Counterterrorism: Military and Economic Options

COUNTERTERRORISM: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OPTIONS
"No military plan survives its first contact with the enemy" (Helmuth von Moltke)

Counterterrorism is not an exact science. As a policy arena bridging domestic and foreign policy, it is usually stumbled into because terrorism is unlike any other government challenge. One must face the fact that no war on terrorism ever results in the enemy's unconditional surrender. Counterterrorism has few positive consequences for foreign policy. Errors, misunderstandings, and hurt feelings will accumulate. International cooperation will be lacking, and intelligence sharing will be less than optimal. The laws on the books will seem useless and antiquated. Every nation suffering from shock will be tempted to engage in isolationism, self-blaming, or the fatalistic belief that the problem is a "rare event" that will go away if ignored. Other nations will be tempted by the "go-it-alone" syndrome. Counterterrorism has negative consequences for domestic policy. Governments can count on resistance from their own people, not simply because of fatigue, but because citizens of all nations naturally cultivate friends and foes alike. War is a tempting option because it is the only thing which unites people, but even it brings about protest and dissent.

The reasons why a nation goes to war with terrorism are many, but boil down to the idea of taking the fight to the enemy, a "forward defense" strategy, if you will. Some nations may want to flex their muscle (Kagan 2006); some may believe they have perfected society and want to share it with the world (McDougall 1998); some may believe they are simply doing what is right to battle the evil of terrorism (Rosenthal & Muller 2008); and others may believe the only viable option is to make life as difficult as possible for the terrorists (a kind of "keeping em busy" strategy). Most nations are easily aroused by dangers or threats, sometimes economic threats, sometimes ideological threats, but most of all, military threats. Counterterrorism is much like responding to a military threat. Any counterterrorism policy is going to involve tampering in the affairs of a foreign country. An effective counterterrorism policy requires an informed public equally interested in foreign and domestic affairs. There is no such thing as a foreign policy specialist who is not also a domestic policy specialist, and this can be more broadly stated that no nation has any special expertise in tampering with the domestic affairs of another nation. Sometimes, foreign intervention does wonderful things; other times, it goes horribly wrong. Some strategies work well for a time; few work well for long periods of time.

The military option comes into play when a government recognizes it has got to do what is necessary to safeguard its security by using military force to protect the right to freedom. The use of force must not be whimsical (Gurr 1970). The worst thing a government can do is be inconsistent, being tough one time, and then being soft the next. Military commanders in the field rarely get the chance to implement creative twists, as with the fictitious Pershing strategy of using an enemy's taboos to break their spirit. More often, the implementation of military strategy takes the form of conquering and holding territory, or creating a buffer zone to mitigate threats by pushing them further afield. The United States has recognized its right to take the battle to the enemy ever since the War of 1812 when the country was humiliated by the White House burning. In fact, the political term "hawk" has its origins in this historical event. However, the U.S. also embraces tolerance of liberalism and the checks and balances of democracy. Liberal democracies rarely go to war because it is assumed (by democratic peace theory) that the majority of people would never vote for war. Hence, democracies face some difficult dilemmas. Policymakers have to set an agenda and then sell their domestic audience on that agenda. This means that foreign policy often becomes inseparable from public opinion, but a lot depends on the leadership and the construct employed to sell the agenda. In this regard, Mead (2002) has outlined four traditions in American foreign policy, as follows:

Distinguishing these traditions has grown increasingly difficult over time, as they have often been combined and recombined. The passing of history also takes effect. Nowadays, the names do not mean that the foreign policy is derived from the historical figure so much as the main idea in each tradition was once associated with that historical figure. Historians often debate, for example, whether George Washington was an isolationist or unilateralist. A longer list of traditions is provided by McDougall (1998), as follows, but be advised the descriptions (like those given here) are far from definitional.

Measurement of success is difficult for any approach. However, for a variety of reasons, military and economic counterterrorism are successful largely for symbolic reasons. Basically, it makes governments feel good to drop bombs on an enemy and to think that money is being siphoned away from them. This is known as the "catharsis effect" of counterterrorism, and there are some experts (Lesser et. al. 1999) who argue that that is the best (and only) measure of success. It is also possible, as anti-hawk "doves" advocate, that more innocent people suffer this way. Bombs go awry, causing "collateral damage," and it is well-known that economic sanctions rarely cause the targeted regime to suffer -- it is the people who suffer. Therefore, some argue that these options produce destabilization in regions, which can only accomplish a kind of containment in the short-term, but never that age-old justice principle called deterrence. In today's complex, interconnected world, it may very well be true that one-word descriptions of principles, purposes, and effects are old-fashioned.

In the beginning, there were city-states which saw themselves as some sort of union or federation, which became nation-states, and then the great wars of survival began. The first, the Peloponnesian war, brought an end to any hope for a free Greek nation-state, and then there was the Roman Empire, that great experiment in centralized government. Provinces in the Roman Empire were allowed to practice self-government within limitations established by Rome. The famous "Pax Romana" was based on subjugation without assimilation, an unworkable strategy, but one which stood as a symbol of law and order for over a thousand years. When Rome fell, Pope Leo III appointed Charlemagne as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Roman system of administration was replaced by the feudal system. Under feudalism, the notion of "sovereignty" developed, with a vassal owing unquestioning allegiance to their overlord in "fiefdoms" (as far as the lord thought his power extended; his dominion as master of all that he surveys). However, the Pope started removing fiefdoms in cases of misconduct, and the notions of "jurisdiction" and "legitimacy" replaced sovereignty. The territorial jurisdiction system came into being, and along with it, the quest for territorial expansion of jurisdiction. Part of that was the Crusades, but another part was the urge to create a new world order. It failed, and Europe drifted into a state of anarchy with rule by dukes and duchesses.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended rule by dukes, re-created the nation-state system, and brought with it the notion of "balance of power," the world's first strategy of international relations. From 1648 to 1919, the theory of balance of power shaped the world into much of how it looks today.

BALANCE OF POWER: The idea of an interlocking, equilibrium-based system of international order in which each nation kept an eye on each other nation, and when one nation showed signs of starting a war or expanding its colonies, the other nations would shift their alliances, the weak against the strong, to restore the status quo distribution of power.

It had always been the case throughout history that alliances and treaties were formed on the basis that one's ally was who they fear less versus whom they fear more. This reflected the basic raison d'etat, or law of survival, but it had never been the case, until the balance of power, that the enemy of today might become the ally of tomorrow. This led to strange bedfellows, and even stranger power politics as powerful, allied nations began to carve up the world to their liking. Some realized the balance could be maintained by options other than war. For example, arranged marriages, diplomacy, intrigues, and partitions worked quite well as replacements for war. However, as the idea of colonialism spread, so did the nature of war. Since other nations could be kept in check by various means, one could launch limited, "small" wars where they pleased. New alliances could be adjusted in time to check any aggressor. The acquisition of new territory by one power did not mean that others had to make a similar expansion. The balance could be maintained by redistributing economic wealth, commercial channels, monopolies on technology, or other resources. Balance of power was a wonderfully peaceful system for preventing global domination by any one power, but it encouraged colonialism, and all fell apart with World War I, and was only resurrected for a short while after World War II in a version of it known as detente.

Detente comes closest to the old justice principle of deterrence. It is a game to be played by superpowers only, and with the whole world as the stage. In the nuclear form that detente played out, it became an Arms Race and Cold War where the U.N. was helpless and other nations were helpless. Nations organized into "blocs" and "proxy" wars were played out everywhere. The idea of sovereignty lost meaning. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was the fullest expression of detente philosophy. It meant that because each side had the ability to wipe each other out, they didn't dare do it. The idea of flexible response which augmented MAD was the notion of using conventional forces first, then smaller warheads, then the big ones. The wonder of Cold War stability was that it was all based on managing perceptions. If your enemy thought you had all kinds of weapons, and were willing to "use it or lose it," then detente was well-played. Variations on this strategy developed as improvements; e.g., various War Games scenarios such as a "decapitation" attack upon command and control sites. It soon became apparent that there were more nuclear weapons than were militarily useful, which is to say more warheads than targets to drop them on. This became known as overkill, and led to limitation and disarmament talks. The first SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement started in 1969, followed by the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty in 1974, and more recent events include SALT II in 1989 and SORT (Strategic Offense Reduction Treaty) in 2002.

Today, the situation has changed dramatically. Nuclear deterrence no longer preoccupies policymakers. Instead, the primary threats facing the United States, its allies and its friends are terrorism, ethnic violence and a few small states that seek to use force to intimidate their neighbors or to enslave their own populations. Some strategists have urged a reconsideration of deterrence as defense policy, but terrorists and their sponsors are quite difficult to deter because they seek destruction (the so-called "crazy states" phenomenon), and threatening them with war and destruction in retaliation for some violent act produces no deterrent effect. This led to consideration of prevention as the best policy, along with preemption - the latter being a way to make use of warning intelligence capability. Preventive preemption or preemptive prevention (it doesn't really matter which word comes first) requires policymakers to assess threats, decide if conflict is inevitable, and then make difficult and horrific decisions in international relations. Pauly and Lansford (2004) define strategic preemption as "when the only sensible option is to take action before threats have fully materialized." Policymakers have to make judgments about the level of risk the nation is prepared to accept and decide whether it is better to fight now while the costs are relatively low, or wait and possibly confront a more dangerous adversary later. Preemptive prevention was announced by the President as the official U.S. policy during a speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, and has been analyzed or written about quite extensively since then (see JSCOPE 2005 Conference Papers on Pre-emptive War or this NDU award-winning paper, in Word, on How the Bush Doctrine meets the Test of the Powell Doctrine). It is somewhat similar to a notion of deterrence, however, the correct terminology is dissuasion. Dissuasion references a situation where there is only one superpower left in the world, called a hyperpower, and dissuasion suggests that military strikes by this hyperpower will be so technologically and operationally advanced, that potential competitors and enemies will abandon all threats. Dissuasion is a hyperpower's way of playing asymmetric warfare, since terrorists do just enough to taunt retaliation with their guerilla hit-and-run tactics, the appropriate response is overwhelming "shock and awe."

PREEMPTIVE PREVENTION: The idea that the best defense is a good offense, or under international law, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or a preemptive war that arises when one side decides there is a very great risk its adversary will attack within days or hours, and that the attack will cripple its ability to defend itself or retaliate.

There have been 20 preventive wars launched by the great powers over the last three centuries. Pearl Harbor, for example, was a preemptive strike by the Japanese against the U.S. Preemptive strikes sometimes backfire. Democracies tend to avoid them. Democratic societies are usually restrained by fear of cost and doubts over the serious of a threat warranting preemptive action. Politicians also are concerned that voters will toss them out of office if they over-reach. Democracies typically prefer to create an alliance or coalition, relying on strategies of destabilization and containment, or preemptive covert operations in hopes of starting a coup. However, there is some precedent for preemption. Military advisors suggested preemption during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Israel definitely used it when they perceived they were under imminent threat of Arab attack in 1967. Preemptive wars are rare because of the immense costs at home and internationally, and there are almost always doubts about the threat's gravity and immediacy.

First strikes can occasionally be justified before the moment of imminent attack, if the point of "sufficient threat" has been reached. This concept has three dimensions: "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting greatly magnifies the risk." The notion of "threat" is also closely related to the term "vital interests," which refers to any threat against the life of the nation, such as destruction of major cities or any step that could ruin the economy. The following are the standard vital interests of any country, particularly the United States:

There is also precedent for preemptive prevention in the U.N. Charter by what is called "anticipatory self-defense." The U.N. Charter, Article 51, declares that nothing shall impair the inherent right of a member nation to engage in individual or collective self-defense if attacked." It should be noted that there are controversies over interpretation of Article 51, just as there are over whether just war doctrine justifies preemption. The interests of justice requires a clear explanation of the grounds for preemption (need for "regime change"), and there is probably some moral obligation for reconstruction ("nation building") after preemptive action has been taken.

Military strategy is rarely ever completely military. That is, the objective of a military strategy is always political. There is no such thing as a purely military strategy conducted solely for military ends (Jajko 2007). Every military strategy is unique. Adopting a military strategy involves risk -- risk of a people's very existence -- through war, which is always risky. Military strategy therefore always involves risk assessment, much like risk assessment in the emergency management business except that different intelligence collection procedures are used and the nature of leadership is different. Victory under a military strategy is usually determined by accomplishment of the political objectives, and in one sense, war never ends. Peace is usually conceived of as war fought by other means.

The military option is what most people think of when they think of counterterrorism, however, special counterterrorist operations, like special counterdrug operations, usually are only carried out under special, highly restrictive, circumstances. The basic problems are that the military doesn't work well with criminal justice procedures (which are often part of the mix when capture, rather than assassination, is the goal). The military's purpose is also to blow things up, and terrorists rarely provide a "target-rich" environment. The military is also trained to carry out defensive as well as offensive action, but in many cases, usually involving occupation of a country afterwards, the need for defensive maneuvers interfere with successful completion of tracking down terrorists. Offensive action may be necessary to destroy regimes that align themselves with terrorism, and these often have to be U.S.-led efforts, in order to create an incentive for allies to send police forces afterwards. Offensive action is usually synonymous with higher morale at home. Although there are many reasons why the U.S. has adopted an official "we don't do body counts" position (NOBODY LIKES BODY COUNTS), figures on casualties are usually important to collect if one is at least interested in having one gauge of success. The following chart from Terrorist Death Watch illustrates that the typical ratio of US forces killed to terrorist forces killed in a full-spectrum combat operation like Iraq is about 1:10.

All branches of the U.S. military contain special operations forces that are well suited for counterterrorist missions. We have arrived at that moment in history when special operations may very well be the preeminent means of dealing with terrorists (Leebaert 2007). It is well known that special forces are more effective and produce less direct and collateral damage than conventional forces. They are also the kinds of forces that commit to the most risk of death, and this is the reason why policymakers are reluctant to use them, besides the fact that "special" often means testing the limits of conventional military procedures, and improvising on the spot. Some special forces contain police units, but most of them are trained for reconnaissance, surveillance, "surgical" raids, hostage rescue, abductions, and liaisons with allied counterterrorist forces. U.S. special operations forces are organized under a Special Operations Command, and deploy mostly in terms of what was once referred to as the Green Beret "A Team" concept. The traditional purpose of an A Team is force multiplication, or getting on the ground and multiplying their operational strength. However, a special operation is not defined by its size, but by the fact that it is typically deployed behind enemy lines. Secrecy is somewhat important, as exemplified by Delta Force (also known as 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment). When elite units are needed for extreme or impossible missions, America can and should rely upon such units that can go far beyond the usual objectives of military counterterrorism; i.e., to punish and destroy the terrorists, and destroy their military and paramilitary assets.

There are times, however, when you need to go further, and destroy the terrorist state-sponsored means of support. This is when covert operations are called for. These are usually arranged by an agency of the intelligence community, but frequently involve U.S. military forces. Some intelligence agencies have their own paramilitary force. There is a long history of covert ops, or "shadow wars," and probably the most controversial aspect of it is assassination. This is generally reserved for the elimination of key supporters of terrorism. There is little research on the effectiveness of assassination when it comes to terrorism, and martyrdom effects are likely. Needless to say, such missions are secret, and government "deniability" is incorporated into such operations. Some history: after the Vietnam War, the U.S. officially declared that it would no longer use assassination. A presidential executive order signed in 1981 (Executive Order 12333) expressly forbids employees of the U.S. from assassinating adversaries. This was reinforced later by Executive Order 11905 which prohibited hiring anyone to commit assassination. These prohibitions were reconsidered in the wake of 9/11, and the current buzzword is "targeted killing."

Also covert and somewhat secretive in nature is psychological warfare, which involves the creation of internal mistrust, fear, infighting, and other types of discord. Typically, this is a destabilization operation, and ranges from activities as dangerous as infiltrating a terrorist group to dropping propaganda or disinformation leaflets over the enemy. A number of newer techniques have incorporated principles of cyberwar or information warfare. Modern wars are essentially fought for, and against, information, and this is information warfare, a subtype of insurgency warfare called counterinsurgency (COIN).

Terrorists use a variety of means for financing. Besides money laundering, they may use drug trafficking, smuggling of bulk cash, trade-based money laundering, charities for fundraising, and informal money remittance systems such as hawala. Hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system used primarily in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It originated in South Asia. In the hawala system, money is transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. The transparency of hawala networks (no records are kept) may very well represent the greatest challenge in fighting terrorism on the economic front. Besides hawala, the world also has a rather large black market peso system (usually involved with drug money) and a Fei chien (Asian variety of hawala meaning "flying money") system. A challenge is that terror funds may be raised legitimately or be perfectly "clean" at the beginning, but then, the transfer method may be illegitimate (involving money laundering, smuggling, invoice manipulations, or trade diversions). Some transfer systems are legitimate, however. For example, commodities trading may take place with gold, precious gems, tobacco, or oil. The regular security transfer and brokerage process may be used, and additionally, funds may be transmitted via gift cards, debit and credit cards, Internet digital currency systems, and stored value cards, like prepaid phone cards and "chits."

The Invisible Bankers used by Terrorists, Drug Dealers, and Smugglers

For hundreds of years, the world has had an informal money-remittance system in which people living overseas could send money home for relative's living expenses, and this "fringe" banking system has always been cheaper and faster than anything like Western Union. In a given year, an estimated $150 billion flows through such channels, which is about 35% of all global transfers. The al-Qaeda terrorists who attacked on 9/11, authorities discovered, operated with a $800,000 budget, and used such a system -- the well-established Middle Eastern "Hawala" network. Within the US alone, there are about 23,000 convenience stores, restaurants, and small shops where the Hawala banking system is practiced, and record-keeping is sloppy. It is difficult to investigate because, in contrast to the usual procedure of money laundering, funds used by Hawala to underwrite terror frequently start off "clean" and become "dirty" later (and amounts are somewhat small, say around $200). Operators are known as hawaladars, who pool remittance cash with funds from business, and then work with a hawaladar colleague (or cousin) in the destination country, who delivers the remittance amount (for a very small fee of maybe 1%), and the two hawaladars settle up later (perhaps by one hawaladar shipping $1000 worth of goods to his cousin, but only invoicing for $800, and then the other hawaladar selling the goods for a full $1000, wire-transferring back the $800, with the remaining $200 going to party originally targeted for remittance). Source: Freedman, M. (2005).

Fighting terrorism economically is a priority established by Executive Order 13224, which expanded U.S. power to target the support structure of terrorist organizations. Law enforcement (primarily the U.S. Treasury Department with some of its new offices - see graphic below) now has the ability to freeze assets and to block the financial transactions of terrorists and those that support them. It also enables the United States to deny foreign banks access to U.S. markets if they refuse to cooperate with American authorities by identifying and freezing terrorist resources abroad. As of early 2003, the United States has succeeded in freezing terrorist assets in over 165 countries. Since 11 September 2001, more than $112 million in terrorist assets has been frozen worldwide in over 500 accounts. More than $34 million of these assets was frozen in the United States, and over $78 million was frozen overseas.

Besides Treasury Dept. initiatives, also established under the USA Patriot Act was the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) intelligence unit which is tasked with being the primary U.S. intelligence source for domestic financial information. It is responsible for maintaining and analyzing Suspicious Action Reports and Currency Transaction Reports filed by financial institutions in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act. It also works with law enforcement, the CIA, and regulatory agencies to assist with intelligence of financial crimes committed within the United States. In addition, there is the Egmont Group—an international organization of 69 Financial Intelligence Units formed six years before 11 September 2001 to share intelligence of suspicious financial activities. Other multilateral groups, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assist with legal harmonization, which is a term meaning that technical assistance treaties and extradition treaties all have to be modified to support more sophisticated tracking of terrorist financing at the same time being sensitive to the different definitions of terrorism and legal systems of foreign countries.

Although terrorists engage in illegal activity to obtain funds and then launder the currency as conventional money launderers do, some terrorist organizations are much more likely to raise their funds legitimately and then use those funds to kill and attack. For example, terrorist groups in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America rely on common criminal activities including extortion, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and fraud. Other groups, such as those in the Middle East, rely on commercial enterprises, donations, and funds skimmed from charitable organizations to not only fund their activities but also to move materiel and personnel. Still other groups rely on state sponsors for funding.

Charitable organizations and nongovernmental organizations are popular ways for terrorists to raise and transmit funds. Terrorists have abused some legitimate charities with schemes to siphon money from humanitarian purposes and funnel it to terrorism. For example, the Palestinian militant organization Hamas used a U.S. charity, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. Hawala networks operate outside the formal financial system and are used legitimately by those who distrust formal financial institutions. Due to the lack of a paper trail, tracing funds through hawali is practically impossible. For example, Al-Barakaat was a Somali-based hawala with connections in over 40 countries. It was the money-remitting company used by Usama bin Laden to finance al-Qaeda operations. Hawala networks are required to register with the governments they work in. However, failure to register is not as powerful a law enforcement tool as one would wish. The names of originators and receivers in financial transactions are still anonymous.

Commodities- or trade-based money laundering is another type of terrorist financing, and involves the smuggling of bulk cash and the evasion of federal reporting requirements used to track money laundering with commodities such as diamonds, precious metals, gold, and tobacco. There is evidence that bin Laden's al-Qaeda operation shifted to trading in gold after investigators started pursuing his financing. In other cases, outright fraud is involved. International trade can be used by terrorist organizations to disguise funding sources being imported and exported. Front companies might overvalue or undervalue merchandise or might fabricate shipments altogether. Customs officials are usually able to identify anomalies in the packing weight, shipping weight, and reported value of trade shipments. A Customs supercomputer called the Numerically Integrated Profiling System (NIPS) has improved the Treasury Department’s counterterrorism efforts. This intelligence software, which was originally designed to track airline passenger information, was modified to track terrorist financing activities. NIPS is housed in the Trade Crimes Intelligence Unit within the Intelligence Division at Customs headquarters, and the service spends about $150,000 per year on it, which runs under Windows NT and can search as much as 100G of data very quickly.

It's appropriate to "harden" targets when it is suspected they will come under terrorist attack. There are many ways to classify these targets, for example, as vital, critical, political, economic, or symbolic, etc. Some targets are most likely already hardened, like military targets, and the list of vulnerable military targets is quite small. However, other targets are most likely "soft" targets - either because they are vital, but have no security or bodyguards in place - or as is often the case, they are symbolic targets that are only "symbolic" to the terrorists, and you would never think they needed protection.

When selecting a target, terrorists usually seek out the one that is: (a) most high up in vital importance; (b) softest in terms of being unprotected; and (c) most significant or symbolic to their cause. A series of attacks on one of the nation's landmarks, for example, would not be the typical pattern of a relatively small, emerging terrorist group. That kind of totally symbolic strategy would most likely be pursued by a large terrorist group which has already attacked other targets, and is using the landmarks as a way to "finish up" their work. Groups of medium size tend to attack targets which demoralize or weaken their enemy, and there may be some unusual race-based or nation-based hatred involved. The main targets for any terrorist group are going to be POLITICAL and ECONOMIC targets, especially as these two overlap. Terrorists can be expected to do their homework, and they will find out which companies, corporations, and causes most likely fit their conception of an "enemy," and these kinds of calculations will ultimately determine targeting. While there is no substitute for the value of news coverage that will be obtained by bombing a soft target, such "flashy" tactics really do not matter to most terrorist leaders, who by virtue of their leadership position will hold the group to account for more meaningful targets.

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