Target Hardening

APPROACHES TO TARGET HARDENING
"The threat of terrorism is not stronger than the will of the American people" (Chaka Fattah)

The idea behind the concept of "target hardening" is that a strong, visible defense will deter or delay an attack. It is, in essence, the same as the concept of opportunity reduction, except that what matters is that security measures should be visible and send a clear message or signal. Opportunity reduction generally encompasses the notions of accessibility and surveillability, but target hardening comes from the world of CPTED (Crime Prevention Thru Environmental Design) where it has enjoyed some success in preventing burglary and robbery (Cross-Drew 1989). The best that can be said for target hardening as a terrorism prevention tactic is "It works, but not always" (Gunaratna 2003). As a criminological concept, target hardening has its advocates because it forces a greater effort to commit a crime. However, it also has some serious deficiences. For one, it only works against opportunistic or amateurish criminals. A determined, clever criminal would probably not be deterred, and some cleverer ones might even be attracted to hardened targets. Then, there are the policy problems inherent with target hardening. It's cost-prohibitive. It's impossible to harden everything. Some targets usually get hardened better than others. Some targets are relatively unhardened, or not hardened in depth. Other, unhardened targets (ones you might never think of) become targets. Displacement effects are, of course, quite common in crime prevention, but they occur in numerous ways with target hardening. Displacement simply means that potential offenders go elsewhere. Eck's (1993) review of the many types of displacement effects stands as one of the best theoretical reviews of the subject, and Hesseling (1994) offers a more empirical-based review. Displacement causes what was once "your" problem to become some "other guy's" problem.

There are numerous ways to do target hardening. Some are not all that desirable or ethical. Using the military distinction between "soft" (attackable from all directions) and "hard" (attackable from only one direction) targets, a soft target can be hardened by armor, camouflage, mobility, co-location with a defended location, or a less humane approach such as utilizing a human shield or by placing it in a sensitive location. There is even something called "security thru obscurity" which makes a target safer by making no big deal about it. Using another military analogy, a distinction can be made between "outer" and "inner" perimeter. As most security textbooks (e.g., Fischer 2003) define these concepts, an outer perimeter consists of: barriers, fences, or walls; gates or locks; lighting; surveillance; roofs and walls; and zones; and an inner perimeter consists of: doors and pass systems; files, safes, and vaults; inspections; and alarms.

When human life is at stake, some of the basic principles of security do not apply. For example, a general rule of thumb is that the cost of security measures should not exceed the total (original/replacement) cost of the item to be protected (Fennelly 2003). Human life is an obvious exception to this. With suicidal terrorism, factors like ease of getaway become unimportant in security surveys or design considerations. What substitutes for crime prevention when the rules of crime prevention do not hold is crime protection with situational awareness (see Lecture on Situational Awareness) a protective strategy relied upon in many homeland security contexts. Clearly, there is room for more theoretical and conceptual work in the crime prevention literature when it comes to terrorism and homeland security. Suffice it so say that no one has discovered the "perfect mix" of technology and human assets.

Crime prevention and crime protection can be broadly defined as anything which reduces the level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime. The crime prevention framework, in particular, is focused on making the environment safe from crime, reducing the potential for crime in high-risk situations, and halting the possibility of future crime. These three areas of action (safe environment, high-risk potential, and future crime) have been conceptualized as primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention (Brantingham & Faust 1976). The crime protection framework, in particular, is focused on ensuring victims their rights to assistance and attention to their needs, with particular emphasis on prevention of re-victimization. This type of action is best exemplified by ideals contained in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also by other governmental and non-governmental programs involving victim assistance, advocacy, compensation, reparations, reconciliation, restoration, and reintegration. Crime protection that involves witness protection programs and victim advocacy should be carefully distinguished from self-protective action, such as firearms ownership, self-defense training, and vigilantism which are not part of the crime protection framework, at least not as it has been conceptualized. Self-protective measures such as gun ownership, martial arts training, and possession of chemical agents or other personal defensive devices are a matter of controversy because it is not known if the net effect is to increase or decrease harm (Kleck 1998). Likewise, Miethe (1991) analyzes citizen-based approaches and finds they, too, are subject to displacement effects the same as government-based approaches.

Situational crime prevention should also be distinguished from offender-based, predispositional approaches. At the core of situational prevention is the concept of opportunity (Clarke 1980), as this concept implies a more stable "context" for the study of high-crime places instead of high-crime people. Specialization in crime also tends to be more analyzable in contexts, or more precisely, "marketplaces" for crime (Weisburd 1997). Sherman (1995: 36-37) points out the advantages of the situational approach by saying "future crime is six times more predictable by the address of the occurrence than by the identity of the offender."

Since 1973, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has administered the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) based on a system of household interviews which provides the best detailed information on victimization incidents involving nonfatal violence and property crime. Information on homicide generally comes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) which also measures nonfatal violence and property crime. The NCVS complements the UCR since it is known about 50 percent of crime is not reported to police and thus absent from the UCR (Meadows 2004). Therefore, while a UCR report might indicate that 20 million crimes have occurred in a given year, the real number according to NCVS figures may be closer to 40 million. In fact, from 1973 until about 1995, between 40 and 50 million violent crimes were reported every year by the NCVS. That number has been steadily declining since 1995, reaching a new low of 23 million in 2002 (BJS 2003). People do not report crime to police but will in a household interview for many reasons, such as the crime was unsuccessful, not important enough, a private matter, distrust of police, or fear of reprisal. Females are slightly more likely than males to report crime to police, and the elderly are more likely than young people to report crimes (Skogan 1984).

Overall, about one in four households a year are victimized by crime. Females are just as likely to be victimized by intimates as they are by strangers, although males, African Americans, and young adults between the ages of 16 and 19 have consistently had the highest risk of victimization for most offenses. People with lower income, who have never married, and reside in an urban area are also victimized at higher rates. Less than 29 percent of violent crime is committed with a weapon, although firearms are used in about seven in ten murders (Meadows 2004). Much violent crime, particularly homicide, has consistently followed an intraracial pattern where the offender and victim are of the same race.

The impact of victimization is of utmost importance for crime prevention and protection. More than one-third of crime victims have no health insurance, and besides the cost of medical expenses, there is mental health care, property repair, lost wages from missed work, and reduced quality of life as part of the impact. The government pays about $8 million annually in medical reimbursements through victim compensation programs (Meadows 2004), but no one can calculate the impact in terms of grief, fear, and anger. Victims of crime often carry emotional burdens or exhibit certain symptoms or syndromes that ruin their social, intimate, and work relationships. The aftermath of being a crime victim frequently involves a numbness or geographic relocation in an attempt to reorganize one’s life, and it is in this sense that it can be said the victim sometimes contributes to their own re-victimization. In other words, the crime protection framework deals with what can be done about the impact or aftermath for victims, while the crime prevention framework, especially primary prevention, aims at what can be done about the first instance of victimization and focuses upon keeping potential offenders from becoming actual offenders.

Primary prevention can be done in any context or location, whether a residence, workplace, school, neighborhood, community, or society. Primary prevention involves altering the environment in such a way that the root causes, or at least the facilitators, of crime are eliminated. As such, primary prevention is typically driven by supportable theory about the etiology of crime. An early example of this would be the social disorganization theory of Shaw and McKay (1942) which stated the residential mobility and racial heterogeneity led people to have little interest in improving their neighborhood and more of an interest in moving out, leaving behind an area where crime could easily occur. More recent examples include Newman’s (1972) defensible space theory, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory, and Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows theory. The theory of defensible space, like its counterpart in the field of private security called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CTPED), tends to have a focus on preventing easy access and exit by potential criminals as well as the elimination of their hiding places and where they can geographically select a target. Routine activities theory posits a high rate of potential victims becoming actual victims whenever three things occur in space and time together: the absence of capable guardians; an abundance of motivated offenders; and suitable targets. Broken windows theory argues that signs of decay, disorder, and incivilities, such as abandoned buildings, broken street lights, and graffiti all invite potential criminals to an area. On a larger level, primary prevention can be based on macro-social theories about the causes of crime in society, with examples of such efforts being job, housing, education, healthcare, and religious programs (Lavrakas 1997).

Secondary prevention involves a focus upon specific problems, places, and times with the twin goals of reducing situation-specific opportunities for crime and increasing the risks for committing crime. Following Clarke (1980), many people call this situational crime prevention. Secondary prevention is most typically based on well-established law enforcement practices, such as problem-oriented policing where the problem drives a team solution, hot spots analysis which targets certain areas for saturation or directed patrol, surveillance and target-hardening which increase the risk and effort for committing crime, property identification, security lighting, intrusion alarms, Neighborhood Watch, citizen patrols, protection personnel, and efforts on the part of victims to change their lifestyles. A major criticism of secondary prevention is that is doesn’t really reduce crime, but displaces it to other areas. Criminological theories that have been developed in this area include routine activities theory, lifestyles theory (Jensen & Brownfield 1986), and rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke 1986). Lifestyles theory posits that individuals who lead deviant lifestyles, such as abuse of drugs or alcohol, spending time on the street, or association with deviant peers, are themselves more likely to be at high risk of victimization. Rational choice theory emphasizes the calculated decision-making that offenders engage in while determining the payoff and risks for certain crimes. Additional reward-risk models can be found in the criminological literature for specific offense categories.

Tertiary prevention is a term taken from the field of medicine to describe procedures to be taken after a disease or threat is manifest. Such procedures typically serve a deterrence or minimization of harm purpose, and are almost always characterized by being reactive, or after the fact. Examples would include personal injury or property insurance as well as self-protective measures engaged in by those who have been victimized previously. Carrying a non-concealed self-protective device or walking in a self-confident manner accomplishes the purpose of deterrence. Carrying a concealed device or whistle to blow for help accomplishes the purpose of minimization, or at least the chance for an unsuccessful criminal outcome. In some cases, a victim’s device may be turned against him or her and result in greater harm, but these cases are probably few in number since it is known that less than 5 percent of homicides involve the killer using the victim’s gun (Kleck 1998). Tertiary prevention is often symbolic, as with get-tough legislation and other legal reforms which make the punishment for crime more certain, severe, and swift.

Crime protection involves reactive, or after the fact, measures. One of the ways victims can secure a sense of protection from further victimization is to sue the property owners and managers of establishments in high-crime areas. Known as premises liability, such civil cases generally seek compensation for being victimized and improvements in security. They are based on claims that inadequate security or design flaws are present in the environment. Negligence cases are similar, where third-party defendants, such as landlords and employers are found in breach of their duty to protect and the breach is a proximate cause of the injury. Civil justice for victims can also involve a finding of liability on the part of an offender who is not found guilty in the criminal justice system. Civil remedies can be an exhaustive, expensive, and risky activity for victims, which like seeking restitution from the offender, depends upon the ability of a liable party to pay.

Victim compensation programs, which originated in 1966 and reached their zenith in 1984 with the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), utilize federal funds or incentives to encourage state funding of victim compensation and outreach. Compensation funds come from many sources, such as fines, penalties, forfeited bail, and prisoner income. As an example of the latter, a so-called Son of Sam clause in VOCA prohibits criminals from profiting by telling their stories while their victims suffer financially. State compensation programs have rather strict eligibility requirements, and the amount of compensation varies.

Victim support service programs are designed to reduce trauma, ensure recovery, and provide orientation and support during criminal justice proceedings. Victim advocacy and sensitivity are integral parts of these programs. Eligibility requirements sometimes allow anyone who has witnessed a crime to qualify, but again, benefits vary from state to state. Since passage of the 1982 Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), victims have also earned important notification and protection order rights, followed by the 1994 Violent Crime Act which spawned victim impact statements.

Additional rights for the protection of victims have been legislated or come into existence only recently, such as the right for a homicide victim’s family to attend the killer’s execution, public notification of when a released sexual offender moves into the neighborhood (Megan’s Law), mandatory reporting of campus crime statistics, improved efforts to track missing persons and children (Amber Alerts), better coordination of temporary shelter, counseling, and protective custody, and victim/offender reconciliation programs. In addition, penalties have been increasing for witness tampering, intimidation, and harassment, especially in gang-related cases. A variety of witness protection and victim assistance programs have been developed at different levels, from the federal government all the way down to local non-profit organizations.

Admittedly a rather technical subject, the topic of stand-off distances is an important part of emergency planning and management. There are three types of distances to consider, as the following diagram makes clear:

A. The "preferred" area (out of harm's way) for evacuation of people in buildings and mandatory for people outdoors. The distance is always greater that the Zone B distance.
B. All personnel in the "B" zone should seek shelter immediately inside a building away from windows and exterior walls. Avoid having anyone outside -- including those evacuating -- in this area. A known terrorist tactic is to attract bystanders to windows, doorways, and the outside with gunfire, small bombs, or other methods and then detonate a larger, more destructive device, significantly increasing human casualties.
C. All personnel must evacuate (both inside of buildings and out).

Realistically, there are only about eight (8) sizes that bombs come in. The following chart shows a typical building's vulnerability to explosions, but a lot depends on the building's construction and composition. Not all data in the chart may accurately reflect all variables, and some risk will remain regardless if the "proper" stand-off distances are observed. The discrepancy between the Zone B distances for briefcase bombs versus vehicle-borne explosions is due to the fact that briefcase bombs typically have the ability to throw fragments farther than vehicle bombs.

*Threat Type*	*Explosive Capacity*	*Zone C Distance*	*Zone B Distance*
Pipe Bomb	5 pounds of explosive (max)	70 feet	850 feet
Briefcase Bomb	50 pounds	150 feet	1,850 feet
Compact Sedan	500 pounds	320 feet	1,500 feet
Sedan	1,000 pounds	400 feet	1,750 feet
Passenger Van	4,000 pounds	640 feet	2,750 feet
Delivery Truck	10,000 pounds	860 feet	3,750 feet
Moving Truck	30,000 pounds	1,240 feet	6,500 feet
Semi-Trailer	60,000 pounds	1,500 feet	7,000 feet

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Last updated: Jan 29, 2008
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