Toward Intelligence Theory

TOWARD A THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE
"If the facts don't fit the theory, change the facts" (Albert Einstein)

There are a number of significant problems in trying to come up with a good theory about how intelligence agencies are supposed to work, and behind every reform proposal, there's an inherent theory, much of it, unfortunately, focused on failure. What is needed, however, is a theory about success, what has worked, and what will continue to work. If intelligence, in the broader sense, is defined as consisting basically of three components: knowledge, activity, and organization (Kent 1949), then we need to conduct our search for theory in a way that conjoins these three levels, and not just be singularly concerned with how to organize or re-organize.

KNOWLEDGE (for What? for Whom?) -- It seems definitely important to be time-based and mission-oriented, but at the same time, it seems important for somebody to be keeping an eye on everything else that doesn't seem relevant at the time. Little "blimps" on the radar screen may be just as important as big "blimps" that everyone knows about. While the job of monitoring these little, inactive corners of the world may be an unglamorous job, it is a job, nonetheless, that needs to be done. Theoretically, this goes to the heart of what we call "secrets." Our intelligence agencies zero in on secrets, the things that enemies and allies alike try to keep from us, and the unstated assumption is that "big" secrets are better to know than "little" secrets. Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) make a useful distinction in the last page of their book between "secrets" and "mysteries" where mysteries consist of all the little things that nobody can know for certain. A contemporary example might be the case of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq where we were in a situation calling for knowledge of intent (to use weapons) and not necessarily knowledge of capability. What's likely to go on in the mind of a foreign leader three or four years from now would certainly qualify as a "mystery," but it's exactly the kind of knowledge we need, and exactly the kind of foreknowledge that makes intelligence work a craft, and not just a collection of analytic methodologies. The defense of the United States requires not just a defense of its physical assets, but a defense of its ideals, and it is easy for a country to be attacked in today's world in someway other than the physical sense. Too much intelligence work seems to subscribe to a "jigsaw" theory, where the assumption is that all it takes is that one, little piece of information to make it all "fit" together.

As far as for "whom" the intelligence is for, the problem has always been that "spot" intelligence (or "Information please") is the most demanded product. This has resulted in the fetishism of PowerPoint, as anyone knows who has attended those many PowerPoint slide show briefings given all the time (in the military and law enforcement too). This converts our intelligence agencies into some kind of reference service, much like the function performed by the Congressional Research Service for the U.S. Congress. A better way of delivering presentations and briefings is needed (see humorous excerpt below).

Son, we live in a world that has powerpoint. And those slides need to be produced by men with oak leafs. Who's gonna do it? You? You with a star? I have a greater responsibility than you can possibly fathom. You weep for my briefings and you curse my formatting. You have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what I know: that my briefings, while drawn out, probably save lives. . . You don't want the truth. Because deep down, in places you don't talk about at meetings, you want my presentations. You need my presentations. We use words like diagram gallery, paste special, clipboard . . . we use these words as the backbone of a job spent briefing something. You use them as a punch line. I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain why I formatted an object to a man who briefs and gets promoted by the very presentation I make, then questions the way in which I format it! I'd rather you just said Thank You and went on your way. Otherwise, I suggest you make your own slide, and give the briefing. Either way, I don't give a damn what you think the slide should say.

Intelligence agencies are not supposed to be a policy-making bodies, but rather policy decision-making support agencies. When an intelligence agency produces a product that does NOT support current policy, the regular tendency of politicians is to call for reform and/or greater accountability of that intelligence agency. At least, this has been the most common pattern in the establishment of most reform commissions. When an intelligence agency is investigated, the regular tendency of intelligence professionals is to draw back upon its need for secrecy and internal control. Secrecy and control and different things. Secrecy thwarts accountability while an over-emphasis upon internal control tends to create tall hierarchical forms of organization that result in communication distortions (stovepipes), administrative inertia (resistance to change), and barriers to employee involvement, retention and recruitment. Internal control is what created the "two bosses" problem, with some agencies budgetarily fixed to the DCI and other agencies budgetarily fixed to the SECDEF. Secrecy may be the more important issue than control, however, since accountability is necessary for at least one aspect of intelligence - covert action - where blurred lines of accountability and the inefficient practice of plausible denial have created more failures than perhaps any other area of intelligence.

ACTIVITY -- Existing alongside the tendency to give priority to current rather than predictive intelligence is the unfortunate tendency for most intelligence agencies to put on the appearance of consensus, and a unified voice, behind their products. Everyone knows that this is not the case, as there are almost always "voices of dissent" within the agency who have their opinions stifled. The intelligence community as a whole has never grasped the importance of institutionalizing forms of competitive analysis and devil's advocacy. They have "experimented" with it, but never institutionalized it. Theoretically, this goes to the heart of training analysts. A "good" analyst will be an uncompromising, independent thinker, and will find ways to "share" their information short of treason or whistleblowing. In today's world, information sharing is highlighted by the need for cooperation in homeland security efforts. It is unfortunate that the necessary levels of cooperation are not present. Military agencies do not trust civilian agencies, and police agencies do not trust intelligence agencies. One solution to this problem is called "marketization" of intelligence (although it has a number of different names), and basically involves adopting a business model. The private sector and field of economic (business) intelligence has much to offer as a possible model. The business sector, for example, utilizes academics in times of crisis. The natural impulse and reaction to crisis in a business organization is to bring in as many fresh voices and "outsiders" as possible to at least study the problem in task forces or strike forces. By contrast, the intelligence community operates much like law enforcement in their response to crisis, which is basically "circling the wagons" and only having an "inner circle" make decisions. We need to replace the formal, hierarchical intelligence structure with a horizontal, cooperative, and fluid architecture that gets information from those who have it to those who need it through the development of virtual communities of information sources, analysts, and users.

ORGANIZATION -- Most reform has resulted in little improvements, and one can easily predict what the conclusions would be of any reform commission, as it would go something along these lines: "Today's intelligence agencies are out of sync with emerging threats and realities..." Transformation, rather than reformation, is needed. We need to stop looking backwards at mistakes, and come up with some theories, doctrines, or models that are forward-looking. Reconceptualization must come before reorganization. The big issue here is whether we want domestic intelligence or not. The Patriot Act has slightly changed the traditional demarcation between foreign and domestic matters, but there may be a long way to go. One could argue that a domestic intelligence apparatus would be easier to build. It wouldn't require extensive years of training at foreign languages, for example, and if technology was not relied on (and abused) at the expense of civil liberty, it might be possible for the United States to come up with a good domestic intelligence model. There would have to be safeguards and thresholds to protect privacy and personal identifiers as well as a better set of Constitutional balancing tests, but it could be done. Above all, in doing it, we need to look forward and not backward, because looking backward will remind us of our horrible history in this regard.

Decisions need to be made before adequate theory can be developed. Smaller, harder-to-monitor threats are upon us, and both terrorists and criminal gangs remain disruptive and confrontational. The increasing globalization of the world will most likely result in a greater proliferation of "trouble spots," insurgencies, and the need for peacekeeping. Political opponents are likely to be driven more by emotional agendas than rational agendas, and their violence or state-supported violence will become more unpredictable. Those who wish to do us harm will take advantage of every opportunity for surprise and every loophole in our Constitutional safeguards.

Most of our collection systems are outdated or in need of repair or replacement. We have long been set up for the kind of slow moving threat that the Soviet Union presented, and our political oversight and policymaking processes are also set up to avoid dramatic swings and unforeseen threats. A larger intelligence community is needed. We used to get by with only sampling a fraction of what we needed, but now almost every little bit of "chatter" is needed, no matter how irrelevant. Clandestinely and covertly, we must recruit and operate in places that are more difficult, involving tight, family-like cell structures with enormously sophisticated models of leaderless resistance. Minor actors can have major impact.

Today's threats to the homeland are not just from military forces, and military solutions alone will not protect us. We need and must always have civilian intelligence agencies. While it may be possible to integrate military and civilian capabilities in certain regions, it is unclear what sort of synchronization can be done domestically. Technology is no longer our monopoly, and the huge budgets we used to see in staying technologically ahead of communism are unlikely to continue. We must do more with less, or rely upon our private sector and their commercial interests to help us in this regard. Expert systems and AI may, but may not, help us with the "glut" of information that can be technologically processed. However, at the same time we are investing in technology to process information, we also need to invest in R&D (research and development), much like the way we used to invest in disguises, special documents, communications devices, and special weapons. We can continue to expect that our enemies will learn how to "work around" our remote sensing systems and develop new deception techniques to deny us information or deceive us. An investment in technology now might help us. We need newer technologies, such as quantum computing (for better cryptography), nanotechnology (to get closer to targets), and spectral imaging systems (to see underground).

The right knowledge must get to the right people at the right time. Intelligence and law enforcement need to be integrated in some way, and information must move at the speed of warning. Cooperation should also extend to business and academia, not so much for warning purposes, but to ensure that the best minds and expertise are brought to bear on problems. In many ways, openness is not incompatible with security.

U.S. intelligence has long been a collection of vertical monopolies, and this is no longer desirable and acceptable. Intelligence must be re-shaped to better reflect the world we will live in.

PRINTED RESOURCES
Halperin, M. (1974). Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute.
Johnson, L. & Wirtz, J. (Eds.) (2004). Strategic Intelligence. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Kent, S. (1949). Strategic Intelligence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Lowenthal, M. (1993). "Intelligence Epistemology." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6(3): 319-325.
Resch, D. (1995). "Predictive Analysis: The Gap Between Academia and Practitioners." Military Intelligence 21(2): 26-29.
Shulsky, A. & Schmitt, G. (2002). Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3e. Washington D.C.: Brassey's. test

Last updated: Feb 23, 2007
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