losing the war on terror. Washington DC: Brassey's.
Archer, D. & R. Gartner (1984). Violence and crime in cross-national perspective. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Ashley, K. & Walker, R. (1990). Conclusion: Reading dissidence/writing the discipline. International Studies Quarterly 34(3): 367-416.
Azar, E. (1986). "Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions." Pp. 28-39 in E. Azar & J. burton (eds.) International conflict resolution. Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books.
Beier, J. & Arnold, S. (2005). Becoming undisciplined: Toward the supradisciplinary study of security. International Studies Review 7 (1), 41-62.
Biddle, S. (2004). Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
Bilgin, P. (2003). "Individual and societal dimensions of security." International Studies Review 5(2): 203-22.
Brown, J., Pegg, S. & Shively, J. (2006) Consensus and divergence in international studies: Survey evidence from 140 international studies curriculum programs. International Studies Perspectives 7:3, 267-286.
Buzan, B. (1991). People, states, and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
Buzan, B., Weaver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
Campbell, D. (1998). Writing security. Minneapolis: Univ. of MN Press.
Checkel, J. (1998). "The constructivist turn in international relations theory." World Politics 50(2): 324-48. [online doc]
Cox, R. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2): 126-55.
Crocker, C., Hampson, F. & Aall, P. (2004). Taming intractable conflicts. Washington DC: US Inst. of Peace.
Crocker, C., Hampson, F. & Aall, P. (2005). Grasping the nettle. Washington DC: US Inst. of Peace.
Dogan, M. (1997). The new social sciences: Cracks in the disciplinary walls. International Social Science Journal 49(3): 429-43.
Drahos, P. & Braithwaite, J. (2003). Information feudalism. NY: Norton.
Dunne, T. & Wheeler, N. (2004) "We the peoples': Contending discourses of security in human rights theory and practice." International Relations 18(1): 9-23. 
Hamre, J. & Sullivan, G. (2003). "Toward postconflict resolution." Pp. 169-183 in A. Lennon (ed.) The battle for hearts and minds: Using soft power to undermine terrorist networks. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Harriss, J. (2002). The case for cross-disciplinary approaches in international development. World Development 9/30(3): 487-8.
Jessop, B. & Sum, Ngai-Ling. (2001). Pre-disciplinary and post-disciplinary perspectives. New Political Economy 6(1): 89-101.
Jones, R. (1999). Security, strategy, and critical theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. [Google Books]
Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (Eds.) (1977). Power and interdependence. Boston: Little Brown.
Keohane, R. (1984). After hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
King, G. & Murray, C. (2001). Rethinking human security. Political Science Quarterly 116(4): 585-610.
Kolodziej, E. (1992). Renaissance in security studies: Caveat lector. International Studies Quarterly 36(4): 421-438.
Krasner, S. (Ed.) (1983). International regimes. NY: Columbia Univ. Press.
Krause, K. & Williams, M. (Eds.) (1997). Critical security studies. Minneapolis: University of MN Press.
Krause, K. & Williams, M. (1996). "Broadening the agenda of security studies." Mershon International Studies Review 40:229-54.
Lansford, T., Pauly, R. & Covarrubias, J. (2006). To protect and defend: U.S. homeland security policy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Lipson, C. (1991). "Why are some international agreements informal." International Organization 45(4): 495-538.
May, E. (Ed.) (1986). Knowing one's enemies. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
Maoz, Z. & Russett, B. (1993). "Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace." American Political Science Review 87(3): 624-38. 
Nye, J. & Lynn-Jones, S. (1988). International security studies: A report of a conference on the state of the discipline." International Security 12(4): 5-27. 
Reiss, A. & J. Roth. (1993). Understanding and preventing violence. Washington: National Academy Press.
Rittberger, V., Hasenclever, A. & Mayer, P. (1996). "Interests, power, knowledge: The study of international regimes." Mershon International Studies Review 40:183-87.
Rosen, S. (1991). "Net assessment as an analytical concept." Pp. 283-301 in A. Marshall, J. Martin & H. Rowen (eds.) On not confusing ourselves. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Shultz, R., Godson, R. & Quester, G. (Eds.) (1997). Security studies for the 21st century. Dulles, VA: Brassey's.
Tickner, J. (2004). "Feminist responses to international security studies." Peace Review 16(1): 43-48.
Walt, S. (1991). The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly 35(1): 211-239.
Waltz, K. (1993). The emerging structure of international politics. International Security 18(2): 44-79.
Williams, M. (2005). Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. International Studies Quarterly 47: 511-531.
Zahn, M., Brownstein, H. & Jackson, S. (2005). Violence: From theory to research. Cincinnati: LexisNexis Anderson.

Last updated: June 19, 2008
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O'Connor, T.  (Date of Last Update at bottom of page). In Part of web cited (Windows name for file at top of browser), MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/rest of URL accessed on today's date.