The contrast between civilian intelligence (like the CIA) and military intelligence (like the DIA and parts of the Pentagon intelligence network) is great.  In recent years, the CIA has had reason to resent the expansion of military intelligence as turf infringement, especially in the area of HUMINT where the military has begun placing special forces in remote locations disguised as civilians; e.g., in the form of MLEs (Military Liaison Elements).  Critics of military intelligence argue that its expansion is an effort to avoid congressional oversight while supporters of it argue that the CIA should stick to strategic intelligence while the military needs its own network for tactical intelligence.  As it is sometimes put:  "the CIA wants to know if Osama bin Laden is developing a nuclear weapon; the military wants to know where he goes out for a hamburger."  Most definitely, the military has its own intelligence needs, and the war on terror has made those needs more unique and peculiar.    Infiltration becomes as important as monitoring, locations are more exotic and obscure, and "actionable" comes to mean not only gathering intel but the ability to act upon it fast.    

  As Hughes-Wilson (2004) notes, a distinction between military and civil intelligence is likely to be a false distinction since pretty much all intelligence is government intelligence.  The unfortunate political reality is that things almost always become a military problem when something goes horribly wrong.  Today's world is seeing more synchronization and hybridization, especially with joint civilian and military activities, which is changing who the consumer or "customer" of intelligence is, be they political or military.  It should also be pointed out that military intelligence is NO contradiction in terms (or oxymoron) since the military is an institution specifically charged to guard against surprise.  Khalsa (2004) makes clear that guarding against surprise is the primary function of military intelligence.  Even though operations are the usual military path to glory, military intelligence is just as important since it functions to reduce surprise, error, and anomaly.  It does this by basically collecting and processing information about an enemy's capabilities and intentions, which refer, in part, to an enemy's capabilities and an enemy's state of mind.  It is also the case that military intelligence, unique among other kinds of intelligence, is usually characterized by crystal-clear expectations about what the intelligence officer is expected to deliver.  For that reason, it makes for good introductory material for the student of intelligence to learn about.  Here's an example of some essential elements of information collected with military intelligence:

    The United States has some first-rate military intelligence institutions.  To mention a couple, the University of Military Intelligence at Fort Huachuca in Arizona (pronounced "Wah-chew-kah" not "Who-ah-chew-kah") should probably be noted since almost all military intelligence officers go thru training there.  The second one is the National Defense Intelligence College (formerly known as JMIC, pronounced "Jay Mick") in Washington DC, which is technically part of the DIA and operates as an accredited graduate school with an enormous outreach.  There are several other fine institutions which could be mentioned (such as the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the JFK Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg, the Air University at Maxwell AFB, the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA and JSOU at Hurlburt Field, FL, but suffice it to say that all nations have always maintained a military intelligence corps, and military intelligence is conducted in peacetime as well as wartime.  The U.S. has various ways of referring to its military intelligence corps.  Joint intelligence staff work for the J-2, while multinational intelligence is under a C-2 designation.  Both will usually also have G-2 (military/ground intelligence), N-2 (naval intelligence), or A-2 (air intelligence) designations for all staff.  Some staff may be assigned at lower than a general's staff level (the normal G-2 designation), and such personnel are typically referred to as S-2s which involve warrant officers or NCOs.  Most military intelligence officers have undergone extensive background checks, and it is said that the intelligence testing they go through to get selected places them in the top ten percent of the population in terms of IQ.  Much of what modern military intelligence is about involves exploitation of open source information in a media-saturated global context.  In this regard, we'll discuss this as fourth-generation warfare below.

INTELLIGENCE AND FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE   

    Fourth-generation warfare usually presses the military into options that have yet to be realized.  Traditional military intelligence is mostly performed at the brigade and battalion levels, but some options require examining the possibilities for other types of intelligence-centric strategy, operations, and tactics.  The U.S. has an extremely modernized military, while the rest of the world, for the most part, has not invested in such modernization.  There are 165 armies in the world, but only about 60 of them are real armies.  Most of them are ceremonial armies, political parties, or police forces.  Arab and African armies are traditionally ceremonial – they look good in parades.  Asian and Latin American armies are traditionally political parties – which are involved in military coup d’etats when generals become politicians. Dictators everywhere tend to use their armies as a police force.  The doctrines of a military hyperpower must change to keep current with these realities, as well as the kind of dictator armies and guerilla forces most commonly faced today.  Some military capabilities can and perhaps should be merged with intelligence functions.

    Since the way a society conducts warfare tells a lot about its social structure and the beliefs it holds dear, it helps to have some kind of theoretical perspective on warfare to begin with, and a Darwinian perspective (war evolves) is as good as any, which in fact is the approach taken by Hammes (2004) who outlines the following four stages in the history of warfare:

• First-generation war (1GW) -- the kind practiced by Napoleon in the 19th century, involving line and column attacks, and dependent most of all upon patriotism to provide a continuous supply of manpower

• Second-generation war (2GW) -- the kind displayed during the two World Wars in the 20th century, involving campaigns of movement which eventually get bogged down in trench warfare where defense assumes supremacy over offense, and mostly dependent upon a strong economy and superior firepower

• Third-generation war (3GW) -- the kind exemplified by Hitler's blitzkrieg actions during WWII, involving the projection of power and maneuver warfare over vast distances quickly to wipe out an enemy's command and control, and mostly dependent upon propaganda to rob the enemy of their will to fight

• Fourth-generation war (4GW) -- the kind that focuses deeply in the enemy's rear, like an evolved form of insurgency, which uses all available networks (netwar) - political, economic, social, international organizations, the media, the Internet, and world opinion - to make the enemy's goals seem unobtainable or too costly. This is the only kind of war America has ever lost, and it has done so three times (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia).   

    Terrorism, ruthlessness, and asymmetric tactics characterize fourth-generation war.  For example, the enemies of the U.S. have long learned the lesson that to defeat superior firepower, all that is necessary is to push women and children to the front, and to practice classic Maoist insurgency tactics:

• Di jin, wo tui (When the enemy advances, we withdraw)

• Di jiu, wo roa (When the enemy rests, we harass)

• Di pi, wo da (When the enemy tires, we attack)

• Di tui, wo jui (When the enemy withdraws, we pursue)   

    A war of attrition at one's own pace, accompanied by extensive international propaganda, is the fastest way to weaken an enemy's resolve.  Traditional battlefields and battlespaces don't matter.  What matters is whether the press is covering the story, and whether, for example, there are reporters and/or academics who see the insurgent's side of it as a genuine, resistance movement.  This tactic -- the Sandinista refinement --as Hammes (2004) calls it, is NOT the same as Che Guevara's "foco" theory of insurgency, which holds that a small focus group of guerrillas will stimulate a spontaneous uprising.  In fact, it is important for today's revolutionaries to disavow and dissociate themselves from anything resembling Communist doctrine.  The broadest base of allies must be obtained, such as the support which comes from peace groups and religious institutions.  The moral high ground must appear to have been taken, so the Palestinians, for example, will present the image of youngsters throwing rocks (avoiding the more practical method of throwing Molotov cocktails) and portray Hamas and terrorist groups as providers of medical care and social services.  It must always appear that the fighters are oppressed, impoverished people fighting for human dignity.  The goal is to change world opinion.  If taken prisoner, the fighters must be ordered (as the al-Qaeda training manual instructs) to claim they were beaten and abused.  If all else fails, it's time to use an accelerated birth rate to simply out-demographic the enemy.  The interesting thing about fourth-generation war is that the fighters don't even have to win; they simply have to stay the course until the other side gives up or gets distracted by something else.

SOME STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE

    The United States has always strived to prepare itself to fight two wars on two different fronts at any given time.  This two-theatre-of-operations strategy has been in place since WWII, and is associated with the doctrinal idea that for infantry to win a war, the important factor is a sustained rate of advance (the rate at which the entire army moves forward).  A second principle is that while a war isn't over until your ground forces occupy the enemy's territory, it has become more true in recent times that control of airspace may be more important than control of groundspace (Biddle 2002), and it is customary to note that many modern military intelligence processes rely heavily on airspace.  For example, aircraft can better manage the jamming or disrupting of communications, and the airplane (as the Wright Brothers conceived it) was always intended to be used for spy purposes.  A typical maneuver involves what is called a FERRET MISSION.  The word "ferrett" refers to a vehicle, usually an aircraft, used to investigate foreign radar systems by approaching them so as to cause them to be turned on.  In recent years, unmanned drones (called Pioneer or Predator drones, some with stealth capability, others with weapon capability) represent, in many ways, the perfect example of a hybrid civilian and military intelligence operation.  To mention a couple of drones, there is one named Global Hawk, which can remain on station during winter weather at over 12 miles in altitude for over 24 hours.  It can take pictures 100 miles away -- through all weather with heat-seeking cameras.  The smaller Predator can be fitted with electro-optical, infrared and synthetic radar to fly at about three-miles altitude.  The Predator has become an intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance workhorse, and can be fitted with Hellfire missiles.

    Satellites are important to military intelligence.  At any given time, there are about 550 operational satellites in orbit, and there are about 100 new satellite launches a year.  There are also about 10,000 objects of trackable debris floating around the earth.  There are four (4) basic orbital patterns: (1) high-resolution photography satellites are usually in low-altitude polar orbits to take advantage of angle to the sun; (2) navigation satellites use mid-altitude (20,000 kilometers) orbits of 63.4 degree inclinations; (3) surveillance satellites use equatorial orbits or zero inclination, and are maintained geosynchronously by matching the speed of earth's rotation; (4) communication satellites use elliptical orbits (a perigee, or low point of 500 kilometers, and an apogee, or high altitude of 40,000 kilometers).  Current U.S. policy (and the policy of most nations) considers satellite attacks an act of war.  Satellite launchings that go east or west most probably involve an electronic eavesdropping satellite headed for a geostationary, equatorial orbit. If it goes north or south, it's most likely a photo-reconnaissance satellite headed for a polar or figure-eight orbit.  Some of the world's most well-guarded secrets involve the frequencies and equipment on satellites.  Enemies of the U.S. generally use nuclear powered satellites, but the United States does not.   Some nations and firms which own satellites sell their low-resolution LANDSAT photos, although high-resolution photos are available on black markets.  Normally, military accuracy is within 30 meters, but most of what is available to the public is 100-meter accuracy.  Exceptions exist, and John Pike's GlobalSecurity website can be visited for some further examples.  Satellites are involved with the state-of-the-art global interception system, known as Echelon (below):

    A lot of resources are devoted to counting and estimating military capabilities.  Most modern nations budget their military spending on the principle of "fives" which means that normal spending for adequate protection is or should be around 5% of GDP.  During wartime, this is or can be incremented by additional "fives" to 10% or 15% at the maximum.  The United States maintains an average military strength of about 2.1 million enlisted personnel and a spending rate at about 5% of GDP.  In the event of an emergency, additional members of the reserves and National Guard can be called up.  In the event of war, the Coast Guard becomes part of the Navy. Total forces deployed overseas at any given time amount to about 900,000 people, half of whom are often civilians. Thirty percent of all military personnel move each year.  To maintain this strength level, the U.S. must entice about 60,000 new recruits to join each year, and the officer corps frequently needs replenishment.  Below is a guide to ranks:

    The United States maintains about 850 U.S. military installations on the homeland, plus about 20 more in U.S. territories, commonwealths, and possessions. In addition, there are about 350 U.S. military installations overseas.  Since the end of the cold war, America has switched from a land-based presence overseas to what is called force projection mode, which is essentially a naval presence strategy.  This makes sense because the majority of the world's population centers are within two hundred miles of open ocean, and this strategy requires no host nation support.  Fleet operations also often involve multilateral involvement, the basic operational divisions appearing below:  

    The U.S. Navy has become quite active at electronic warfare and intelligence gathering.  The following are typical missions that the Navy is best suited for:

• PRESENCE -- peacetime missions designed to make regional bullies, dictators, and warlords back off from what they're doing.  The idea is that by putting big boats in the trouble spot instead of small boats, if something happens to one of your big boats, you've got a war instead of an international incident.

• SHOW OF FORCE -- the one-time use of force to send a message, using your naval forces to launch a measured raid or strike

• FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION EXERCISE -- dictators often think like Surf Nazis when it comes to waters off their beach, and the U.S. has always been more than willing to test whatever lines they draw that impedes the right of innocent passage

• MARITIME ESCORT -- certain high-value commercial shipments, like oil, often need military escorts past hostile shores

• EXPEDITIONARY SUPPORT -- "expeditionary" is a fancy word for invasion, and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) often start their operations on board a Navy ship

• POWER PROJECTION -- this is the flying of many, sometimes unnecessary, sorties over an area just to show that the U.S. is committed to a long-term operation

CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

    Military forces conduct conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs), counterterrorist operations, peacekeeping operations, and operations other than war (OOTW).  With nonlinear, or asymmetric, warfare, of utmost importance are command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (C4I).  Joint operations between the branches are commonplace. Contemporary military activity includes counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations.  Airborne, Marine, and Special Forces are noteworthy in this regard.  The purpose of having an Airborne division is to put large amounts of troops anywhere, anytime -- rapid deployment -- and grab or blow something up fast, something the enemy cannot do without.  It's taking the offensive, or seizing the initiative.  Airborne units are sometimes supported by links to all the major intelligence agencies, like the CIA and NSA, as well as operating their own intelligence (G-2) service.  Airborne units are also equipped to handle military policing (prisoners of war), biological and chemical warfare, and can conduct certain special operations.  Airborne paratroopers are usually elite units, elite meaning they train harder and do more dangerous things.

    SPECIAL FORCES are even more elite, specially selected, specially trained, specially equipped troops given special missions and support.  Each unit usually consists of a dozen men, each with a different variety of specialties, some of whom are cross-trained in each other's specialty.  These units can be used at any stage of war, from beginning, middle, to end.  They specialize in unconventional tactics and operations.  The most common missions for a special ops force are as follows:

• COUNTERPROLIFERATION -- these missions involve weapons of mass destruction where the unit might stake out a site where nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are suspected of being developed, and enforce export or arms control  

• COUNTERTERRORISM -- these missions involve responding to terrorist threats as they evolve by conducting counter operations or resolving the situation somehow

• FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE -- during these missions, foreign officials, such as their military, paramilitary, or police force are trained in how to protect their own societies

• SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE -- clandestine or covert missions to conduct surveillance activities in foreign countries

• DIRECT ACTION -- a fancy term for a raid which seizes, captures, recovers, or destroys something or somebody

• PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS -- missions that mix news, entertainment, information, and coercion to reinforce favorable attitudes among combatants and noncombatants

• CIVIC AFFAIRS -- public relations and rebuilding aimed to benefit the civilian population

• UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE -- a fancy term for long-term guerrilla warfare

• INFORMATION WARFARE -- disruption of all forms of telecommunications and computers

• COALITION SUPPORT -- missions that help integrate coalition partners

• COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE -- dangerous missions to recover fallen comrades behind enemy lines 

• COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS -- participation in the training and operations of anti-narcotic officials of foreign governments

• HUMANITARIAN DEMINING -- helping remove land mines and unexploded ordinance

• HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- supporting relief operations and officials

• PEACE OPERATIONS -- monitoring peacekeeping operations or helping to broker deals among warring factions

• SECURITY ASSISTANCE -- helping foreign fighters learn how to use U.S. military equipment  

• HOSTAGE RESCUE -- this is the special mission that the Army's Delta Force carries out   

    The standard unit of comparison between militaries is the division. A division consists of infantry, armor, artillery, and support under one command and capable of independent operation for extended periods of time. Divisions are mobile. The rule of thumb is that no more than 500 sorties (500 evacuation operations) would be required to relocate the division and all its equipment. The following list gives some definitions of typical terminology:

• Theater = consists of 2 or more Fronts

• Army Group or Front = consists of 2-5 armies

• Army = consists of 5-6 divisions; about 75,000 people

• Division = consists of 5,000 to 20,000 people

• Light Division = consists of about 10,000 people

• Brigade or Regiment = consists of about 5,000 people (a junior division)

• Battalion = consists of about 500 people

• Company = consists of about 100 people

• Platoon = consists of about 33 people (3 platoons per company)

WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLY ISSUES

    Besides the expected weapons differences, there are some significant differences between how different militaries handle supply issues.  American artillery procedures are also somewhat different.  For example, Americans bring the ammo to the guns, while Communist-trained enemies bring the guns to the ammo (planted there beforehand).  Many nations have traded speedy airborne divisions for the comparative advantage of greater firepower.  Many nations, other than the U.S., organize their ground forces on a "cadre" system. This means that most bases have only part of their personnel strength (not enough to man all equipment; sometimes as low as 10%) but a full complement of equipment. By contrast, U.S. divisions are organized at full strength with both personnel and equipment at or near full capacity.

INTERNET RESOURCES
ABCNews Weapons of the future 
Aircraft Carriers and Battle Groups
Defense Tech Blog
Fleet Numbering System
MIT Unofficial Military Intelligence website
Past, Present & Future of Warfare 
Institute of Space Policy
Satellite Vulnerabilities and Orbital Tracks
The Satellite War over Yugoslavia
U.S. Policy Considers Satellite Attacks an Act of War

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Last updated: Apr 25, 2008
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