Intelligence Collection

Those who intercept and process raw information; i.e., the "collectors," generally outnumber the smaller number of analysts in any intelligence service. Debates about who has more resources or who is "smarter" (collectors versus analysts) are legend in intelligence work. It is not a good idea to presume one group is smarter than another, and Herman (1996) makes the point that even though specialty collectors were the first "intelligencers," intelligence collection has come a long way from the days when it was done ad hoc by just reading the news. Further, it is probably a fallacy to assume (as many politicians do) that simply "collecting more intelligence" is all that's needed to solve a crisis or fix a problem. Empirical evidence shows that more information does not necessarily improve the accuracy of assessment, although it may improve certainty in assessment (Kam 1988; Khalsa 2006). An intensified collection effort will not necessarily lead to better analysis, just as analysts' complaints about insufficient collection will not lead to better collection. The way it's supposed to work is that there should be a harmonious relationship between collection and analysis, sharing, among other things, a "duty" to deal with future dangers, not ruminate over past differences (Heymann 1998; Ronczkowski 2004). Collection, above all, must be active, and being proactive is even better. In order to spawn good intelligence, one needs as much information as possible. There is no such thing as a bad source, only bad information. Information equals intelligence, not the other way around. Gathering or obtaining good, clean, timely, and accurate information is key.

Collection produces information, and collection derives from requirements. Requirements are those interests, many of which are self-evident, which involve some risk or likelihood of a national security event, usually a threat or some issue of vital importance to an administration priority. American intelligence agencies currently take their cue from a dynamic (updated semiannually) document called the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), and it serves as the DNI’s guidance to the IC on priorities approved by the President (such as which foreign nations to focus upon). The NIPF guides prioritization over the operation, planning, and programming of U.S. intelligence analysis and collection. All intelligence requirements for collection are and must be based on and traceable to the NIPF. It goes without saying that perfect collection is not possible. It is impossible to cover everything, and not every issue requires the same collection resources, and not everything collected is of equal value (Lowenthal 2006). Collection for homeland security purposes requires all-agency and all-source reporting, even law enforcement reporting of suspicious incidents, and that such reports be forwarded and put into some kind of central or master database. An agency can, of course, "sanitize" any report it forwards to avoid compromising sensitive sources, and there are various other things that are done with classified documents. In practice, there will be several lists and databases, posing a database integration problem. Reports going into databases also have to be checked for functional integrity, which means that certain form fields need to be filled in properly.

For counterterrorism, Khalsa (2006) estimates that about 2500 raw, incoming, terrorism-related intelligence reports are generated every day by agencies and sources within the intelligence community. Now, one can then use Artificial Intelligence programs to sort the database, but these programs are only about 80% accurate -- the same level of accuracy that Humans have when "collectors" read through the assembled reports on a first-pass basis. For just the terrorism-related intelligence, then, you would need 84 collectors, profilers, or junior analysts (whatever you want to call them) because 1 person can only read one report every 10 minutes, and therefore, if a person works at this for 5 hours in an 8-hour day, they can only get 30 reports done daily. All this points to a critical principle regarding the function of collection: nothing ever gets put aside to be done later. All reports must be reviewed at the collection stage daily. Raw reports will then have sections highlighted by collectors before they are sent on to analysts, who may (and should) use other sources (not just their in-boxes) to create their finished assessments. Raw reports and finished assessments are all there is in intelligence production, and (this is important) the relevant raw reports can be attached to the finished assessments for submittal to those policymakers who want more than quicky-reference, pretty, color coded presentations. In this way, the policymaker is assured that what they receive is both: (a) all the intelligence community knows on a given topic; and (b) all the intelligence community needs to know on a given topic. If there is any question about either one, the solution is to be found in the way the intelligence cycle is supposed to work -- with collection feeding analysis and analysis feeding collection. It becomes common for analysts to help improve collection, and vice-versa, but the so-called "stovepipes" problem may develop as analysts tend to come to rely upon one form of collection at the expense of another. This aspect of the stovepipe problem runs counter to the kind of synergy and two-way communication which is required by the intelligence process.

Information is endless in terms of quantity, but is most exploitable when there is some "schema" which organizes "categories of interest" by the kinds of things which lend themselves either to patterns, series, or trends (which can be easily data analyzed) or detailed specifics like names, numbers, or addresses (which make the data amenable to link analysis). Identification is important, as one often runs into the problems of stolen identities, aliases, and false IDs in intelligence work. Accuracy in numbers is also important, as, for example, in the assessment of property value, smuggled quantities, costs of crime, as well as addresses. Suspicious incidents are a challenging category one must learn to master with greater consideration than is ordinarily given to such things. Given these challenges, then, it is no wonder that modern intelligence gathering is usually an extensive and hard-working endeavor having both an electronic and human face, and it has to be a bit overboard, shall we say, because the gathering or collection of intelligence is nothing more than stealing someone's secrets which they are closely guarding. It is done strategically, which means according to some direction, plan, or mission, and it is done competitively, which means that your opponents and allies are also most likely doing it, and it is done non-transparently, or in secret. The policymaking process which is informed by intelligence may be transparent, but the intelligence gathering or collection process rarely is disclosed. The first requirement is that your target must have something worth stealing. If they don't have anything worth stealing, then all you're doing is snooping or doing research. In business, this is known as the difference between competitive intelligence and market research. The military takes intelligence gathering rather seriously, as it is almost always collected for the purpose of assessing risks and hazards in preparation for the order of battle (IPB, or Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace). The most important thing to remember is that there is no such thing as intelligence for intelligence's sake. The whole purpose of gathering information about other's secrets and processing it into intelligence is to provide your leaders or policymakers with options to make policy more effective and efficient. There is no point in tasking, collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence products if there's no policy, issue, or anticipated issue on the table.

Intelligence gathering is another word for collection, and gathering takes place using open or closed sources. It may be helpful to review some definitions of intelligence, which would include the following. Intelligence is "the product resulting from the collecting and processing of information concerning actual and potential situations and conditions relating to domestic and foreign activities and to domestic and foreign or US and enemy-held areas" (Carl 1990). Intelligence is "secret knowledge of the enemy, a kind of knowledge which stands independently of the means by which it is obtained and the process by which it is distilled" (Troy 1991). The most basic intelligence process, or cycle, involves 3 steps: (1) collection; (2) analysis; and (3) synthesis. Collection will be outlined below. Analysis involves a variety of techniques to make conclusions or inferences. Synthesis normally produces a product, such as a chart, graph, table, summary, or other visual aid. The synthesis step is sometimes called fusion. There are additional steps which are worth mentioning because those are the ends to which intelligence is put: (4) policy; (5) arrest; and (6) war.

Some of the historical reasons for having steps or names for the separate processes of intelligence go back to the 6^th century BC writings of Sun Tzu, who said the process consisted of four basic elements (and possibly a fifth): collection, analysis, covert action, counterintelligence, and maybe opportunity analysis. Over the years, there have been many additions to this literature on the intelligence process, and some examples would include: Kahn’s Law (O’Toole 1990): "Emphasizing the offensive tends toward a neglect of intelligence." The First Corollary = Emphasizing the defensive tends toward an emphasis of intelligence … The Second Corollary = Emphasizing the offensive tends toward an emphasis of counterintelligence … The Third Corollary = In situations of stalemate, both sides tend to emphasize intelligence equally … The Fourth Corollary = An offensive operation that acquires defensive aspects tends to increase the emphasis on intelligence. A look at the contemporary as well as ancient way the intelligence process is organized appears below:

Sometimes, a whole lot of sophisticated technology is unnecessary because, believe it or not, 5% of the enemies of the U.S. still use Morse code. Sometimes the term COMINT is used and treated as a subset of SIGINT for Communications Intelligence when the enemy simply passes unsecure information via radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, but there may be some processing of encrypted information, however transmitted. There are a lot of job titles involved in the whole process. For example, interception comprises teams for search, intercept, operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptoanalysis, decryption, study of plaintext, and the fusion of these processes and the reporting of results. Different agencies divide up the interception tasks differently, as they do with the processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts. If something is unencrypted, then COMSEC, or Communications Security (like OPSEC), comes into play, which involves measures to deny persons information derived from national security or any authenticity of a communications. ELINT since 2001 is generally only involved when something is encrypted (consistent with the Unified Cryptological Architecture and NSA's mission management structure), but occasionally the term is used for the detection of emissions emanating from atomic detonation or radioactive sources. FININT, or financial intelligence, is a hard-to-classify, newly emerging discipline, practiced primarily by Treasury Department agencies that should most probably be considered a subset of SIGINT, but definitely involves other disciplines as well.

It is worth noting that the newest discipline of all -- called HSINT for Homeland Security Intelligence -- is the brainchild of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (headed by Charles Allen) and is trying to stand up on its own, and the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security is attempting to help with that. Nobody really knows for sure as of yet what HSINT would look like except that it would involve some mixture of both foreign and domestic intelligence processes.

Guidance From The Ancient Spy Master, Sun Tzu (500 BC)

     Some trace the origins of spying to the time of Moses, many experts point out the contributions of the ancient spy master, Sun Tzu (500 BC) who said there were five classes of spies:
     (1) Local spies - recruited agents who are inhabitants of an enemy territory
     (2) Moles - recruited agents who are officials in an enemy government
     (3) Double agents - recruited enemy spies who are used for your own purposes
     (4) Doomed spies - spies used for deception purposes and expendable
     (5) Surviving spies - spies who produce intelligence on your enemies
     Sun Tzu said - "When all five kinds of spy are hard at work, none can discover the secret system, or "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the commander's most precious resource. More intimate relations ought to be maintained with your spies than with your own army. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other field should greater secrecy be preserved. Sun Tzu went on to say:
     (1) Spies must possess a certain intuitive sagacity
     (2) They should be managed with benevolence and straight forwardness
     (3) Spies are ingenious, so make certain of the truth of their reports
     (4) Be subtle, but use your spies for every kind of warfare
     (5) All spies are expendable
     Whether the object be to crush an enemy, storm a territory, or kill an official, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the official in question. Such assistants make up the playing field for spying because it's where your recruits and replacements come from. When the enemy's spies come to spy on you, they must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the double agent . Hence it is essential that the double agent be treated with the utmost liberality. Sun Tzu also stressed the necessity of counterintelligence. An intelligence service is a two-edged sword. It is of no use unless it can be trusted beyond any shadow of doubt, but the fact that it is trusted leaves it dangerously vulnerable to its compromise by enemy agents. An intelligence service reduces the mass of data, often contradictory, straining for a leader's attention: instead of ten versions of the nature of a problem, the leader has just one. This minimizes confusion, but it allows your enemies an easy and single target for penetration and deception.

Each discipline has its advantages and disadvantages, and to a degree, they are very competitive with one another in trying to create a "pipeline" to the top. Imagery (IMINT) is often graphic and compelling and easily shared, but is only a snapshot, and armed, real-time images (such as in armed Predator drones) are the cutting-edge now. Signals intelligence today is quite advanced at denying the enemy any use of their own SIGINT capabilities, but interception of communications remains as highly important (at the content analysis level) as monitoring communication for volume and traffic (COMINT). One way to distinguish between IMINT and SIGINT is to say IMINT tells you what happened and SIGINT tells you what will happen. In discussing collection, scholars (Lowenthal 2006) often refer to "pipelines" and "stovepipes" which are terms used in different senses. First, since all the technical collection disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT & MASINT) and the nontechnical (HUMINT) disciplines each have similar end-to-end processes (i.e., their own pipelines), it is expected there will be stovepipes formed from beginning to end (collection through dissemination) in other "types" of collection disciplines. Second, stovepipes may simply refer to the idea that different collection disciplines are in competition with one another, not well-coordinated at a central level, and hence produce complete, but individual and separate reports. Third, the reference may be to "stovepipes within stovepipes" where separate disciplines have separate processes within themselves that work somewhat independently of one another, the assumption being the idea that such natural competition produces an aggregate benefit. In common parlance, the stovepipes problem is often mentioned whenever one is talking about the lack of synergy among the various collection disciplines.

Military intelligence usually has a far better handle on how to coordinate various collection disciplines, given, in part, because the military sometimes defines intelligence as collection, along with other meanings, such as: (1) surveillance -- the systematic observation of a targeted area or group, usually for an extended period of time; and (2) reconnaissance -- a mission to acquire information about a target, sometimes meaning a one-time endeavor.

An excellent example of collection synergy is pointed out by Lowenthal (2006) and involves the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. A human source provided information on the location where U-2 flights could be targeted over a trapezoid-shaped area bounded by four towns in western Cuba. Photo interpretation was then supplemented by Soviet colonel Oleg Penckovsky's turning over Soviet technical manuals. Imagery intelligence then provided crucial data (see famous "Star of David photo" below -- of an air defense site in Cuba, 1962, which was an unique road pattern previously seen only in the USSR). With this example, one can clearly see the beginning-to-end or pipeline nature of this particular type of collection. Some things are just visually self-evident.

However, basic intelligence gathering should also consist of collecting facts (data) and observations from open sources or clandestine sources. There, it needs to be patiently and rigorously analyzed, evaluated, compared, and integrated with other information and existing intelligence to arrive at conclusions relevant to the needs of policymakers. Trends and anomalies from the collected intelligence are processed carefully, and if the incoming intelligence seems to follow a pattern that pre-existing intelligence has indicated, this is called "connecting the dots." If there is an anomalous, sharp spike in the quantity or quality of incoming intelligence, this is called "chatter" or "noise." The key to success is that once your collection elements are deployed, the intelligence coming in from them is rapidly compared in a pre-production process called "cross-cueing" which ensures the possibility for timely dissemination of intelligence products. When basic intelligence collection products are compared to the kind of collected intelligence coming in from advanced methods (such as orbital or airborne sensors), this pre-production process is called "fusion," although the terms cross-cueing and fusion are sometimes used interchangeably. The United States operates with a multi-level intelligence community where interoperability and collaboration are important and intelligence from different collection sources can move rapidly from one collection discipline to another. Other nations, even our allies, use somewhat different ways of organizing their intelligence community with regard to collection. A few other democracies (like Australia and New Zealand) involve civilian oversight; Latin American nations generally involve their police and military more; communist nations usually have some form of party or council control; and Muslim nations exercise theocratic control. Some foreign ways of organizing are more or less multi-level and more or less centralized than the U.S. approach.

All gathered intelligence is rated for its quality and reliability, and then it is exploited. It is customary to apply a simple alpha (A-F) and numeric (1-6) system on raw data, where the alphabetical characters represent the reliability of the source (A= completely reliable, F= unknown reliability) and the numerical characters represent the accuracy of the information (1= confirmed by other sources, 6= truth cannot be judged). There are very few intelligence gathering sources with an A-1 rating. In the pre-production analysis phase, cross-cued intelligence is evaluated by what is called "analysis of competing hypotheses." Using this approach, an analyst (or group of analysts) tries to identify all plausible explanations or conclusions about an issue in an effort to select the correct (or most correct) one. There is then a simultaneous comparison of how well the available information supports each potential hypothesis. The ultimate finished product is a NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) presented to the National Security Advisor for the President that lays out the probabilities or possibilities. There are always caveats or provisos to intelligence products, and in many ways they affect the mindsets of analysts who use them, but often don't affect the policymakers. The collection fields of intelligence work have their own folklore which provides many cautions for those who produce intelligence products, and some basic truisms of that folklore, as well as some of the folklore itself, is discussed below:

Spies are (and should be) the basic collection platform for any well-rounded intelligence system. Much of intelligence gathering at the clandestine level is a lot like undercover police work. Like the policeman's attitude toward the "stool pidgeon" or "snitch," it's important to note that to intelligence professionals (case officers or case handlers), an "agent" is a foreign national, an informant, someone committed to treason and "spying" on his or her own country. The theory behind working undercover is that it removes any impediments to acquiring information, and allows a number of activities such as surveillance, eavesdropping, use of informants, and espionage. It typically involves an assumed identity for a defined and considerable amount of time. Undercover work allows someone to circulate in areas where they are not ordinarily welcome. The job of anyone working undercover is to "make cases," or in other words, to gather enough information to enable a successful outcome, remembering that the goal is to be a hunter, not a gatherer. The first rule of clandestine intelligence gathering is to go after the big game. You want the payoff to be big. You want the largest impact possible because you've maximized your gathering operation as dangerously as possible.

A distinction is usually made between agents who are under cover and those who are under deep cover. This is sometimes referred to as "legals v. illegals" although more common terminology distinguishes between "official" and "unofficial" cover. Official cover refers to disguishing an intelligence officer as an attache or liaison officer at an embassy or overseas post. Nonofficial cover refers to someone in deeper disguise who is acting like a businessman, journalist, tourist, or college professor on an exchange program. Those people on nonofficial cover make up what is called the "NOC list" (for NonOfficial Cover), and the NOC list is a closely guarded secret because NOCs are either high level principal agents or staff employees under a variety of covers. There is usually little to no cover working out of an embassy because everyone knows embassies are a hub of espionage. If a case officer under official cover works out of an embassy, they can expect extensive surveillance of their every move, so usually such officers restrict their recruitment activities to a third country outside where their embassy is. On the other hand, NOCs often have dual nationality, and require handling by an inside case officer, and employ covers that Rustmann (2002) distinguishes as "cover for status" (the legitimacy to live and work in a particular country) and "cover for action" (the aliases or identities which allow operations to be carried out).

Let's examine the stages of undercover work: THE EARLY STAGES -- A typical pattern is to bring someone in as the girlfriend or boyfriend of an infiltrator, and then distance themselves from that infiltrator. Once it's clear to all the parties involved that the undercover agent is single again, another undercover agent is brought in as the boyfriend or girlfriend of the first undercover agent. This allows the gathering unit to work as a team, which is better for safety. The initial targets are usually the big leaders of a group that has been infiltrated, but often the undercover operatives have to settle for going after the small fries, accumulating information and case material as they go. A supervisor or case officer usually makes the decision about whether enough important information has been accumulated to decide if and when the operation should be terminated, and a system will have usually been put in place for the operative to turn over evidence on a systematic basis or en masse at one time. THE MIDDLE STAGES -- some agents are allowed to create their own cover stories or legend, and this will depend upon the type of behavior involved (drugs, contraband, gambling, "subversive" groups, terrorism). The need may arise for false documents or computer records for such agents. This is not ordinarily done with minor cases. The need may also arise for creating various kind of setup situations in which the agent "proves" their criminality or loyalty by engaging in a staged showdown with police or a brush with the law. The staged encounter may also be an opportunity to supervise the agent. Since supervision and continued surveillance becomes more difficult as the operation progresses over time, agents are sometimes busted to give a progress report and let management know if they need more or less supervision. THE LATE STAGES -- some deep cover agents lose perspective and go native so agencies have policies in place to help avoid this. Most agencies will call someone in who has been doing this kind of work too long so that they can salvage their usefulness as a regular employee, and in fact, this is a job benefit guaranteed by civil service rights. Employees at the SIS and SES levels, of course, enjoy no such rights, and are allowed to be hired and fired at will. Danger, temptation, and paranoia play roles in the late stages, and it is always possible the person becomes a rogue agent where one of the hallmarks of this is that they arrange their own private surveillance and protection.

Employees of intelligence services don't consider themselves spies; they consider themselves recruiters of spies. Sometimes, they sneak into foreign countries and do spy work themselves, but they still primarily think of themselves as case officers, supervisors, or handlers. In actual practice, there is a vast bureaucracy of people backing up the spy and their handler, or case officer. In any clandestine operation, the upper eschelon of a spy bureaucracy consists of: (1) a regional desk officer, who oversees all HUMINT operations in that region of the world; (2) watch officers, who staff a 24-hour crisis center; (3) a counterintelligence officer, who oversees clandestine meetings between officers and agents; and (4) a reports officer, who acts as a liaison between officers in the field and analysts at headquarters. The spies themselves are mostly considered traitor or fools, and fools come in an amazing variety of forms:

    1. People with loose lips, careless security attitudes (inadvertent spies)
    2. People fleeing the rule of their own country (defectors)
    3. People looking for a source of extra income (walk-ins)
    4. People who have made a plea bargain with law enforcement (undercovers)
    5. People tricked, bribed, or blackmailed (recruits)
    6. People caught spying against you (double agents)

Spies are usually classified as PRIMARY or ACCESS agents. A primary agent is someone with actual access to the information you need. An access agent knows somebody who is more important, and serves as a gateway or portal to others. Recruiting spies is all about deception. Case officers regularly deceive spies as much as spies deceive the people they spy on. Those who recruit and manage spies, however, must always come off as honest and sincere friends, and tell believable lies. Much of tradecraft is the pursuit of skill at lying. Here's one of the most standard deceptions:

Three resources that a recruiter will need, and plenty of it, are: money, drugs, and sex. Money is generally used to attract a recruit's attention, and sooner or later, it's all going to come down to money. Normally, the money will come from the budgets of the intelligence service; and at other times, activities will be self-financed. Drugs are generally used to service or create an addiction which is then used for blackmail purposes, if appropriate. Alcohol is the drug of choice, but anything that will build rapport and encourage talking is suitable. Sex almost never involves the case officer engaging in it with the recruit. Instead, the case officer uses prostitutes paid to pretend being innocent lovers, capitalizes on an ongoing affair, uses another recruit, or an innocent amateur.

In the advanced second phase, TESTING means checking your informant's information against known facts. Regardless of the reasons for error, if a spy doesn't produce credible information, they should be threatened with termination at this point, or dropped as a source. Spies are also often "fluttered" at this point, which means that they are given a polygraph examination, or interrogated. TRAINING involves teaching the spy how to use specialized equipment and codes. One of the other important things the spy will want training in is escape and evasion tactics. Training should also involve coaching the person in how to spend money. HANDLING is a term short for "psychological handling" which usually involves the passing of control from yourself to another, usually superior, case officer. The handing off of spies is done for several reasons: so they don't get too close to their original recruiter; to make them feel they are getting better protection; and to make them feel they are getting promoted. Often, it has been your agency which has generated some fear, convincing the spy that their mother or other relative needs protection. Spies can be promoted all the way up to Admiral or General since it's only honorary rank. TERMINATION is always done by the agency. The most common reason given for termination is budget problems. Usually, the person is allowed to immigrate and is given a new identity, a desk job, and sometimes a pension. Other times, they are allowed to get caught or killed. It's important to break off all contacts with a terminated agent. They cannot be allowed to quit or resign.

Case officers and their spies should work up a special communications code between them. It may involve the type of clothing worn, or a series of hand signals. Code words and nickname are also usually involved. A code word generally refers to an intelligence document and has a classified meaning; a nickname usually consists of two words and is assigned an unclassified meaning. At a minimum, the following should be able to be communicated without words:

Spies have copied, photographed, or memorized things, which they then pass on to their contacts. Most intelligence services use what are called COURIERS to handle all such exchanges and contacts. Sometimes, couriers are involved in the initial recruitment and training of a spy; and at other times, they're unrelated to the case. Professional messenger and postal services are also sometimes used. A traditional exchange is:

Telephone conversations are always avoided, as are computerized forms of communicating over the Internet. A few Internet exceptions exist, however, as a popular form of exchange takes place not with encryption, but with postings in public bulletin boards or Usenet discussion groups. In other words, no direct computer-to-computer connections are allowed. SAFE HOUSES exist in almost every city. Most commonly, they are hotel or motel rooms; other times, a rental house or apartment. Safe houses are always constantly being rented, the purpose being that their newness prevents the planting of surveillance devices. As a general rule, spies and visitors should always be blindfolded when taken to a safe house.

Getting past the extensive folklore on this subject is necessary. Sex is only one (1) of several methods for turning someone into a traitor or spy. Almost all the motives for becoming such a person are expressed in the acronym MICE (Money, Ideology, Compromise, Ego). Sex falls under the Compromise category. The letter "C" (for Compromise) can itself be subdivided into three (3) distinct subparts:

The theory behind the use of sex in espionage is based mostly on Freudian theory, the idea that the sex drive is basic, so basic, in fact, that it is the basis of all other drives, a generalized drive, if you will. Additionally, the sex drive is compulsive or addictive. It cuts across various degrees of mental intellect. There are several known incidents in which powerful and intelligent people have jeopardized their careers to satisfy a sexual urge or craving. The use of beautiful women in baited situations is known as planting a "honey trap", or more formally "entrapment," but sometimes a good-looking man (or romeo) is planted. The Arab countries are said to know everything about NATO activities and plans because it has been so efficiently penetrated by Arab romeos. A rather interesting part of spy history involves the use of HOMOSEXUAL agents. Some of the most notorious spies in history have been homosexuals (the Cambridge Spy Ring) or sexual deviants (the KGB agent Geoffrey Prime). Most sexual deviants don't succeed in the spy business, but homosexuals apparently do. Instead of being called "honey-traps," a homosexual compromise situation is called a "drone-traps."

Recruits are also often enticed into various "deals" which expose them to blackmail by the host country's intelligence services. Here's a list of various techniques:

Any refugee or war criminal makes excellent material for recruitment. The immigration quota system may be used to threaten people. An applicant is converted into a spy by promises of moving quickly on their visa application (permission to leave the country) in return for agreeing to spy in their newly adopted countries. Some nations offer to pay all tuition expenses if the student, studying in the host country, agrees to engage in espionage.

Job titles come in many forms. At the top of the hierarchy are officers in the various intelligence agencies. An intelligence officer position is usually an executive position, which means they get to stay home at headquarters most of the time. Underneath this career level are junior officers who are known as legals or illegals. A legal junior officer is one sent overseas under cover as a diplomat or attache. Illegal junior officers have more deceptive covers, usually as a business or sales person. Among the junior officer ranks, there is usually one spy master, who acts as the head controller. Almost all junior officers stationed abroad serve as case officers, or controllers. They are expected to recruit and run agents who come from the host country, setting up what is known as "assets," or a spy ring. The people who work in various supporting capacities at the home office are called analysts.

The persons recruited in the host country to work as assets, spies, or traitors are called agents. One of the defining characteristics of all agents is that they're expendable. There are different types of agents: penetration agents, or moles, who work under deep cover and are well-placed; double agents, who work for both sides; cut-outs, who act as intermediaries or mercenaries; feedback agents, who provide running commentary on political events, and may consist of stay-behinds, which are those left in place by retreating troops in wartime; and all-purpose agents of influence, who are provided with little direction and operate fairly independently.

Advocates of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) believe that, despite technological advances, traditional espionage remains crucial in providing information known as the foreknowledge before something takes place; i.e., information about intentions, political activity and strategic concepts of an adversary's leadership. Moreover, taking into consideration the current threat the world is faced, terrorism, where targets have gotten smaller, more mobile and have gone underground, the human intelligence platform becomes more important as well. There are advantages and disadvantages inherent with use of Official Cover (diplomat or any government official posted abroad) operatives and Nonofficial Cover (business, journalist, tourist) operatives, and the following chart details those matters:

*Types of Intelligence Officers: Pros & Cons*
Official Cover	Nonofficial Cover
Advantages:
Diplomatic immunity improved access to some potential sources i.e. "innocent" opportunities to meet host government officials and other diplomats matter handled by an intelligence professional in case sensitive materials reach embassy certain administrative convenience i.e. remuneration and other personnel issues	Access to a different, wider spectrum of potential sources pose/be as nationals of the country posted to facilitated in making contacts with potential sources continuance of operations in case of diplomatic breakoff harder for the host government to identify
Disadvantages:
Greater chances for counterintelligence service to find out the intelligence officer hinder access to others who might be hesitant to deal with foreign officials disruption of operations/networks in case of diplomatic breakoff	Expense and administrative difficulty devotion of greater time to cover activity rather than on intelligence collection communications difficult

Tradecraft prevails in intelligence collection when human assets are involved. No misinterpretation should be made about it: espionage is spying, period. To historians, it's the world's second oldest profession. To criminologists, it's a crime against government. To practitioners, it’s the exercise of tradecraft in the Great Game. Tradecraft is any technique or trick that substantiates a view of the work as a skilled occupation or craft. The most common operational skills for espionage work involve surveillance and running agents. At the barest minimum, there are only three basic requirements of an espionage operation: (1) a way for the agent to get a hold of someone in case of emergency; (2) a way for the intelligence officer to get information from the agent; and (3) a way to pay the agent. Those who do the actual spying are called agents. Their supervisors are called officers.

Spying is not considered a crime against government by the government that employs them, only by the government upon which they're spying. If the spy is a double agent or spies against their own country, then they're guilty of treason or being a traitor. Treason is a rather loose word that involves aiding or abetting your country's enemies, and is often tossed around with cases of ideological dissent or protest. Spies are always at risk of becoming traitors. One of the most frequently cited definitions of espionage is "the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation" (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive). Perhaps the most controversial areas of intelligence involve covert action and counterintelligence.

It is in the nature of counterintelligence that you never quite know what you're doing. This can make it appear silly or childish. Outsiders sometimes suggest that the melodramatic intrigue of the intelligence business be junked entirely; but even if all the spies were let go, and all the field stations closed down, counterintelligence would necessarily remain, for reason that a vulnerable intelligence service is worse than none at all. Once that point has been conceded, all the rest of the clandestine enterprise comes tumbling after, because the best way to protect one's service is to penetrate the enemy's. The game of espionage will always go on because even allies will spy upon another, not just enemies. Counterintelligence (CI) involves any effort to protect secrets, prevent an intelligence mechanism from being manipulated, and also exploit the intelligence activities of another entity. It can be passive or active. Passive or defensive counterintelligence is called "security," and involves locating, screening, and identifying people, limiting their access to classified material, and instituting accounting systems to trace losses. Active counterintelligence is called "countermeasures," and involves specific protections using specific tactics such as neutralizing an enemy or putting them under surveillance.

Covert action (operation) can be defined as anything falling between the extremes of diplomacy and war. All covert action requires counterintelligence for protection. Counterintelligence also involves protection against assassination, kidnapping, espionage, and sabotage. Espionage, also called spying or running agents, involves access, infiltration, and penetration, and is probably best seen as a type of reconnaissance. Counterespionage is sometimes treated as synonymous with counterintelligence, but it is somewhat different in that the former is more aggressive. Counterespionage is primarily concerned with deception (sometimes called deception and denial) and counterintelligence is primarily concerned with monitoring. For example, counterespionage would try to stage fake accidents in which fake classified documents would fall into the hands of the enemy (in order to deceive them). It relies upon the skills of camouflage and forgery. Counterintelligence would normally try to keep the enemy's regular communication unaltered (for monitoring) to stay one step ahead of them, and to expose potential vulnerabilities that may be exploited later on. Counterintelligence produces some of the most confusing disinformation in the world, and several nations play that game well.

Covert action has generally not been a good friend of collection since it not always impossible (in today's world especially) to trace an activity back to its sponsoring intelligence agency or "source." There is quite a bit of literature available on this topic, much of it critical and questioning whether covert action should be a standard part of foreign policy or is an nonessential element of intelligence operations. Defenders of the need for covert action argue that it provides an intermediate step between failed diplomacy and outright war. Current law (the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) requires that the President deem any proposed covert action as important to national security. Godson (1994) probably has the most popular book on the subject, although he combines covert action and counterintelligence, two very different intelligence disciplines. Covert action has been practiced by all Presidents, from Washington to Lincoln (Knott 1996). According to a 1948 National Security Council document, covert operations are defined as: "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation; and subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world."

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