COLLECTIVE RESPONSE AND GLOBAL TOLERANCE
"A man has to know his limitations" (Clint Eastwood in Magnum Force)

    The collective response approach to terrorism prevention is, with few exceptions, an inherently politically liberal approach.  One can mix or juggle around the words in the title, Collective Response and Global Tolerance, and pretty much express the same set of ideas which make up this approach.  It entails some different perceptions of the problem and some different suggestions for remedies.  One may or may not personally agree with this approach, but it's usually incumbent upon critical thinkers to consider all sides to an issue, so the following remarks are offered in that spirit.  It's possible that a liberal perspective may come to dominate U.S. politics, and current thinking in terrorism studies would have to adjust.  It's also the case that many other nations have not been inclined to embrace the conservative U.S. position, and therefore, liberal perspectives are worthy of study for that reason.  Liberalism and its study comprise large segments of thinking in international politics.  It would be nice if one could lay out the key assumptions and linchpins of the liberal approach, but the perspective is quite diverse for that, and frankly, many liberals exaggerate certain points solely for purpose of dissent, and others simply use terrorism as a wedge issue.  However, there are some ideas worth exploring that have kernels of truth in them.  Further, there is an emerging academic literature which tries to go beyond the usual polemics.

    For example, no less than the esteemed terrorism expert, Brian Jenkins, both in his book Unconquerable Nation and RAND brief, Fear Cannot Counter Terror, basically says we just need to get used to the occasional, horrible things terrorists do.  The title Unconquerable Nation derives from a quote by the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who wrote “Being unconquerable lies within yourself.”  Now, Jenkins (2006) does not go as far as saying that jihadists will attack the U.S. again and again until Americans psychologically accept notions about radical Islam's autonomy and superiority, but Benjamin and Simon (2003; 2006) say just as much with their repetitive and distinctively liberal, "We are losing" thesis.  What's spooky about Benjamin and Simon (who are former national security advisors under the Clinton administration) is that their 2003 book was contracted and penned prior to 9/11, which makes them prophets of sorts, if one believes, as liberals often do, that any "war on terrorism" is doomed from the start.  The most polite, but hard-hitting exposition of this thesis is Richardson (2006) who argues that having war declared on them gives terrorists exactly what they want.  A commonly cited statistic comes from Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank's The Iraq effect: War has increased terrorism sevenfold in the March 1, 2007 issue of Mother Jones magazine.  Liberals believe not only that war makes terrorism 7x worse, they also believe that terrorism can never be completely eradicated from the planet until some global progress is made, as that progress is outlined in the (no better capsule statement of liberal solutions exists elsewhere) 13 Steps for Restoring American Leadership from the Soros-funded Open Society Institute.  The basic polemical problem is that conservatives tend to see terrorism as a snake (which can have its head chopped off) and liberals tend to see terrorism as a mold (a fungus which spreads and is unstoppable in many forms).     

  Criminological thought on the subject is emerging.  For example, there is Arena & Arrigo's (2006) book, which in typical liberal fashion, attempts to better understand terrorist motivation, and presents the argument that terrorists simply have a confused sense of self.  Hamm (2007), another criminologist, goes further, claiming there's nothing so special about terrorism that good, old-fashioned community policing can't handle.  Again, these are just examples, and other liberal points of view are much more nuanced.  Although no one has written a book on the subject, the idea that terrorist wannabes can be detected early enough to put them on some kind of "probation" so they can receive some state-funded "rehabilitation" has great appeal to criminologists.  To a large extent, this is because modern criminology has become so over-specialized, so empirically-driven, and so micro-oriented that it fails to consider the whole repertoire of social control responses, especially at the international level, which is admittedly, not a mature subject area for the field.    

A RESPONSE IS A RESPONSE IS A RESPONSE

    There are two basic options for fighting a global war on terror: unilateralism, where one nation goes it alone, yet runs the risk of being called nationalist or imperialist; and multilateralism, where treaties and institutions (like NATO or the UN) are relied upon, yet are reluctant to put any teeth behind their commitment to an attack on one is an attack against all ideology.  It would seem that both options have significant drawbacks, but also significant is the common rhetoric for success.  Underlying both options is an assumption that greater strength prevails against terrorism, since after all, terrorism is essentially a weapon of the weak (Tehranian 2002).  The strong/weak dualism provides some interesting rhetoric.  Strength and resoluteness (firmness of purpose) are seen as necessary to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.  Peace through strength is said to bring safety.  Strength is itself victory, and as General MacArthur used to say, "there is no substitute for victory." 

    There are many types of victory, and the type sought will determine response.  For example, there is TOTAL victory which calls for total response, as former SECDEF Rumsfield put it in 2005: "What's the goal of this Global War on Terror? Tell them it's victory. Unconditional, unapologetic, and unyielding."  On the other hand, some strategy documents, including the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, refer to a "desired endstate" where terrorism is rendered "unorganized, localized, non-sponsored, and returned to the criminal domain."  Ledeen (2003) says that the win will come when we have killed or incarcerated the major terrorists, destroyed their infrastructure, start to see defectors, drops in morale, and the other usual signs when somebody's ready to lose a war.  It would seem PARTIAL victory is acceptable to some degree.  Absent any science of metrics for victory, one is hard pressed to answer the "how long" question of what it takes to win a generational "war on ideas" inherent in such concepts as the long war, WWIV, freedom agenda, and long-term antidotes to the ideology of terrorism.

    One idea for what to do with the defectors (once they start coming in) is to set up "rehabilitation centers," something along the lines of "al-Qaeda Anonymous" meetings.  Such programs would guide radicalized Muslims away from the path of jihad.  This idea has been suggested by none other than an ex-jihadist, a British Muslim called Ed Husain, as reported in this 2007 UK Telegraph article.  Mr Husain, 32, is a former member of the extremist group Hizb ut-Tahir and is now a PhD student in Great Britain.  He says that most extremists have never met a genuine Muslim scholar, and there need to be more forums for moderate Muslims to speak out.  He also says that preventing terrorism should become a civic duty.  Ed Husain (2007) is the author of the book, The Islamist, which details why he quit radical Islam.  More such stories of ex-terrorists should be told.

    Another idea is to increase the presence of moderate American Muslims on the international scene.  Presumably naming a Muslim to the post of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. accomplishes that, in the form of Zalmay Khalilzad, widely regarded as the highest-ranking Muslim in the U.S. administration.  A similarly prominent Muslim in high U.S. circles is Dr. Zuhdi Jasser, who heads the influential American Islamic Forum for Democracy.       

APPEASEMENT AND NEGOTIATION   

    One size for victory may not fit all.  The world is a big place where tolerance of SOME terrorism might be acceptable.  Reasonable minds may differ over this idea, with some arguing that no stable equilibrium is possible (terrorists would eventually assassinate those who tolerate them), and others arguing that relative peace and stability are achievable given greater opportunities for dialogue and understanding.  No one since Gal-Or (1991) has ever done a scholarly examination of whether the world can sustain a tolerable level of terrorism.  Looking at the world realistically, it does seem impossible to wipe out the breeding grounds for terrorism because much of the world is impoverished and must choose between fighting terrorism (reducing political turmoil) and sustaining economic development (realizing growth potential).  Many spots on the globe simply can't afford to combat terrorism, and additionally, some forms of extremism may hold special sociocultural importance.  To end the war on terror -- to really END terrorism -- may require considering "weak responses" or as Ross (2006) puts it "recognizing that terrorism is here to stay."    

  From these considerations, a collective responsibility thus ensues around the common challenge of how to build a more peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious world with terrorism still in it.  In short, a collective response is needed to achieve global tolerance.  This project cannot be done unilaterally.  It cannot be done militarily.  As absurd as it sounds, we may need to learn how to befriend terrorists.  Grievances must give way to friendships; interference must give way to independence; and long-standing disputes must give way to confidence-building.  It is important to note that "non-response" is not being proposed here, in the Wilkinsonian sense (Wilkinson 1986) that even a non-response is a response (of weakness).  Complacency is not an option.  Terrorism is a menace and a scourge.  Terrorism is part of the problem, not the solution.  Terrorism has, and always will be, a threat to civilization and democracy.  Terrorism is the traditional enemy of dialogue.  Terrorism will attempt to use every opportunity at its disposal to obtain some pretext of legitimacy.  Yet, there may be some small-time terrorists less offensive than others.  Declaring war on them just gives them the pretext of legitimacy they want.  Back channel diplomacy might work, as Harvard professor Louise Richardson suggests in Isn't It Time We Talked to bin Laden?  Talks don't have to be negotiations, just informal talks to see what it takes to cool things down a little.  Appeasement is not defeatism.  The Wikipedia Entry on Appeasement points out that historically, there have have been many "bought years" of peace where appeasement worked, and back channel diplomacy worked well for the British with their Northern Ireland problem.

    As former President Clinton likes to remark, the Human Genome Project tells us all humans are 99.9% alike.  It is precisely this commonality which seems to make common challenges surmountable.  One of the equalizers is justice.  All terrorists have rather strong conceptions of justice and equity, albeit "alternative" or unusual conceptions frequently out of the mainstream.  Further, all terrorists have goals or expectations of tolerance, albeit thinly-disguised grabs for power or influence.  The justice and equity approach to be discussed here has frequently only been discussed in the context of the economic implications of globalization.  The externalities of globalization may or may not be relevant to the present discussion (see Terrorism as Antiglobalization on that topic).  Justice as equity (in the sense used here for negotiating with terrorists) typically comes down to conceptions of need and/or merit.  Tolerance is, additionally, a loaded concept used in the context of everything from cultural sensitivity to teaching how to "take the terror out of terrorism" (see Terrorism Investigation for sensitivity issues).  It is used here to refer to the understanding of other political-social systems as well as disharmonious "other" cultures and values, similar to the Pakistani notion of "enlightened moderation" (see Wikipedia Entry for Enlightened Moderation).  The hope, therefore, is that an adequately global and tolerant response will address the root, underlying causes of terrorism and prevent the emergence of terrorism by defeating the hate and anger on which terrorism thrives.

TOWARD LESS FREQUENT, LESS DEADLY TERRORISM

    It is possible to define terrorism downward.  The international community can't seem to agree upon a definition or a list of who are the "true" terrorists.  Much of the world (particularly the Middle East) seems to prefer distinguishing "freedom fighters" from terrorists.  Nations like Syria regard Israeli military actions as the only "true terrorism" in the world.   Terrorist campaigns could be redefined downward as criminal conspiracies.  Doing so runs the risk of tolerating mass atrocities, but at least it wouldn't be called "terrorism" and at least under the international law, authorities are on more solid ground when it comes to handling things like crimes against humanity.  However, that still makes the problem a war crime, involving more military than criminal justice.  Accountability which gives recognition to justice and equity is far better established under a criminal law framework. 

    What's needed is some kind of International Terrorism Tribunal (“ITT”); essentially, “an international treaty based court established to try international terrorists.”  Case Law student William Carmines ('05) has, in fact, put forth such a recommendation, along with a fifty-page treaty (at law.cwru.edu/curriculum/news/pdfs/itt_treaty.pdf).  The ITT idea, generally speaking, would be a treaty based tribunal formed by like minded nations united in an effort to combat international terrorism by trying international terrorists.  It gives the ITT jurisdiction to try international terror suspects detained by Member states.  That is, once a party to this treaty, a Member state should not try a suspected terrorist in a domestic court.  In fact, once the suspect is arrested and detained on international terror charges (including, but not limited to, the actual use of terrorist activity, as well as the threat, financing, and harboring of such terrorists), the suspect then, within 7 days unless an extension applies, must be transferred to the ITT’s Administrative Counsel for further detention, pre-trial hearings, interrogation, and potential prosecution.  What's essential are the due process safeguards built into the judicial process, under the presumption, alongside humane detention, that swift and certain punishment will act as a deterrent on collateral deadly terrorism carried out in protest of captured terrorists.      

    Ceasefires and truces are also known to reduce the lethality of terrorism, although sometimes a spin-off group will emerge that is more deadly than the original.  The U.N. is specifically set up to monitor ceasefire arrangements, and it's often possible to get some political leverage over terrorism by pursuing a ceasefire arrangement.  Everyone in a leadership position wins by a ceasefire.  The terrorist leader looks good; all leaders look good; and if the experts who say terrorist leaders have low self-esteem are right, it should be an easy job to feed their egos and get cooperation via negotiation.  Sometimes, however, you can't trust a brokered deal regarding ceasefires, truces, or peace treaties.  A lot depends upon the personalities involved, and the temptation toward military build-up and rearming should be resisted.  Ceasefires don't solve much in the long run unless there's some work on the underlying problems in the meantime.  Fetishizing ceasefires for their own sake is futile.  What empirical research exists on the subject of ceasefire effectiveness indicates that any wise course of action would involve utilizing the growing corps of professional peacebuilders.  Examples from the literature include (Curle 1986) who has long called for establishment of an International Mediation Center; Ricigliano (2003), who passed along the idea that successful interventions must be at the political, social (relationship), and structural (legal) levels; and Stabel (2005) who acknowledges the need for peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA), a methodology which seeks to ensure, among other things, that the peace process does not result in any extra privileges (or rewards) for terrorism.

    Bringing in civilian expertise to help win the war on terror is probably a good idea.  Often, military troops could really use help from the civilian sector.  Conservatives tend to view the idea of a Peace Corps/AmeriCorps/Girl Scout kind of organization as liberal nonsense, but Presidential contender John Edwards has proposed just such a thing:  a 10,000-person “Marshall Corps” to deal with issues ranging from worldwide poverty and economic development to clean drinking water and micro-lending.  Edwards says investing in those areas would shore up weak nations and help ensure that terrorism does not take root there.  America has long engaged in humanitarian relief efforts overseas, and such efforts could be redirected to fight the causes of terrorism, assuming, of course, that poverty is such a root cause.          

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

    A Cold War concept in origin, peaceful coexistence refers to the possibility of two antagonistic forces (in the Cold War case, communism and capitalism) living side-by-side with one another, without war, without interference in each other's internal affairs, and a de-emphasis upon military disposition toward one another (mutual non-aggression).  It was never quite realized historically with Russia primarily because of confusion among Russian scholars about its doctrinal congruence with Marxism-Leninism, but China embraced it in the 1990s as did the Vatican where it stands as the Catholic Church's official statement on how to achieve peace in the Middle East.  Peaceful coexistence involves travel and interaction, not isolationism.  An exchange of material and ideas is supposed to take place.  Peaceful coexistence can take place not only between nations, but within nations.

    Today, Fethullah Gülen is the world's most prominent advocate of peaceful coexistence.  Gülen is a Turkish Islamic preacher/scholar who lives in the U.S., has written several books (e.g. Gülen 2004), has founded numerous educational institutions (e.g., Virginia International University), and is owner/operator of several influential publishing outlets (e.g., the newspaper Zaman).  Opinions vary about his politics as well as his religion, but he is undeniably a leader in the interfaith dialogue movement.  The phrase "interfaith dialogue" refers to cooperative and positive interaction among people of different faiths to uncover common ground or similarities.  The movement has been strong since the 1960s, and for many years before (and after) was led by groups such as the Bahá'í Faith (a post-Islamic monotheistic religion sometimes spelled B’nai Brith to overcome American hostility toward diacritical marks) and the World Council of Churches.  In recent years, many religious denominations, for one reason or another, have embraced the need for interfaith dialogue, not all in the most sincerest of ways toward understanding, but in thinly-veiled missionary ways toward the hope of converting Muslims to a different religion.  An example is Southern Baptist advocacy of Camel Training (Greeson 2007) which holds that the Qur'an says Allah (God) breathed life into Maryam (Mary) to give birth to Isa al-Masih (Jesus the Messiah) and gave Isa (Jesus) the power to raise the dead to life.  Jesus is traditionally recognized as an important prophet in most varieties of Islam, but only the followers of Isa are called "Pakka" or true (complete) Muslims.  Similarities abound between the Bible and the Holy Books of Islam; e.g., Isa said "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (Yuhonna 14:6; Surah Al-Imran 3:42-45).

    Evangelism toward Muslims can be dangerous if not done in a non-threatening, culturally appropriate way.  As Mother Teresa put it, it's always best to "help a Muslim become a better Muslim."  The conservative evangelical approach is perhaps very dangerous.  Calling Islam "an evil and wicked religion" and/or calling Muhammad a "demon-possessed pedophile" isn't likely to endear yourself to any Muslim, and will likely get yourself killed.  Fortunately, there are other approaches to "interfaith understanding" such as those of the Orthodox and Roman Catholics as well as mainline Protestant churches like the Methodists, Episcopalians and Lutherans.  However, like all missionaries (as with students, business people, diplomats, and aid workers), they are what security specialists call “soft targets” -- easy prey for organized or free-lance terrorists.  Christophobia runs rampant in some parts of the Muslim world, and in some cases, missionaries are more dangerous than terror organizations in disturbing the peace.

    What hope does evangelism have with jihadist Islamists?  These are Muslims who believe in violence and armed resistance against what they perceive as the continuing onslaught of the enemies of Islam.  Chances are their agendas are pragmatic enough to NOT be bothered by missionaries, but on the other hand, they might see missionary success as threatening if the "recruit base" for terrorism is affected.  There are, indeed, other possibilities beyond the scope of this essay to remark upon.  Suffice it to say that a faith-based approach to terrorism prevention is "interesting," and that what may be really needed are LESS books by recently-converted Muslims about how "true and correct" Christianity is, and MORE books by "better" Muslims about how to be moderate and eschew jihadism.

 ARE THERE ANY TOLERABLE FORMS OF TERRORISM?

    If terrorism is no longer to be tolerated, societies need to stop tolerating the part they have played in it.  It makes no sense to crackdown on "terrorism from below" when "terrorism from above" is tolerated, as with proxy warfare and covert action which stir things up a bit and eventually come back in the form of "blowback."  Dictators should be held accountable as well as leaders of liberal democracies, but getting caught up in somebody else's civil war should not be a part of the "war on terrorism."  Neutrality is indeed possible.  There are some things worth avoiding involvement with.  Most of all, societies need to avoid the trap of demonizing enemies, of dividing the world between “us” and “them” as terrorists do.  Violence around the world doesn't respond to an on-off switch, but a dimmer switch.  Terrorism will never go away.  It is the height of grandiosity to assume that one nation's security is coterminous with that of everyone and everything else.  Far wiser is a policy of selective eradication where only the "worst" terrorist groups are targeted, and targeted in their entirety, both their operational and support cells.  For other terrorist groups, only the operational cells need eradicated, with great care taken to avoid broad-brushing supporters as terrorists.  For even other terrorist groups, no eradication may be necessary; only an effort to understand and explain, which is not the same as excusing terrorism.  Indeed, some congratulations may be in order for some terrorist groups who do humanitarian work.  Hamas and Hezbollah, for example, have set up medical centers in the Middle East, and even America's own Sen. Patty Murray extolled Osama bin Laden’s highway-paving project in Sudan.  The point is it should be possible for terrorists to "redeem" themselves in some way. 

    Justice and equity require that would-be terrorists should be able to come forward with a way to present their genuine grievances, and for those who have crossed the line and become terrorists, to assume the responsibility of all, and not only some, of their acts.  At the same time, the nations who fight terrorism need to admit that the terrorist acts perpetrated against them are a consequence of frustration, despair and total loss of hope.  In many cases, terrorist despair is driven by the inability of the international community to do anything effective other than to sit back and do nothing.  Doing nothing is NOT an acceptable collective response, and tolerance is not the same as doing nothing.  If the institutions of global governance can do nothing else, they can at least be honest about the who, what, when, and where tolerance is needed, and advise on the shapes and forms behind a system of gradated tolerance.  Equity and justice can eradicate most terrorism if given the chance.  It certainly cannot eradicate all terrorism, but then again, what would?

INTERNET RESOURCES
Americans for Victory Over Terrorism
Berghof Handbook of PCIA (pdf)
How Muslims Resist Christian Missionaries
International Horizons Unlimited, Ltd.
Pakistan Proposal for Global Counterterrorism (pdf)
Statement by Prime Minister of Spain
Terrorism and Tolerance Videolecture
UN Report: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (pdf)
United States Institute of Peace
Whither Victory in the War on Terror?

PRINTED RESOURCES
Arena, M. & Arrigo, B. (2006). The terrorist identity. NY: NYU Press.
Benjamin, D. & Simon, S. (2003). The age of sacred terror: Radical Islam's war against America. NY: Random.
Benjamin, D. & Simon, S. (2006). The next attack: The failure of the war on terror and a strategy for getting it right. NY: Holt.
Curle, A. (1986). In the middle: Non-official mediation in violent situations. UK: Berg Publishers. [Available online]
Gal-Or, N. (1991). Tolerating terrorism in the West. NY: Routledge.
Greeson, K. (2007). The camel: How Muslims are coming to faith in Christ. Richmond, VA: WIGTake Resources. [Available online]
Gülen, F. (2004). Toward a global civilization of love and tolerance. Somerset, NJ: The Light, Inc.
Hamm, M. (2007). Terrorism as crime. NY: NYU Press.
Husain, E. (2007). The Islamist. NY: Penguin.
Jenkins, B. (2003). Images of terror: What we can and can’t know about terrorism. NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Jenkins, B. (2006). Unconquerable nation. Santa Monica: RAND.
Ledeen, M. (2003). The war against the terror masters. NY: St. Martin's.
Richardson, L. (2006). What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat. NY: Random.
Ricigliano, R. (2003). "Networks of effective action: Implementing an integrated approach to peacebuilding." Security Dialogue 34(4): 445-446.
Ross, J. (2006). Political terrorism. NY: Peter Lang.
Stabel, K. (2005). "Engaging non-state armed groups: Possible third party conflict resolution theories and practices." Dissertation submitted to University of Bradford.
Tehranian, M. (2002).  "Global terrorism: Searching for appropriate responses." Global Change, Peace & Security 14(1): 57-65.
Wilkinson, P. (1986). "Terrorism versus liberal democracy: The problem of response." Pp. 3-28 in W. Gutteridge (ed.) Contemporary terrorism. NY: Facts on File.
Zellen, B. (2007). "Whither victory in the war on terror?" Strategic Insights 6(2). [Available online]

Last updated: May 13, 2008
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