HOMELAND SECURITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
"There is no security on this earth, only opportunity" (Douglas MacArthur)

    The comparative perspective involves looking at how homeland security is accomplished in nations other than the United States.  There are many different ways that security is handled in other nations around the world, some more effective and efficient than others, some less effective and efficient than others.  Likewise, the differences in approaches to counterterrorism are striking.  For example, a 2007 Europol report (pdf) says that the European Union (not counting Britain) processes about 700 terrorism cases a year (Britain processes almost 1,700).  This is a significantly greater prevalence of terrorism than found in the U.S., despite the fact that nothing like the 9/11 attacks have occurred on European soil.  Europeans also have a longer history with terrorism.  In general, they have tried to avoid military countermeasures in favor of enhanced policing and intelligence.  They have also tried to avoid piling on new homeland security laws after each terrorist incident.  Each nation balances security and liberty in different ways, and there may be no "right" or "wrong" way, but it is important to try different ways.               

    When starting down the comparative path, one is immediately confronted with the compare and/or contrast dilemma; i.e., to look at nations similar to the U.S. or to look at dissimilar nations.  The resolution of this dilemma is to do both, to try and find "modal" examples of each as well as to consider "outliers" that may signal a new trend or "third way" of doing things.  There is a dire need for further research in this area.  To mention a few examples of the research opportunities would include:  conducting "natural experiments" (when a nation switches from communism to capitalism); engaging in "historiography" (making use of all those memoirs and tell-alls that ex-government officials write these days); and putting together "case studies" which shed light on something exemplary or noteworthy.  Nomothetic sampling  (many cases) is preferred if general conclusions are to be drawn, but idiographic (single case) sampling is still appropriate in an emerging field of study.  There is nothing wrong with having a case study of one.  There is a notable tradition of this in many fields, like criminology.  However, true comparative studies in homeland security are rare.  This lecture note attempts to remedy that situation by providing at least some initial insights. 

THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH

    Arguably the country most like the United States, the U.K. is most similar with respect to the jumble of laws the British have.  If the Patriot Act was the watershed legislation for the U.S., the Terrorism Act of 2000 is the watershed one for the U.K.  It has been said, however, that no country in the world has more anti-terrorism laws than the U.K. (Walker 2002).  Much of British law in this regard should be seen as part of an evolution in British handling of the Northern Ireland problem.  The British have long dealt with this problem, and have been anxious to put it behind them to concentrate on other threats, particularly those coming from Middle Eastern nations or terrorist groups.  For example, Great Britain was shocked by the 1998 Pan Am Flight 103 Lockerbie air disaster which turned out to involve Libyan agents, and then, of course, there was Great Britain's version of 9/11 in the form of the 7/7, or July 7, 2005 London bombing as well as another attack, two weeks later, called the July 21, 2005 London bombing.  The 7/7 attack was a well-coordinated series of four, deadly, rush hour subway and bus bombings, while the 7/21 attack only involved the detonators going off.  For both attacks, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.  Currently, the Brits have a number of deadly Islamist terror cells in their midst, as well as a large Muslim migrant population whom some say intend to create "Londonistan," or London as the world capitol for exiled Islamic groups (Phillips 2006).  Nevertheless, the Brits are committed to fair-minded homeland security approaches as well as to multiculturalism.

    It used to be that Great Britain had a "political violence" definition of terrorism.  That is, to be convicted of terrorism, one had to be engaged in at least symbolic overthrow of the government.  Nowadays, Great Britain uses a "consensus" definition of terrorism which applies to a risk toward all kinds of targets and covers all sorts of motives, not just political, but religious and ideological motives.  Cybercrime is clearly considered a terrorism act in the U.K. as are threats to property, not just people.  These moves toward an expanded definition of terrorism have not been without their criticism, and are significantly different from the U.S. approach which covers cybercrime as a non-terrorism subtype of larceny or fraud.  However, the U.K. approach is similar to the U.S. approach in that the government has the undisputed power to maintain lists of certain designated ("proscribed") terrorist groups, foreign and domestic.  Reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause becomes the legal standard in police encounters with such groups.  And, although the U.K. has not gone as far as "indefinite detention," they have expanded the number of days a terror suspect can be held for questioning.  The most curious thing the U.K has done recently is create the hybrid legal device of "control orders."  These control orders are kind of like house arrest or probation, and they occur when British judges impose legal disabilities on people; i.e., electronic tags, limitations on freedom of movement, mandatory check-ins with the police, etc.  They are regularly used when a suspect is suspected of terrorism but there’s not enough evidence to prosecute or extradite, and/or extradition might involve sending suspects to an "inhumane" country.  Control orders keep suspects in Britain under 18-to-22 hour curfew (judges think 24 hour monitoring is unfair) with no Internet or cell phone access.  According to news reports, the British have been discovering high rates of absconders and violators.   

    Great Britain didn't have any homeland security alert system until August of 2006 when it decided to create a dual system of alert or warning.  The general public is informed via a non-color-coded five-level system: Low = unlikely; Moderate = possible but not likely; Substantial = strong possibility; Severe = highly likely; Critical = imminently.  Specific sectors of the infrastructure have a three-level system:  Normal = low to moderate threat; Heightened = substantial or severe; Exceptional = critical.  British officials claim their system is better than what Americans have because there is less of a yo-yo effect when moving up and down levels.  As far as strategy goes, the current British counterterrorism strategy is called CONTEST, and is based around the "four Ps" -- preventing terrorism by tackling its underlying causes, pursuing terrorists and those who sponsor them, protecting the UK public and interests, and preparing for the consequences of any attack.  This strategy has been in place since 2003 and seems to be working well except for the prevention part.  What seems to be most effective is the preparing for the aftermath part (see Home Office CT Strategy page).  The British conduct much training under mock scenario drills, and even though some of these drills involve preparation for high-profile events like a WMD attack, the majority of British preparations are aimed, strategy-wise, at cost-effective "dual-use measures" which leverage training and skills at the most likely threats and risks (not over-stretching by preparing for the most unconventional challenges).

    MI5 has been said to be the world's best model of domestic intelligence by some experts (Masse 2003) and the wrong approach for America by other experts (Kessler 1993).  MI5 has an extensive history going back to 1909 and a formidable bureaucratic structure which, if implemented, would dwarf what was the sizable creation of DHS.  Nevertheless, the largesse problem hasn't stopped DHS officials and RAND experts from continually looking toward MI5 as a model of some kind.  What is perhaps most enviable about MI5 is its excellent command and coordination structure, coordination and integration being provided by the Home Office.  The Home Office is an immensely complex organization, and symbolizes the joining of traditional criminal justice functions with intelligence and counterterrorism functions.  Some say this joining of functions would never work in America because it cuts into civil liberties, but others say nothing like the debacle which was America's experience with Katrina would have ever happened if we had a good coordination agency like the Home Office.  From time to time, there is talk in Great Britain about forming a Homeland Security Ministry separate from MI5, mostly for budgetary reasons, but like the United States, the United Kingdom remains committed to finding efficient ways to manage all the inter-governmental coordination problems which come with setting up any kind of homeland security apparatus.

    The U.K. places more emphasis upon intelligence than the U.S. (Lansford et al. 2006).  There are layers upon layers of surveillance cameras all over, and the police and courts regularly rely upon and use evidence from such closed circuit television cameras (CCTV).  Further, British authorities utilize biometrics in the form of facial recognition software to identify suspects in crowds.  Whether or not such things violate an “expectation of privacy” in public places is open to debate.  The effectiveness research is overwhelmingly in favor of such practices, the best review of the literature being that done by the Home Office itself on the Crime Prevention Effects of CCTV (pdf).  The U.K. is also known for relying upon informers, a practice similar to the U.S. procedure of offering an S-visa to an illegal immigrant if they become an informant, except that the U.K. doesn't provide as many rewards and/or witness protection services as the U.S. does.            

    THE FRENCH APPROACH

    The French think their justice and anti-terrorism methods are superior.  Basically, they look for ways to manage social problems, rather than eliminate them, by following a strategy which mixes old-fashioned police work with computer technology with diplomacy and multiculturalism in the form of forced assimilation.  However, association with wrong-doers has always been a crime in France, and French police are usually quite persistent at rounding up accomplices since their legal system has a certain repressive element.  France relies heavily on HUMINT (infiltration and clever interrogation of suspects) to uproot terrorist networks within the context of wide criminal dragnets.  French intelligence and counterintelligence are also good, and France has extensive experience with counterinsurgency, counter resistance movements, marquis units, assassination prevention, and using attractive women (honey traps) as bait.  As opposed to Italy (where Italian law requires intelligence documents and materials to be open and transparent), French intelligence continues to value secrecy, and in this regard is much like the U.S.  In the 1960s and 1970s, France at one time followed Spain in a get-tough counterterrorism policy which included assassination of terrorist leaders and deportation of others.  The European Convention on Human Rights has since softened these kinds of approaches, but still allows a certain kind of level-headed jurisprudence (foreign to the U.S. and U.K.) where terrorists, for example, CANNOT use lawyers or the law to hide from responsibility for their actions.     

    Since 1998, the Muslim population in France has tripled to about 5 million, consisting of "old" immigrants (French Muslims) who have assimilated into the wine-drinking culture, and "new" immigrants who hold fundamentalist, quasi-terrorist beliefs.  Muslim protests are not uncommon in France, and new immigrants were behind the October and November 2005 Civil Unrest of the French riots where roving gangs of Muslim youth terrorized most of Paris.  In a gesture of tolerance, government officials denied that Islamic sentiments had anything to do with the riots, but other observers called it the start of a "French Intifada" aimed at creating some jihadist conception of "Eurabia" (Ye'Or 2005).  The French have long standing ties to many Middle Eastern nations which they hope will help them curb the Islamic extremism which has become their number one domestic problem.  The French have a law authorizing the administrative expulsion of foreign clerics who preach a radical and violent brand of Islamism.  When the intelligence service identifies a radical they inform the local brigade (criminal police), and then the offending cleric is summoned and threatened with deportation unless he moderates his preaching.  French intelligence is also known for wiretapping sermons in mosques to determine which clerics are preaching radicalism, assisting terrorist recruitment, or granting material support to an operational network.

    French counterterrorism officials work closely with civilian scholars and journalists, many of whom have been way ahead of their European and American counterparts in dissecting Islamic extremism and jihadism.  Researchers are also allowed access to French prisons to interview terrorist prisoners.  France is serious about Islamist terrorism, as this AEI Report on French Counterterrorism shows.  It knows it is a target because it is a symbol of Western civilization, and it has been clearly shown that France is the target of choice for the Algerian GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat).      

    The legal system in France is quite unique and based on codified continental law which is seen as never needing changing.  All laws derive from the state.  Thus, the same laws used to fight crime are used to fight terrorism in France.  Their definition of terrorism is "an act that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order."  Essentially, this is a we-know-terrorism-when-we-see-it approach, and when a regular suspect is thought to have terrorist intent, they are either transferred or waived to a special court which has a niche understanding of the problem OR they are handled via a regular criminal court and subjected to enhanced sentencing penalties.  In recent years, France has had to increase the sentencing penalties for such things as terrorist recruitment and financing.  French courts are also known in some cases for being "soft" on crime, giving some terrorists amnesty and pardons.  Hardcore police practices that the French allow include: preemptive arrest; ethnic profiling; domestic wiretapping; and the detention of suspects for up to three years while an investigation is in progress.  It is not uncommon for terrorist suspects in France to be held in preventive detention for four or five years before their case goes to court.  The most highly intrusive powers are granted to the main internal security service, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), and to its counterterrorist investigative magistrates (juges d'instruction).  These magistrates allow the French to combine the powers of prevention, deterrence, and punishment within one person in the form of each magistrate. The magistrate office, created in 1986, has no American parallel and its powers are unique within Europe, overseeing and often directing the investigative reach of many agencies.         

    France has a hodgepodge of agencies devoted to counterterrorism (at least 6 exist in the Ministry of Interior alone), and none of them are well coordinated except by an interministerial liaison committee, although the magistrates (juges d'instruction) do a good job at concentrating the combined resources of the state very quickly.  The military (Ministry of Defense) along with the Interior Ministry comprise the bulk of the country's homeland security efforts.  The "seconding" of personnel, or their temporary detailing back and forth from civilian to military agencies (often crossing various levels of rank) is commonly found in France, and is something that the U.S. emulates to some degree.  The latest-elected President, Nikolas Sarkozy, is preparing to establish a French version of DHS which will concentrate police-security powers under a new Ministry, but he faces stiff opposition to this.  France has an alert system called Vigipirate based around four color-coded levels (yellow, orange, red, scarlet).  It has existed since 1978, and like many other government operations in France, the exact protocols for elevating or reducing a threat are classified.  It is unknown how effective this alert system is.  The famous crime-fighting group, Interpol, is of course, located in St. Cloud, France, and it has long been active with crime threat assessments, and a fusion intelligence function since 9/11, but its services are more utilized by foreign countries than France itself.  The country also has the famous French Foreign Legion, which is a formidable resource, but it is prohibited from operating on French soil.

    THE ISRAELI APPROACH

    No country has had to deal with continuous terrorism as much as Israel.  Since its founding in 1948, there have been ongoing troubles with Palestinian groups as well as other states, state-proxies, and non-state actors.  "Troubles" is too light a word to use since Israel has been basically under violent attack from terrorism for many years.  To protect itself, Israel has, to be sure, taken some steps which could be viewed as incompatible with what a democracy would normally do; e.g., targeted assassination and building a security fence.  Targeted assassination is also called targeted killing and in the U.S. model exists as a form of covert action.  Security fences are used worldwide as the Wikipedia Entry on Separation Barriers points out.  The issue of targeted killing is ironic since Israel has long abandoned the death penalty for criminals, but seems inclined to carry out such "instant justice" when it comes to well-known terrorists.  The phrase "death is different" has meaning in Israel.  For all the controversy surrounding the security fence, the fact of the matter is that it has reduced the number of deaths from terrorism by 45% (Cutler 2005).  The case of Israel presents some interesting lessons on how homeland security efforts can be integrated at the doctrine and policy levels.  This is to say that, despite some domestic dissent within Israel, the nation's people are, for the most part, solidly behind their government and cooperate with homeland security initiatives to the degree that DHS officials have always hoped American citizens would.  For example, the Israeli media is much more cooperative with government.  Business sector involvement in homeland security is also very high in Israel, and Israeli security technology is highly regarded and utilized worldwide at many of the world's most critical sites.  One could go so far as to argue that most Israeli citizens have accepted decreased civil liberties in exchange for increased security. 

    Terrorism is defined under Israeli law as "the resorting to violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or threats of such acts."  There are a number of terrorism-related laws which outlaw unlawful associations, impose curfews, and regulate the media.  The most controversial of these is the Defense Emergency Regulations of 1945 which is usually pointed to by most experts as a piece of emergency legislation which has become a piece of ordinary legislation, which is to say that Israel is always in a state of emergency.  The significance of this is that it has allowed Israel to bypass a lot of debate over the proper role of risk and threat assessment in homeland security.  Intelligence is intelligence, and while Israel provides some degree of legislative oversight, it conducts security intelligence very broadly (C4I), and some would say, very effectively.  For example, counterterrorism policy in Israel has three prongs: offensive, defensive, and punitive.  Typical offensive actions are sweeps of suspect areas by military forces.  Typical defensive actions are armed checkpoints at critical areas.  Typical punitive actions involve arrest, exile, assassination, and destruction of housing.  There are no less that three (3) intelligence agencies: Shin Bet, Mossad, and Aman.  Each are very well-staffed and funded, and they are supplemented by rather large police and military forces.  Israel has a compulsory military service requirement for both men and women.  There are no "turf battles" or "stovepipes" with any of the Israeli security agencies, which is in stark contrast to the bitter rivalries between American law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

    Most homeland security efforts in Israel fall under the Ministry of Public Security, which has strong policy-making authority and also oversees a couple of important agencies:  (1) the Israel National Police (INP), who are usually very busy handling about 80,000 bomb disposal incidents per year; and (2) the Israeli Civil Guard, an all-volunteer force created in 1974, consisting of networks of neighborhood command centers, armed patrol units, and rapid emergency response teams.  The volunteer force is comparatively small (numbering about 45,000 people), but they participate regularly with the police in training and target practice.

    Tadmor et. al. (2006) detail the amazing and noteworthy levels of preparedness Israel enjoys.  Most of the hospital drills and protocols have not only been extensively exercised but tested by actual terrorist attacks.  Surge capacity, for example, has been built into the system of hospitals, clinics, and centers, and few expenses have been spared for funding the first responder community.  Two-hour reaction times for handling emergencies are not uncommon, and that includes clean-up of the site of the attack.  Citizens have access to state-of-the-art protective garments, gas masks, antidotes, and decontamination services.  Redundant systems have been built into critical infrastructure.  A full cycle of training, drills, and simulations takes two years to accomplish, but involves every citizen in the nation.       

THE RUSSIAN APPROACH

    The Russian Federation approach to homeland security focuses upon the protection of vital interests and is particularly sensitive to international threats, not just from international terrorism but from transnational criminal groups and asymmetric threats of various kinds.  This means that the Russians take very seriously things such as asymmetric cyber-attacks while at the same time tolerating for as long as possible the activities of nuisance domestic groups.  Russians value their dignity so much that sometimes they overreact to the slightest nuisance.  Several security agencies exist across many ministries and they are all coordinated centrally via a strong Presidential office.  It is sometimes said the Russian approach is "heavy-handed," which is to say that in terms of the traditional phases of disaster management (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery), the one the Russians emphasize most is response -- hard-hitting, rapid response with overwhelming force when necessary.  There are no special operations forces in the country, but military, police, and civilian cooperation is good with intelligence functions being mostly a military matter.  Military leaders are frequently fired (purged) for when a terrorist incident embarrasses the government.  Citizens regularly participate in preparedness exercises, but are denied most access to media coverage of terrorism.

    The Russian definition of terrorism sees it as a battle for hearts and minds.  The Russian criminal code (translated) states terrorism is "any action endangering the lives of people, causing sizable property damage, or entailing other socially dangerous consequences; for the purpose of violating public security, frightening the population, or exerting influence on decision-making."  Lansford et. al. (2006) say that such a broad definition blurs the line between terrorist and criminal behavior.  This is true because historically, it has always been easy to become a "political prisoner" in Russia for what basically amounts to "thought crime" which is to say that many ordinary crimes are taken to have political implications, whether they have them or not.  In recent years, Russia has been busy passing several new antiterrorism laws.  For example, in 2003, they began cracking down on terrorist financing by becoming a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and since the breakup of 1993, they have become acutely aware of exactly how important the issue of border security is for them.  Russia has many border problems which are not just migration problems.  Crime, corruption, and conflict are commonplace at almost all of Russia's borders because historically Russia expanded by taking over the sovereign territory of others, and it is unclear under international law exactly where the original borders were.  The southern border (with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan) poses a particular threat by being an entry point for drugs and Islamic militants.

    Islamic extremism is a serious problem in Russia, and jihadists hate Russians as much, if not more, than Americans.  The reasons are theological.  Both the Koran (Surah Al-Kahf 18:94-100) and the Bible (Ezekiel 38:1-6) ordain that in the end times, Gog and Magog (Russia) will join with the Arab nations for the final destruction of Israel.  Hence, there has been a natural Islamic interest in steering Russia toward this direction.  The Russian Muslim community is about 20 million strong, and currently at about 15% of the total population, and growing.  Since 1992, Islamists from all over the Middle East have gone to Chechnya to fight the Russian infidel.  Chechen women, or the so-called Black Widows, have carried out spectacular suicide operations throughout Russia, and for its part, the Russian government has repeatedly denied there is even a war going on in Chechnya or mismanaged the conflict in numerous ways.  The Chechnya conflict is too complex to go into detail here (see Lecture on Religious Terrorism), but suffice it to say the Russians would NOT like to have it thought of as any "model" of how they do antiterrorism or homeland security.

THE SAUDI APPROACH

    Saudi Arabia faces both homegrown terrorism and external threats.  The homegrown threat mainly comes from infiltration by al Qaeda and the Shia minority.  External threats include the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the annual Hajj pilgrimage, and frequent attacks on oil production facilities (such attacks constituting 24% of all such attacks on the world's oil reserves).  The Kingdom is also the frequent target of cyber terrorism attacks, but much of this is aimed not so much at government, but at private sector industries such as banking and finance.  Transportation, aviation, and maritime security are also problem areas.

    Some Saudi efforts rely upon old-school police tactics, such as riot equipment, interoperable communications, and protective gear, for such events as the Hajj (which is an Olympic-sized event every year).  VIP protection services are also quite common, as one might expect for those who can afford the most expensive bodyguard firms.  The oil wealth of the country has enabled, however, much spending on newer, high-tech homeland security measures.  For example, the Kingdom is currently building two, state-of-the-art, high-tech "border fences" with Iraq and Yemen (Kuwait, by comparison, is making their fence out of iron).  These fences stretch for hundreds of miles across the desert, but they aren't your typical border fences because they contain advanced, computer-controlled, thermal imaging systems, facial and voice recognition systems, and a series of electronic gates which can be opened or closed remotely.

    The Saudis are actively spending on homeland security.  The field is, in fact, one of the fastest-growing areas of employment.  Currently, the government runs about 24 different homeland security agencies (many of which are redundant in name and function), and these organizations employ more than 250,000 people.  It is too soon to tell if the Saudi approach results in any net decrease in terrorism, but as expenses go, the country is second only to the United States in how much money is spent every year on homeland security.  Websites which tend to track the successes and failures of Saudi counterterrorism include the Terror Alert Center [just type Saudi Arabia into their search engine].       

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies
Amos Guiora's Paper on Framing Homeland Security
Counterterrorism in the U.K. Since 9/11 (pdf)
Counterterrorism Practices in 10 Western Democracies (pdf)
European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (pdf)
French Experience with Counterterrorism (pdf)
Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads (pdf)
GAO Report on How Five Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism (pdf)
GlobalSecurity.org
Homeland Security and the Russian Approach (pdf)
How the French Fight Terror
Israel's Hard-Learned Lessons Fighting Terrorism
RAND Report on Confronting the Enemy Within
Russian Views on National Security (pdf)
Terrorisme.net
World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems
World Intelligence and Security Agencies

PRINTED RESOURCES
Art, R. & Richardson, L. (2007). Democracy and counterterrorism. Washington DC: US Inst. of Peace Press.
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Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the enemy within: Security intelligence in four democracies. RAND MG-100. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Cronin, A. (2006). "How al-Qaeda ends." International Security 31(1): 7-48.
Cutler, A. (2005). "Security fences." Atlantic Monthly 295(2): 40.
Deflem, M. (2004). Policing world society. NY: Oxford Univ. Press. [author's website]
Greenberg, K. (2006). "Transatlantic Counterterrorism." Pp. 347-52 in D. Kamien (ed.) The McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook. NY: McGraw-Hill.
Homeland Security Research Corp. (2008). Saudi Arabia homeland security market outlook: 2009-2018. Washington DC: Homeland Security Research.
Kessler, R. (1993). The FBI. NY: Pocket Books
Lansford, T., Pauly, R. & Covarrubia, J. (2006). To protect and defend. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Masse, T. (2003). Applicability of the MI-5 model to the United States. Washington DC: CRS Report [online pdf].
Meyers, E. (2004). International immigration policy. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Nielsn, D. (2005). Transatlantic homeland security. NY: Routledge.
Phares, W. (2005). Future jihad. NY: Macmillan.
Phillips, M. (2006). Londonistan. NY: Encounter Books.
Robb, J. (2007). Brave new war. NY: Wiley.
Stringer, K. (2006). Military organizations for homeland defense: A comparative approach. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Tadmor, B., Poles, L. & Shapira, S. (2006). "Preparedness and response in Israeli hospitals." Pp. 721-37 in D. Kamien (ed.) The McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook. NY: McGraw-Hill.
Walker, C. (2002). Blackstone's guide to the anti-terrorism legislation. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
Ye'Or, B. (2005). Eurabia: The Euro-arab axis. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press.

Last updated: Aug 04, 2008
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