Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
"The belief in the possibility of a short decisive war is one of the most ancient and dangerous illusions" (Robert Lynd)

Insurgency is a word meaning armed revolt, insurrection, or rebellion aimed at overthrowing or subverting a government or regime in power, or any duly constituted regime, including elected and non-elected officials. The official U.S. Defense Department definition is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." What constitutes being an organized movement for purposes of this definition is questionable since many insurgencies, taken broadly, can be conceived of as more disorganized than organized. Illustrative of this is the classic definition by Galula (1964: 5): "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order... it can no more be predicted than a revolution; its beginnings are so vague that to determine exactly when an insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political, and historical problem."

For much of the early twentieth century, the phrase "small wars" defined insurgency, as enshrined in a 1940 Marine Corps manual by that name, and then "low intensity conflict" (LIC) became the doctrinal phrase during the 1980s and 1990s, and came to include the topics of counterinsurgency (COIN), insurgency support, counterterrorism, and multinational peacekeeping. FM 100-5 of 1993 introduced the phrase Operations Other Than War (OOTW) which the Joint community modified in Joint Pub 3.0 to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). By 1997 the Army started using the phrase Stabilty & Support Operations (SASO), and in 2007, the doctrinal phrase became COIN, as exemplified in the easily readable December 2006 US Army Counterinsurgency Manual which defines COIN as "a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operation."

Insurgencies involve irregular fighting with non-state armed groups such as terrorists, criminals, militias, mercenaries, and vigilantes. Sometimes the fighting forces are so irregular that they involve suicidal maniacs and irrational psychopaths. Insurgents often make demands that cannot be negotiated with, but sometimes, they can be worked with in compromises and peace agreements. Some insurgents have been known to "trade" or "sell" hostages, carry out assassination and sabotage plots, harm humanitarian workers, seek media attention for themselves, or spin off into criminal enterprise. Sometimes the fighting forces contain a mix of regular and irregular troops, as with the Vietnam War (1959-1975) where the U.S. faced not only the well-disciplined North Vietnamese Army (NVA) but the nominally independent Viet Cong (VC) insurgents as well. Insurgencies may be centralized or decentralized, well-supplied or poorly-supplied, and often make do with improvised weapons, unpredictable attacks, fear campaigns, and guerrilla tactics.

Fighting an insurgency is not the same as fighting a regular war. Although most insurgencies end up as civil wars, there are differences. According to Global Security's Glossary of Military Terms, a civil war involves factional fighting and must meet five (5) definitional criteria for international recognition as a civil war: the contestants must control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military operations. An insurgency, on the other hand, doesn't have any criteria for international recognition. Instead, an insurgency is all about demands for recognition, and is filled with personal gripes and petty jealousies. Insurgencies tend to last a long time, sometimes as long as 10 to 30 years, and the time it takes to successfully combat one usually requires 8 to 11 years of sustained effort (Stoker 2007). History tells us that a counterinsurgency that is won takes 9 years, and one that is lost takes 13 years. By comparison, the average length of war from start to finish is only about 3 years (Hammes 2004). Fighting an insurgency also requires a special military strategy where psychological offensives are more important that armed combat (Collins 2002). It's often said that insurgencies are 80% psychological. Further, strategy will be complicated by ethical or moral factors because asymmetric warfare is likely involve a lot of unfair fighting. Also, because insurgencies rely so much on force multipliers, they are best fought with force multiplying forces, such as special operations forces (SOF), peacekeeping (PK) forces, stability operations, and rescue operations. While some insurgencies will use the tactics of terrorism, an insurgency differs from terrorism in that insurgencies are usually contained geographically, and in this respect, are more like domestic terrorism if like terrorism at all. An insurgency also differs from terrorism in being driven by diffuse anger than specific anger. It may be impossible to identify the leader or spokesperson for an insurgency, or on the other hand, the leaders may be well-known and a surgical strike on the leader may work much better than it would with terrorism. One thing that terrorism and insurgencies have in common, however, is the contest for the "hearts and minds" of the populace, making it a kind of psychological warfare (explained below). Revolutionary ideology is often involved (but not required) whereby both sides to an insurgency usually claim they are the only ones who can legitimately meet the needs and expectations of the people. Insurgencies are probably best defined as an extreme form of political and civil unrest. Criminal justice and law enforcement are urgently needed during an insurgency, but standard doctrine indicates that such civilian forces should be commanded and controlled by a different command for effective interagency cooperation that integrates military counterguerrilla action with the complex of separate and joint civil and military operations. Some decisiveness (but not necesarily destructiveness) is called for. Certain attrition-based strategies can be used successfully, but so can destructiveness strategies. The history of counterinsurgency is filled with many lessons (and mistakes) to learn from. As Stoker (2007) notes in his article entitled Insurgencies Rarely Win, the main lesson is overcoming the myth that determined guerrilla fighters are invincible. They only win (as in Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria) when the insurgency is an adjunct of a regular army; and they always lose (as in Malaysia, Greece, the Philippines, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia, South Africa, Angola, and Peru) when their inherent weaknesses (such as unstable leadership, lack of training areas, and insecure supply lines) are exploited.

Fighting an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war on crime. At some point, insurgents are quite happy to let proxies or criminals do their work, and what mostly happens is that ordinary criminals and/or disgruntled segments of the population jump in on the action. This later tendency is what academics call "primitive rebellion" or criminal banditry, and it has been noted ever since Hobsbawm (1965), but see the more recent U.S. Army War College (2005) document entitled "Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency" which compares mutated forms of terrorist-insurgents to criminal street gangs, or Louise Shelley's Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism (pdf) which explores some interesting connections between terrorists and transnational criminals. The commingling of funds and money laundering, for instance, are good examples of these connections. There are dozens of ways in which criminal behavior and insurgent behavior overlap, and the longer an insurgency runs, the more the overlap. It should be noted that criminologists have never thoroughly examined nor explained exactly how criminal and political motivations mix and morph during an insurgency. This isn't because it can't be done; it's just hard to do because it would require some extensive revision of criminological theory. Thomas, Kiser & Casebeer (2005), while not criminologists, represent a good start in this direction which, in many ways, extends social disorganization and cultural transmission theory toward a description of the seams, gaps, or holes in social structure which provide life-cycle sustaining points for "criminal-terrorists." Robb (2007) also provides some good starting points toward an "emergent intelligence" model of the transmutation from terrorist to insurgent-criminal. It may also be noted that from a spectrum of conflict approach, perhaps the best thing that can happen, ironically, is for an insurgency to mutate into crime. Handling the situation as a crime problem affords an end to the glamorization of insurgents as "terrorists" and starts recognizing them for the "street thugs" they really are.

Fighting an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war on terror. Classic counterterrorism strategy is enemy-centric while classic counterinsurgency is population-centric. Counterinsurgency involves as many as 28 things different from counterterrorism, not the least of which is the importance of keeping the momentum (Kilcullen 2005; pdf articles: 28 Fundamentals of Counterinsurgency pdf; Countering Global Insurgency). A population- or environment-centric initiative aims to reduce "wicked" or complex chaos and violence coming from all sides. Spillover has already occurred. Every solution seems to make the problem worse. It must be accepted that counterinsurgency is both part of the solution and part of the problem; i.e, a quagmire exists from which short-term extraction is impossible. Combat operations do not win COIN. Judicious use of firepower works. Force must be used as carefully and with as much discrimination as possible. The key to success is not to create more insurgents than you capture or kill. It is also important to be agile, meaning that trust must be vested in the lower ranks to make on-the-spot decisions (rank doesn't matter; talent does). Civil and military operations should cut across a number of sectors or lines; i.e., security, economic, political, and information sectors must all be making progress at the same time.

Counterinsurgency in many ways is like peacekeeping, which can be defined as any unilateral or multilaterial intervention into the civil affairs of a foreign country which is designed to contribute to a more secure and stable environment, help support the constitutional process, protect citizens, facilitate the repatriation of refugees, help stand up a provisional or interim government, and set the stage for the arrival of a multinational force. The goal is usually to: (1) get the existing government or militias to cease atrocities (usually accomplished by air strikes); (2) get opposing sides to agree to a cease fire or disarmament (usually accomplished by sending in diplomats); and (3) restore some sense of civil law and order (usually accomplished by sending in criminal justice experts). Humanitarian relief is put in place whenever it's safe to do so. Peacekeeping usually involves two phases: a combat or stabilization phase; and a post-conflict, nation re-building phase (It should be noted that many insurgencies also have two phases, at least according to much of the classic literature). Peacekeeping is primarily a military operation because the military is often the only agency with sufficient resources for these tasks. A civilian component may also be involved in periods of stabilization and reconstruction, but that depends upon what sort of "mission" the Department of State is willing to authorize for volunteers and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations). Soldiers who are assigned to peacekeeping operations usually wear distinctive insignia and helmets, e.g., U.N.-sponsored peacekeepers are readily distinguished by their blue helmets. The United States has steadfastly maintained that its peacekeepers should have immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

A Brief History of Peacekeeping

Although there are several good examples of the early origins of peacekeeping, such as the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, modern peacekeeping is essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon in which the U.S. acts in the role of strengthening the deterrent effect of the U.N. or lends its weight (as the only remaining superpower) to a strengthened role for the U.N. and most recently, for NATO which is gearing up for the peacekeeping function. Peacekeeping is not the same as a superpower acting as the world's policeman. The U.N. Charter specifically reserves the right to engage in peacekeeping for itself, and although a few U.S. presidents have utilized the War Powers Act for unilateral military intervention, the more common path today is for the U.S. to contribute, along with other nations, what military force the U.N. needs, and to follow Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD 71) in strengthening the criminal justice systems around the world. Since 1992, the year when modern international peacekeeping operations seem to have been established, the U.S. has taken on assignments in about seven countries, and the U.N., since its inception in 1948, has launched 56 such missions, 13 of which are still active. With the notable exception of places where the U.S. determines it has a vital interest or is engaged in the war on terrorism, the average contribution of U.S. troops to U.N. peacekeeping missions only runs around 6 percent. The following map shows ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operations:

Where insurgencies arise, the typical situation involves an emerging democracy which is trying to come to power in a Third World area which often happens to not be a sustainable area for life and the people have relatively high expectations of the emerging government. Another situation where insurgencies are frequently found is with existing governments that are on the verge of collapse and have been using bullies or thugs to keep order on the streets. In such cases, insurgent groups rise up in revolt toward what is just short of a civil war, and that's what makes insurgency different and similar to terrorism - if it was a civil war, the fighting would follow some rules. Like terrorists, insurgents don't usually care if innocent noncombatants get hurt. A typical insurgency contains numerous acts of sporadic mass violence that closely resemble terrorism, and in some cases, exceed the problems of terrorism. Besides politically-motivated violence, there's going to be ethnic, tribal, gang, and mob violence. Such violence is rarely organized, but you will find organized cells of insurgent resistance that carry out organized terrorist-style acts. The mere presence of peacekeepers does not guarantee a quiet insurgency. Many insurgencies have started over well-intended religious missionary work, and others have started because a segment of the population thinks that the visitors are there to ravish their women. There are at least five (5) types of insurgent groups, as follows:

TYPE #1: Regime Loyalists -- These are people who consist of the old military and security forces of the previous regime, and would include all the volunteer, civilian militia groups, as well as all the intelligence assets (domestic spies and snitches) for the previous regime's officials. They are not criminals, and many are, in fact, quite well-educated, wealthy, and speak English. Their employment records and histories are likely to have been kept secret, so there's no use in trying to work off some central directory of government employees. This makes their exact number unknown. Their modus operandi, however, is quite predictable. They operate on the basis of inspiration, not taking orders directly from anybody, but dispensing attacks whenever they think the moment is right, almost as if they could read the minds of their leaders. When they attack, they do so with reach, skill, strength, and sophistication, and the attacks are coordinated in military fashion to include distractions and account for counterattacks.

TYPE #2: Disaffected Citizens -- These are untrained, leaderless, delinquents and criminals for the most part, who will do anything for money, anything in hopes of making an illegal profit, and may or may not be genuinely angry about the occupation of their country. Their weapons are frequently homemade weapons or what they can find, and their attacks are quite unpredictable and on an ad hoc (occasional) basis. The problems they present are much like the problems of gang behavior on the homefront, and their actions are sometimes predicable from reading the graffitti they seemingly put on everything. Their modus operandi is not too smart, however, as they always seem to exposing themselves in crowds where they try to whip up a protest into mob violence, and then they get killed. The smarter ones, like citizens in general, keep their role down to serving as spotters for other insurgent groups.

TYPE #3: Terrorists -- These are terrorists who may have been operating in the country beforehand, or terrorists who have come into the country after the occupation. Either way, they represent the same kind of threat, which is that they are usually well-armed, well-trained, and have an interest in weapons of mass destruction. Standard terrorist ideology calls for a "scorched Earth" policy after a safe haven has been occupied, so it isn't past them to use some biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon to destroy the whole area, civilians and all, to get at the occupiers. Actually, it seems the continued influx of terrorists to the region works against their interests, because they spend a lot of time on organizational matters such as "who's in charge" and so forth. Nonetheless, well-organized, military-style terrorist organizations represent the gravest threat during most phases of an insurgency and counter-insurgency.

TYPE #4: Foreign Fighters -- These are people from neighboring countries who either sympathize with the cause of one or more other insurgent groups, or hate the occupiers so much, for their own reasons, that they jump at the chance to immigrate and fight the enemy, "infidels" who have invaded the Muslim world, for example. Generally, they have little or no military training, and their connection to a cause is usually quite religious, but the locals often don't want them around. Some come on their own, or at the prompting of some religious leader, and only a few of them have any resources or money to operate successfully. However, in late 2007, American forces cracked a terrorist stronghold in the Syria-Iraq border region, and found records documenting an organized smuggling operation of foreign fighters from 2006-07. This "Sinjar cell" was responsible for the import of about 700 foreign jihadists into Iraq, 60% of whom came from countries supposedly allied with the U.S. (e.g., Saudi Arabia 305; Libya 137; Yemen 68; Algeria 64; 50 from Morocco, 38 from Tunisia, 14 from Jordan, 6 from Turkey and 2 from Egypt). Foreign fighters represent a wild card, for the most part, for counter-insurgency efforts.

TYPE #5: Criminals -- These are most likely gangs, narcotraffickers, narco-guerrillas, or other aspiring drug- or crime kingpins and their henchmen. They will do almost anything for money or power, although some have ruthless loyalty to a cartel, cabal, or other transnational criminal organization. Local gangs also present a problem. The criminal element is the most vicious, attacking and preying upon ordinary civilians. They almost never have any stated goals or political philosophy. Their objective is to create havoc for the "hell" of it. Criminals often prey on refugees or easy targets of opportunity, and while their dangerousness should not be underestimated, they are a nuisance, for the most part.

In reality, there are many more types of insurgents than these basic five. To name a few more, there may be: insurrectionists (defying authority at every turn), revolutionaries (seeking the creation of a new government), dissidents (who critique just about anything), secessionists (seeking the establishment of a spin-off state), extremists (creating general mayhem and chaos), and militias or vigilantes (paramilitary groups trying to keep the peace). There are also fugitives from justice, as in the case when you have war criminals that have melted into the countryside. One may also encounter rebel groups, factions or splinter groups, cliques or juntas (a political or military faction). Spin-off groups like these tend to create cadres (small cells of people organized for rapid expansion) and cabals (small cells of people, sometimes related, organized for secrecy). In addition, there may be outside state support or sponsorship of an insurgency, and this is similar to what is called a proxy war. Such outside support is usually given for geopolitical reasons, and may involve assistance with weapons, money, material, or a safe place to organize and train (safe haven). Diasporas, or immigrant communities established in foreign countries, frequently support insurgencies in their homeland. Refugees, guerrilla movements, religious organizations, wealthy individuals, and even human rights organizations have all been involved in supporting insurgencies, for a variety of reasons.

Although resistance movements are known primarily for uniting people across ethnic, age, and gender lines (i.e., women and children are recruited into the resistance), the ultimate goal of a resistance movement is to break down the ties of people with their duly constituted government, and to do so by a strategy of attrition (lassitude or weariness). Such movements are not very selective about what it takes to accomplish this, and the intensity of attacks will vary (sometimes being quite focused). They will seize upon any source of discontent among the people to rally support for the "movement" -- a hatred of anything. In other words, resistance movements are not politically well-organized, at least at first, in their so-called "passive" stage. Insurgencies benefit from chaos, mob violence, societal breakdown, and psychological turmoil. The (usually) charismatic leadership of an insurgency doesn't really provide vision or guidance, other than to excite the people into action - militant action where somebody gets killed or property gets destroyed. Leaders gain prestige by how quickly they can mobilize people into action, and most groups use multiple leaders since the movement would be doomed if a single leader were assassinated. Note that this is not leaderless resistance (as found in some forms of terrorism); instead, it is the concept of collective leadership.

At some point, the resistance movement selects an ideology that has great appeal to the most number of people. Often, this ideology is copied in whole or part from the literature on anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism (e.g., Lenin, Mao, Guevarra, liberation theology, etc.). Ideological conflicts will inevitably arise within the movement because the group must be vague enough for broad appeal and specific enough to address important issues. Additionally, insurgents will have to be ambiguous about how they plan to accommodate differences among the various groups within society once they do come to power and get the chance to institute reforms. It is extremely difficult to sort through the ideological machinations of an insurgent movement; and it is also extremely important to distinguish the true ideals that fuel the movement from propaganda. In the secondary stages of an insurgency, armed conflict becomes less important than the practice of psychological warfare.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are asymmetric forms of non-traditional warfare. The insurgents are fighting for the most effect with limited resources, and the counter-insurgents are fighting for the hearts and minds of the population. It is important to clarify that winning over "hearts and minds" is NOT the same as trying to get a local populace to "like" the COIN forces. This gratitude theory, that "being nice to the people means they will feel grateful and stop supporting the insurgents" does NOT work, and in fact, aggravates the insurgency problem because support based on liking does not last. This does not mean that efforts at likeability are totally irrelevant, but it does suggest that the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds is as follows:

PsyOps (Psychological Operations) can be also abbreviated PSYOP or PSYWAR (psychological warfare). Counter-propaganda campaigns on a global level have long been a part of American law ever since the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 which prohibits the use of domestic propaganda on American soil and uses a standard of reasonableness to determine the appropriateness of propaganda intended for foreign consumption. A psychological warfare campaign is a pure war of the mind, and involves the use of communication, television, radio, loudspeakers, leaflets, newspapers, books, magazines, music, and posters to deliver a message that supports loyalty to the objectives of those in power. In a technical sense, PsyOps are not a form of force, but a force multiplier that uses nonviolent means in a violent environment. On the other hand, PsyOps have been a recognized weapon of war ever since Alexander the Great. Today, the U.S. military recognizes three kinds of PsyOps:

The use of propaganda is a prominent feature of psychological warfare, and the CIA, among others, often classify propaganda as one of three kinds. So-called "black" propaganda consists of planted material that makes it look like the enemy insurgents are bad people. Doctored sound- or video-recordings of them saying they don't really care about their own people or that they are cross-dressing perverts are some examples. Then, there's "white" propaganda, which is usually easy to obtain and verifiable, that can truthfully point out how bad the other side is. The population would be informed, for example, that an insurgent leader has six illegitimate kids with women from the other side. Finally, there's "grey" propaganda, of the half-truth, half-falsity variety, otherwise known as misinformation or blowback. Grey PsyOps involve cover and deception, and are sometimes extremely complex and intricate affairs.

The most frequently used means of conducting PsyOps are by radio broadcast and by dropping leaflets. During World War II, the Soviets and Germans dropped leaflets containing sexual propaganda, suggesting to the citizenry that the enemy behind the front lines were ravishing the native women. North Koreans still use this technique today to keep their soldiers stirred up. The U.S. has a formal ban on sexual propaganda, and prefers to drop simple leaflets letting the citizenry know which radio frequencies to tune into, for example, like the leaflet shown. Numerous libraries of leaflet drops over Iraq can be found on the Internet.

Similar leaflets were dropped over Afghanistan, Kosovo, Grenada, Somalia, Vietnam, during the first Gulf War, and the Invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2002-03). Leaflet varieties range from the simple "Surrender or Die" theme to "Safe Passage" tickets for deserters when hostilities are most active, and information leaflets, loudspeaker teams, and radio broadcasts tend to replace leaflets when hostilities are declining. Leaflets have their problems, and what may work better are symbolic PLAYING CARDS, which actually have a long history in psychological warfare, especially with the Ace of Spades Death Card. Cards have other purposes too. To assist with the roundup of fugitive war criminals in Iraq, the Defense Department printed up a small number of playing cards with faces on them. The use of such playing cards was an old military tradition that the DIA wanted to re-implement. The cards were called Personality Identification Playing cards, and for the Iraqi Top 55, they looked like the following:

Radio and television broadcasts for the "hearts and minds" of people, in terms of propaganda and counter-propaganda, have reached new level of sophistication in recent years. Most viewers are familiar with Radio Free Europe, for example, but Clandestine Radio Watch tracks the surging development of this phenomena worldwide. In 2004, the United States launched a Virginia-based, satellite TV station known as Al Hurra (the Free One) which is intended to be a fair and balanced answer to outlets like Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite network that fans so much anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The U.S.-funded Al Hurra channel cost $60 million in seed money plus $40 million added by Congress to get started, but it reaches 80% of Iraq's population with over-air transmitters. The former Iraqi regime's (Saddam Hussein's) state-owned television station was taken over by a U.S. venture group, out of San Diego (SAIC, or Science Applications International Corp.) that now calls itself Al Iraqiya and resembles Al Jazeera in many ways. Both Al Jazeera and Al Iraqiya are broadcast 24/7 in Arabic. Al Jazeera is considered by many in the Arab world as the "voice of truth" because, despite repeated requests by the U.S. to the Emir of Qatar (who subsidizes Al Jazeera to the tune of $30 million a year), the Emir keeps repeating he believes in freedom of the press and Al Jazeera enjoys total freedom. From time to time, Al Jazeera receives videotapes from Osama bin Laden and/or Ayman Al-Zawahiri, which they edit before airing. U.S. requests for the original, uncut, raw tapes go unanswered.

The Problem with Television Stations

Television stations as a tool in the war on terrorism may have limited effectiveness, and in fact, may produce countereffective reactions (if the broadcasts are seen as too strongly tilted or too dull). In the Middle East, for example, where over 100 TV stations exist, Al Hurra tends to rely upon the attractiveness of their female news reporters (which backfires) as a way to counter dullness, and other news reporting is seen as too strongly tilted pro-American. Effectiveness might be increased by abandoning any attempts at "real-time" news reporting, abandoning entertainment programming, and just sticking to documentaries and educational programming. A strong web site also helps with today's media.

To be successful at winning over the "hearts and minds" of a populace, the best strategy is to utilize many different, interagency efforts and initiatives. These joint and independent efforts all need to be effectively coordinated, and in this regard, see the GAO Report on Interagency Coordination relative to countering Arab anti-Americanism. Propaganda can have a "thermostat effect" which heats up or cools down a crisis, and propaganda can also have a "wildfire effect" when it gets out of control and produces long-term, unpredictable effects. Some of these long-term, undesirable effects include the creation of zealots who, years after a crisis, are still carrying out hate crime against a demonized enemy of years ago. Other extremists may construct conspiracy-type distortions based on "outdated" ideas from earlier propaganda. Certain beliefs and attitudes, emotions and feelings, can rather easily lead to political extremism and fanaticism. Many of the crazies and fanatics in the world today exist because some government, somewhere, engaged in propaganda. It's a dangerous, dirty business, and no self-respecting government ought to engage in it because it borders on being state criminality (Johns & Borreo 1991). Another danger is trying to have too much mass appeal in winning a "war of ideas." Trying to use ideas to influence people who do not think is an exercise in futility. Such people are led and influenced by those who do think -- the elites, the educated, or the more literate in a country. On the other hand, it is often important not to forget the masses, and simple messages (or pictures) often work for this, such as the following leaflets from the DoD and CIA showing Osama bin Laden without a beard.

Nation building is neither impossible nor immoral. Tens of millions of people in places like Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Sierra Leone are living peacefully, most under democratically elected governments, because UN, NATO, European, or U.S. troops came in, separated contending factions, disarmed former combatants, promoted reconstruction, held elections, installed freely chosen governments, and remained long enough to see that these took hold. It's important to make at least some distinctions between nation building and standard warfare or other war-like actions which are bound by the dictum that "if you blow things up, you have to rebuild it." Since at least the 1945 War with Japan, the standard expectation has been that, after an invasion or occupation, annexation of territory may take place and/or the establishment of a friendly government will occur. This has been the traditional American approach as a "liberator" instead of an "occupier." Although the U.S. has some experience, since MacArthur in Japan and rebuilding Germany after WWII, at provisional or interim "constitutional-like" methods, these successes have relied primarily upon roundtables or revolving doors where at least some previous regime legality is left in place, in accordance with international law mandating preservation of the status quo. The U.S. is not yet skillfully experienced with what might be called "total nation building" where the breakdown has involved the loss of both legitimacy and legality. Nation building in such climates usually results from a MOOTW (Military Operation Other Than War -- pronounced "moo-twah"). These kinds of operations held a very low priority prior to 9/11. These kinds of operations can produce insurgency problems (Gallagher 1992; Poole 2004).

Nation building has the defining feature of mixing military and civilian forces, particularly in areas involving justice, negotiation, or dispute resolution. Military forces should never be deployed alone to engage in nation building. One of the most basic of all rules in international law is that you don't wage war on civilians, but in the sense of an occupier's "war on chaos" or "war on crime," that's exactly what certain occupations do. The insurgents are going to try and kidnap or kill as many innocent civilians as they can, and the counter-insurgents are going to be unable to distinguish criminals from combatants. It's true what Max Weber (1914/1978) said about legitimacy -- neither pure imposition nor pure agreement will achieve it. If you use strong-arm military tactics, you run the risk of uniting all the different factions, and then you've got a guerilla war on your hands. If you act too slowly or softly, a chain reaction takes place, and you've got countless acts of mob violence on your hands. To do nation building effectively, you need to have power and legitimacy. For power, there has to be an overwhelming police (mixed with military) presence. The RAND corporation estimates that twenty (20) security personnel for every thousand (1000) inhabitants is sufficient to establish such a presence, and produces no question about "who's in control" especially when combined with a massive gun control effort. Other experts say you only need ten (10) security personnel for every thousand (1000) inhabitants, especially if those personnel are specialists and coming from an all-volunteer military. Whatever the size of your force, your next step is to establish legitimacy, and conventional wisdom has it that, at least according to Elster's (1994) notion, you've got to establish electoral freedom and an interim constitution (called "midstream legitimacy") that eventually leads to adherence for the principles of plurality, publicity, and legality (called "upstream legitimacy"). The following are some other selected ideas on the topic -- presented as option A and option B.

Option A (Selective Intervention): You can let the civil violence run its course, or at least let selected acts of insurrection go unpunished. There's actually a school of thought that supports this idea of just letting things run its course. International law, despite whatever other values it may contain, requires a certain amount of tolerance. The principles of national sovereignty and noninterference mean that one nation doesn't normally interfere in the internal affairs of another nation, and the trick is to tolerate those parts of an insurrection that have the most to do with internal affairs (such as family or real estate issues). This strategy, of course, rewards the insurgency, and it will probably escalate to horrible dimensions. It will be terrible to see all those dead bodies and faces of starving children on the television screen every night (the CNN effect), but sometimes it's prudent to let the civil unrest reach its natural conclusion, and let the indigenous people of that country handle it themselves, much like a natural disaster -- such as a flood, earthquake, or volcanic disruption -- with the rebuilding effort focused on recovery of things that matter (such as health services, critical resources, and humanitarian relief). The CNN effect often triggers actions when people get sick and tired of seeing starving children and needless bloodshed. Playing out this strategy runs the risk of being labeled a colonialist exploiter (which is what you'd definitely be accused of if you partitioned the country into separate zones or provinces), but being called bad names is something you're going to be accused of anyway, even in humanitarian situations (needy nations sometimes resent receiving charity). It may be better to preserve your economic vital interests than save your political face or try to achieve political solutions in an insurgency situation. The U.S. democratic system doesn't travel well, and democracy cannot be exported wholesale to some other place. It must be a product of internal domestic development in a society. There are actually degrees of "letting things run its course" and most nations, do not, of course, ever follow the fully extreme, non-interventionist route. Far more likely to happen is that, with a relatively ignored insurgency, there will be more directed and targeted violence at expatriates, foreigners, and other targets of opportunity, and there is the risk that violence will spill over into internecine conflict on other lands.

Option B (Fiscal Law approach): You can engage in both humanitarian and political rebuilding in the form of leaving behind better roads, schools, food, hospitals, etc., and civilized nations adhering to the principle of civility have always thought that these "pre-political" acts of kindness and love will have important consequences for human dignity. The problem, however, is that during active upheavals of social upheaval, most humanitarian aid will be intercepted and monopolized by one or more of the insurgency groups. It can be almost guaranteed that the food, first aid, and supplies will never get in the hands of those starving children you saw on television. Insurgency groups have even been known to kidnap and execute Red Cross or Christian groups trying to get humanitarian aid into the country. Protection of humanitarian aid efforts and/or the notion that a threat to human rights anywhere is a threat to human rights everywhere are the only two good reasons for mounting an enforced humanitarian aid operation. In fact, it may be precisely at this point in the endgame -- when humanitarian efforts fail -- when it is time for the occupying power to "dump" the rebuilt nation on the world's lap -- or perform the handoff in some politically feasible manner. It's important to emphasize exactly how politically correct the handoff must appear because dumping must not appear to have occurred. However, it will always appear to be done abruptly, and it is never perfect. No transition plan in the world is likely to be satisfactory to all parties. If you leave an interim government in power assisted by your advisors, it will quickly be seen as having no legitimacy (a puppet government). Your hardest choice may involve a complete pull-out or withdrawal, leaving what precious few democratic institutions you've built in place and subject to fate. Your worst fate may involve a seemingly unsolvable refugee problem, and refugees flock not only out of safety but in order to obtain any handouts. Over 7 million refugees have been restricted or segregated in camps or settlements for a decade or longer (e.g., 300,000 Angolans in Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa, and Namibia; 2 million Afghans in Iran and Pakistan; 100,000 Bhutanese in Nepal; and 500,000 refugees from Sudan).

Although far from a blueprint for nation-rebuilding (if anything like a perfect "blueprint" existed), the example of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority is illustrative of the magnitude involved in re-establishing a nation from scratch. Iraq's CPA is based on the idea of restoring the ministerial form of government in transitional form. Ministries are the same as executive cabinet agencies, and they should have the power to propose laws that are approved by a temporary civilian administrator. As long as we are discussing the concept of what since 2002 has been called the idea of "Provincial (Provisional) Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), it might also be important to point out that, as Schnaubelt (2005-06), that tensions are inherent whenever "civilian" and "military" responsibilities intersect when attempting to implement frameworks or models. The organization chart which follows should be illustrative:

Iraq is a somewhat unique case in that, since 2003, there have been at least six plans put into effect. The CPA illustration (above) is representative of Plan B whereas Plan A conceived of something much simpler (the Iraqis treating us as liberators, and exiles returning to handle reconstruction). All in all, here's a listing of six plans that have been tried in Iraq:

Post-conflict nation building is complicated by a number of factors. Let's take a look at some of the crime and social problems involved in the total breakdown of a society. In this scenario, there's usually a lot of the following going on:

The regular police will have all disbanded, fled into the hills, been absorbed into some militia group, or divided up along ethnic lines. It should be obvious that one of the main purposes of counter-insurgency is to restore legal order, to act as some sort of international police force, but you will also need a court and penal system. Few military services in the world are designed for these purposes. The military is trained to take and hold territory, not demonstrate proper search and seizure procedures, nor maintain penal institutions. By the time you get any kind of ground force in place, it's often too late to conduct any crime prevention or community oriented policing, but that's exactly what you need.

The CIA did a study back in 1994, called the State Failure Task Force Report, the findings of which coincide with the findings of Kaplan (1994) and Rotberg (2003), which helped to determine what the primary factors were that lead to total social breakdown. They determined three primary factors:

Seventy percent (70%) of all insurgency problems can be predicted with just the first three factors, two years in advance. When a country breaks down, it becomes prime breeding ground for criminal organizations, terrorist training camps, and an economy of smuggling. It's not a pretty site when a country breaks down, but the interesting sociological question is whether social order breaks down. Chances are that some customs, folkways, and norms will remain, and the temptation of theocracy is that mores will cohere these remaining social building blocks into some sense of theodicy or predictability. In a post-insurgency situation, the people will flock to the religious institutions even more than before. A diversity of religious institutions is therefore important to have in place, or at least some other social institutions that provide countervaling values. The more secular and this-worldly an occupying power leaves a re-built nation, the better.

All insurgencies are in some sense civil wars, and along these lines, the work of Paul Collier, an Oxford professor and one of the world's foremost experts in civil war, is worth mentioning. Collier (2003) has written extensively about the causes of internal conflicts, but his main ideas can be summarized below:

The Collier Model of Civil War

There are three ways to deal with civil wars: one, prevent them from happening; two, shorten the conflict; and three, reduce the risk of resumption of conflict in post-conflict situations. The biggest payoff comes from reducing the risk of relapse or resumption, since renewed violence accounts for around half of all global civil wars. The average civil war lasts for about seven years (Collier & Hoeffler 2004), and economically, each year of civil war reduces a country's growth rate by around 2%. Civil war also causes severe deterioration in health status. There is no clear evidence that a civil war usually spills over into neighboring countries, but there are, however, economic impacts and neighborhood arms races. Once a country has had a civil war, it becomes far more likely to have a further war (the so-called "conflict trap"). About half the problems causing a resumption of conflict come from problems generated by the initial conflict, and the other half are typically pre-existing grievances associated with such things as brutality and corruption by a dominant ethnic group or dictator. Poorly-timed aid to a foreign country in the throes of a civil war can make matters worse.

There is perhaps nothing more important on the world stage than the outcomes of constitutional institutions and processes in states which have been rebuilt. Also important are the long-range implementions of sovereignty, sustainment, and freedom. If Iraq manages to succeed in this process, it will have become a shining beacon of freedom in the Middle East, and if not that, at least a testimonial to those soldiers who gave their lives. Iraq, in fact, already has a shining beacon of freedom that exists, in the form of Kurdistan, aka the Kurdish Autonomous Region, which is so pro-American that one of their leaders once remarked "We are ready to become your fifty-first state and provide you with oil" (see Case for an Independent Kurdistan). The following are some basic elements needed for a Constitution-based freedom tailored for a Middle Eastern country. Exactly how these basic elements are spelled out in the actual wording of a Constitutional process is not important; what's important is that the values are codified.

What's Needed in the Middle East

A democratic government based on a federalist model - Swiss, German, or American, it doesn't matter which one - where all the separate states and provinces are unified and drawn upon geographical lines rather than ethnic lines; where minority rights are guaranteed - such as the Kurdistan model of allotting a specific number of parliamentary seats to key minority groups; where there is also a guarantee of equality for all people, including women and built-in rights for women in regards to things such as polygamy and honor killings; where rational economic planning and fair distributions of oil profits are considered; and the government operates in ways that are consistent with Islamic values without being subservient to theocratic law.

Numerous resources need brought to bear on any such project, particularly social science and analytical expertise. Along these lines, North Carolina's Research Triangle Institute (RTI) got the $167 million contract for rebuilding the local governance infrastructure in Iraq, and they effectively use their survey data-gathering skills to develop some consensus on what the people there want and/or need. They also conduct training sessions for Iraqi officials on how to build democratic (meaning transparent and accountable) institutions important to the political economy. RTI's approach is known as "democratic decentralization" which is a type of institution building based on analytical identification of diverse interest groups and selection of leaders for those groups. No self-nominations or interviews are conducted to select leaders as the whole idea is to create a system of checks and balances by having many relatively powerless leaders rather than having a few popular warlords gain power.

Warlordism was a problem with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and militias and cadres of this type need to be assessed from both exogenous and endogenous viewpoints (Thomas, Kiser & Casebeer 2005). Warlordism (as thuggish units) usually don't have the attitude, structure, or effectiveness of professional military units, or insurgents, but they are nonetheless masters of the more "criminal" realms of a society. The whole trick with a nation the size of Iraq, like Afghanistan, is to develop some type of federalism model, in which you have decentralized authority in provinces and towns, but centralized authority in the nation's capital. Warlords and/or militia leaders will take special interest in porkbarrel projects, such as those involving companies like Halliburton and five other companies which are tasked with getting the infrastructure, like transportation, electricity, water and sewage, agriculture, health, and education up and running again. Lots of other contractors are involved in projects, small business development, and the tasks of management consulting; companies like Aegis Defense Services, DynCorp, Erinys International, and Vinnell Corp. The elites like the warlords are the ones who also have an important say in the perception of how things are going. To illustrate this, look at Prof. Byman's (2003) list of challenges which face any democratic nation-building effort:

It's not well-known, but a rather large industry has evolved from the old days of guns-for-hire mercenaries, and these Private Military Firms (PMFs) play a key role on the global stage in doing jobs that, in many cases, involve insurgencies and tasks too dangerous for regular soldiers to do. Mockler (1970) was the first to document the rise of this industry, and Singer (2003) has been among the many recent critics of outsourcing in coming up with, for example, such phrases as the "coalition of the billing." Private soldiers may be especially useful when a low-profile force is needed to solve an awkward, potentially embarrassing situation that develops on the fringes of policy. It is also the case that the death of private soldiers don't carry the same political baggage as the death of American G.I.s. As of 2005, there are as many as 60 different security firms doing private military work for the U.S. government. A significant presence exists in places like Latin America (to fight the drug war), and PMFs account for at least 30% of the work being done in Iraq. Firms like MPRI and Blackwater USA can provide not only tactical and strategic services, but "boots on the ground" as armed security escorts for peacekeeping operations. Some PMFs, like Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), provide military support services, such as delivering military equipment, preparing meals for soldiers, delivering mail, and putting out oil-field fires, as well as handle inprocessing and outprocessing of personnel in and out of the region. Some, like CACI, have assisted with interrogations of prisoners, although not without some scandal. Others, like DynCorp (who have removed their web presence) have also been involved in scandal, but continue to play a rather large role overseas and at home (administering the Justice Department's asset forfeiture program, for example). Still others, like the now-defunct Executive Outcomes, engage in actual combat using former soldiers. Sandline, International maintains an extensive collective of "white papers" about the industry. During the first Gulf War, one of every 100 Americans in that region worked for a PMF. Today in Iraq, one of every 10 Americans works for a private military contractor. Since there are only a limited number of military reservists that can be called up for active duty (a politically unpopular option), PMFs provide the outsourcing often needed to conduct effective nation re-building. For the most part, these firms operate very professionally, and only a small number of "bad apples" have been involved in scandals.

PMFs should NOT be considered mercenaries because mercenaries are prohibited by the Geneva Convention. Most private soldiers have military training, usually special forces training, and while some came out of retirement for patriotism, others are attracted to the money. Private soldiers can make more than $250,000 a year. The U.S. government is billed around $1,000 per man per day, but that is still cost-effective for the U.S. because there are no recruitment, education, or training costs. That is also a bargain compared to what foreign-based PMFs charge. Over 50 different countries have such firms (some of which should perhaps be called mercenaries), and these foreign firms charge as much as $2 million a month or $40 million a year to make some rebel or insurgency problem "go away."

Mercenaries do exist, however. The history of the Congo is replete with examples, and some people regard the Congo as the world's model for the use of mercenaries. Tucker's (1998) article in Parameters covers the Congo as well as the history of mercenaries in general. Mockler (1970) identified three types: (1) soldiers of fortune; (2) various "guards" which heads of state surround themselves with; and (3) free company bands of soldiers. Although there are subtle distinctions between the three types which Mockler isn't all that clear about, the defining characteristics of a mercenary, according to Mockler (1970) are temporary loyalty, a willingness to wage war for its own sake, and a decision that the profits (or rewards) are greater than the risks (or dangers). To make a long historical story short, it all seems to have started when Bismarck decided in Germany back in 1871 to once-and-for-all create a model in which foreigners (whose loyalty was questionable) could NEVER serve in a national army. At that time, and subsequently, numerous private groups arose to fulfill the needs of excluded persons, and they became "tolerated" as "exceptions" to the Bismarckian rule. Such "exceptions" included the Foreign Legion of France, the Gurkhas of Great Britain, the Swiss Guard, the International Brigade in Spain, and the Arab Legion of Jordan.

Less-than-active-duty soldiers also exist. The Reserves consist of seven groups and even include retirees: the Army National Guard; the Army Reserve; the Naval Reserve; the Marine Corps Reserve; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve; and the Coast Guard Reserve. Reservists work for the federal government while the National Guard works for state government, and neither group has any choice under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to activate if called, but they can volunteer if they like. The Secretary of Transportation can also (under Title 14) call up the Coast Guard Reserve, but they can only be used domestically, and for 30 days. The following table lists the three most common ways in which Reservists are called up: PRC standing for Presidential Reserve Call-up, which means for mission purposes the President has deemed required; Partial Mobilization meaning a war or national emergency exists; and Full Mobilization meaning Congress has declared war, and every able-bodied man (or woman) between the ages of 17 and 45 (the unorganized militia) is eligible to be called-up.

	PRC	Partial Mobilization	Full Mobilization
Authority	10 USC 12304 (Presidential)	10 USC 12302 (Presidential)	10 USC 12301(a) (Congressional)
Number Subject to Involuntary Call-Up	200,000 (of whom not more than 30,000 may be "Inactive" reserve)	1,000,000	Unlimited
Reserve Categories Subject to Call-Up	Selected Reserve (Units, IMAs, AGRs) and certain IRR members	Ready Reserve (Units, IMAs, AGRs, IRR/ING)	Total Reserve (Units, IMAs, AGRs, IRR/ING, Retirees, Standby Reserve)
Length of Time of Call-Up	270 days	24 months	Duration of War plus 6 months

Civilians find many ways and places to contribute to post-conflict situations (but they can also meddle and do otherwise). One of the lessons learned with post-conflict Iraq is that civilians should NOT generally be used to train security forces, at least initially. This is a job best left to the military. However, if "capacity building" is important (as it always is in any framework of post-conflict reconstruction), there is a need for civilian involvement, at least in the less law enforcement-related aspects of criminal justice. As many books (e.g., Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005) and the CSIS Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (pdf) make clear, security is only one of four pillars of reconstruction principles, all four as follows:

Politically, there are only two methods of withdrawal from an insurgency: time-based withdrawal; and condition-based withdrawal. Either one will require an endgame or exit strategy. A "strategy" in this context means something more than what Sen. George Aiken once suggested for Vietnam: declare victory and go home. Traditional American foreign policy in this regard is driven by the concept of being an "honest broker" wherein the U.S. withdraws, leaves a modest presence, and does not take sides on any issues, letting the fledgling government make its own choices. Honest brokering requires calm tensions, the encouragement of compromise, and strong legal and constitutional processes. It also usually involves a 10-year plan. For Iraq, numerous strategies have been offered. Egland's (2006) Weekly Standard article, for example, offers a sample ten-year, six-step strategy, as follows: (1) encourage innovation by emphasizing small-scale technological solutions; (2) improve training realism and abandon Cold War-era checklists; (3) allow local commanders to buy what they need; (4) strengthen intelligence sharing and develop a national insurgent database; (5) take the offensive by hunting, rather than chasing, the enemy; and (6) accept the realities of the media age by decentralizing the sharing of information. The NPR series on Iraq strategy offers some other samples similar to this.

Iraq aside, there will be other insurgencies for America and its allies to face. There will be other terror threats beyond al Qaeda with global reach. Endgame strategic thinking must ask questions like "would the war on terror be over if AQ leaders defected, surrendered, and announced a 'calling off' of the jihad?" Actually, a lapsed jihadist and senior AQ theologian named Sayyed Imam al-Sharif did just this in December of 2007, but it is realistic to expect that jihadist remnants will remain, along with the many unstable places in the world which serve as breeding grounds for insurgencies. Strategically, the easy notion of putting "democratically minded strongmen" in place to replace dictators as well as partitioning a country up into ethnic enclaves are, in general, bad ideas because history has shown that installing "puppet" leaders backfires and partitioning exacerbates fighting over scarce resources. If partition must occur, David Apgar argues for a two-state solution (a northwest New Babylon and a southeast Sistanistan) because a three-state solution would aggravate all the neighbors, not just Turkey over the Kurds. It is also possible that continued transitional military rule will be needed, as well as intervention in the form of "soft" coup-d'etats which at least install leaders able to implement orders which mimic the processes of democratic procedures. It seems inevitable that no matter what Iraq's future might hold, a strong degree of militarization is going to be necessary. Hopefully, it will not be of the kind where political elites raise their own paramilitaries. Countries where political parties control their own paramilitaries are unstable and violent-prone countries. What the country needs are good, strong military traditions along with good, stable civil-military institutions. Given the inherent instability in the region, Iraq's future will be a test of how well the usual economic and political development processes mix with the rebuilding of military tradition.

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