ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
"Sad are those who only understand" (Arab proverb)

    Islamic extremism is interesting to study from a criminological perspective, but far too many scholars put it off out of charitable deference to multicultural sensitivities or a desire to leave well enough alone.  Stereotyping is uncalled for, as are ethnic profiles or falsehoods that every Muslim is a degree or two separation from a terrorist.  Not every Muslim is an extremist or a terrorist, and not every terrorist is a Muslim.  It is often the case that revivalist movements of all sorts contain militant elements, and militancy is a different phenomenon than terrorism.  The term "militancy" describes a psychologically aggressive state or combative character.  Militancy is behavior-oriented, and extremism is thought-oriented.  "Extremism" typically connotes beliefs which are irrational, counterproductive, unjustifiable, and unacceptable to any civil society.  It is more accurate to say that varying degrees of militancy and extremism can be found among Muslims than to say varying degrees of terrorism can be found among Muslims, and it is likely only at the level of "jihadism" (see levels below) can one begin to think in terms of terrorism connections.

Levels of Islamic Belief

a Muslim is an adherent of Islam, someone who surrenders their will to God a minority of Muslims are Islamists, who believe the best government is an Islamic caliphate a minority of Islamists are Salafists, or revivalists who believe there is only one right way to do things a minority of Salafists are Jihadists, who believe violence is justified to satisfy the Salafist ideal or for other reasons, such as prophetic commands to do violence. a minority of Jihadists are Takfiris, who believe in the killing or enslaving of non-Muslims and apostates as well as blending in among their enemies to wage better covert warfare.

    Different sorts of Islamic beliefs are hard to separate from different sorts of Islamic extremism.  It may be that more or less "mainstream" forms of extremism exist, as different "brands" of militancy.  It may be that some forms of extremism and militancy should really be called terrorism.  It's also possible that there's no such thing as "moderate" Islam since the only way a Muslim achieves tolerance or moderation is by ignoring Islam's teachings to disgrace, humiliate, and belittle non-Muslims (Ye'or 1996).  For Western infidels to keep quiet about this is called dhimmitude, the humiliating, subservient status of non-Muslims commanded by the Koran or Qur'an (Sura 9:29) which is exactly what Islamic extremists depend upon (Ye'or 2002; 2005).  Most extremist language is draped in the context of enemies - enemies of God or enemies of Islam - and Islamists have no problem recruiting large numbers of mujahideen (holy warriors) because of this built-in villification of the enemy.  In fact, Islamic extremists are recruiting more adherents every day in a much more effective, autonomous, and ubiquitous manner than anything the world has ever known.  As the world's fastest growing religion (by birthrate, not conversion), Islam may very well be popular because it comes in many flavors, as below:

    Although a politically correct approach would acknowledge that there are no distinctions to be made among Muslims, a good conceptual starting point involves making distinctions.  However, once we start distinguishing extremists and moderates, we are immediately setting up straw man arguments for extremists to use -- enabling moderates to be perceived as compromisers with the West.  The extremist mindset holds that there are no distinctions.  There is danger in choosing words since careless terminology often winds up promoting the ideology of extremists (Streusand & Tunnell 2006).  For example, the term "jihad" may or may not have negative connotations for most Muslims, and although Muslims may have debated the meaning of the term for centuries, any Westerner who uses the term in a negative way usually makes himself the enemy of all Muslims.  Similarly, anyone who discusses whether Muslims worship the same God (i.e., the God of Abraham in the common heritage of Judaism, Christianity and Islam) is similarly ostracized because some truths are not supposed to be known, such as the fact that despite official rhetoric to the contrary, Muslims regard their God as different -- with Abraham as the first Muslim, with Moses and Jesus having it wrong, and with Mohammad bringing it down perfectly.  Daniel Pipes has a good article called Is Allah God? which details some scriptural, historical, and linguistic issues, and Piero Scaruffi has an interesting historical article which claims Mohammad was a Jew and the whole religion was hijacked from the very beginning.  What makes Islam most different from other Abrahamitic religions is the strong element of animism (a pagan belief that spirits exist in rocks, plants, and animals).  All sorts of amulets, talismans and other fetishes play a prominent role in Islam, collectively concentrated in the big mega-fetish of the black Kaaba cornerstone in Mecca.

    The Islamic conception of God (if it can be said there is a conception because Muslims believe God is different from anything that the human senses can perceive or the human mind can imagine) involves an all-knowing, all-powerful being that was never born and never died.  Peters (2003) and Lewis (2003), among others, have said this conception is of a more powerful, more remote, and more chaotic deity than Yahweh, the God of the Bible.  "Chaotic" is usually used to describe the conception in two ways: one, any appreciation of God is to be reached by faith or irrationality alone; and two, Islamic theodicy (the study of suffering) calls for a rather irrational approach to reconciling the endemic problems of Islamic societies: namely, widespread poverty, extreme economic inequality, the prevalence of government by despotic rulers, and the inability to keep pace with emerging economies.  The esteemed scholar Bernard Lewis (2003) is a good introduction to the topic of Islamic theodicy, but far more incisive is the work of Max Boot (2003) and Barry Rubin (2002) who suggest that Arabs use the Palestinian issue and anti-Americanism as a way of cynically or psychologically diverting or displacing attention from the failings of their own governments.  Yet even if such displacement were true, there is no sense, as Fukuyama (2006) puts it, in putting Arabs on a psychiatrist's couch to tell them they couldn't possibly mean what they say.  After all, Arabs are extremely sensitive to any condescending attitude from Westerners.       

    Political correctness, rhetorical baggage, linguistic confusion, and lack of definitional clarity all make it difficult to even talk about Islamic extremism.  Anyone labeled an "extremist" might be said to be someone who resorts to (or thinks in terms of) a militant solution first and finds justification for it in faith or the literal meaning of text (e.g., "when texts have spoken, reason must be silent").  The silencing of reason characterizes an extremist.  A moderate is more inclined to supplement faith with reason, the power of mind, and/or the freedom of thought.  The whole "faith then reason" versus "reason then faith" juxtaposition is, of course, familiar to Westerners as part of the Augustine/Aquinas debate in Scholastic Medievalism, but Muslims seem to have a different history of that debate.  Islamic intellectual thought goes back to philosophical differences with the ancient greeks and the reception of Aristotle (Bertolacci 2006).  At the end of the classic era of civilization, many groups rejected Aristotle's insistence that God's knowledge only extended to universals, not particulars, and hence things like accidents and prophecy could not be God-related.  Neo-Platonic movements such as the Jewish Kabbalah rejected Aristotle in this regard, and so did the Peripatetics, who much like the Arabs, valued strength and risk-taking.  Islam also partially rejects the syllogistic form of deductive reasoning that Aristotle invented, but even more rejected is Aristotle's definition of justice as equity -- that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to their relevant differences, and with all impartiality."  Fundamentalist Islam instead adopts a messianic definition of justice as equality -- "the equal distribution of societal resources to all, including the "unequals" whose place in the world depends upon the strength of their belief as the belief of all.  Being a complete and utterly-unthinking believer is important in Islam.  Both Islamic philosophy and theology posit no significant legacy from Plato and Aristotle.  There are no Platonic forms to contemplate and no Aristotelian absolutes to guide one's education. 

ORGANIZING DEBATES AROUND TWO HYPOTHESES   

    It may be the case that moderates outnumber extremists in the Muslim world, but the moderates are clearly serving as a recruiting pool for extremists.  Honest differences of opinion exist among Muslim leaders as to "how much" militancy and extremism serve as a breeding ground for terrorism.  How much is "too much?"  Toward the answer to this, two hypotheses usually make good starting points -- (1) that Islam is inherently violent - and (2) that Islam is susceptible to hijacking or distortion.  These hypotheses organize the literature fairly well, and are themes which organize the discussion later.  For now, a few more issues need discussed as things which don't fit neatly into our organizational schema.

    There are things in Islam which seem foreign and incomprehensible from the Western viewpoint and make the study of Islamic terrorism difficult.  Only the rare secular mind can comprehend the depth of religious passion within Islam.  Witness, for example, the closed-mindedness behind passages like -- "O ye who believe! Ask not questions about things which if made plain to you, may cause you trouble" (Surah 5:101-102).  To understand things like this, it might be helpful to use the framework provided by Cooper (2004) which draws upon the concepts of "political religion" (from the philosopher Eric Voegelin) and "pneumopathology" (from the philosopher Friedrich Schelling).  The term "political religion" usually refers to an ideology where the goal is to create a form of politics with the same power as religion.  Totalitarianism and theocracy are terms often associated with this, but are not absolutely necessary conditions, as even democracies can develop things like "civil religions" around events like SuperBowl Sunday.  There is some debate among scholars about the exact role of the cult of personality in political religions, but Cooper (2004) and others (Post 2004) have said that there is something deranged or disordered about such personalities who voluntarily accept living under such conditions.  The term "pneumopathology" captures this well, referring to a disease of the spirit, an imaginative second reality (deranged by one's beliefs) which sees the world in different terms than what common sense provides.  In short, it refers to a religious conviction so strong and intoxicating that it blinds a person to common sense and makes it impossible for anyone to reason with them.  As Cooper (2004:40) puts it: "there is an inherent friction between commonsense reality and the occult reality within which extremists live imaginatively, an imaginary reality where killing the innocent to impress others is seen as heroic, altruistic, and self-sacrificing."  As a leader of Hezbollah once put it: "we are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out and annihilate the enemy."

    There is also the matter of Islamic teleology (the study of final ends or purpose).  Teleology is usually regarded as too metaphysical for science except for the most dedicated sociologists who tend to assert there are guiding principles of social change to be found.  The customary way of putting it is that Islam has always been an apocalyptic movement with a strong messianic trend (Cook 2005).  It is, in some larger sense, more involved in a warfare of body, mind, and soul -- a spiritual war more than an ideological war -- where the order of battle involves who has the strongest belief system regarding the best set of interrelationships between all sociological "worlds" (i.e., the spiritual, secular, religious, commercial worlds, etc).  Within the predominantly spiritual universe that is Islamist extremism, believers genuinely think they are more heroic and successful than any soldier or businessman could ever be.  This hero fantasy consumes their imagination.  Extremists come closer to their god by defending their god.  Mind, body, and soul become one in an act of martyrdom.  An act of destruction engaged in (any destruction being a victory) brings value to the cause and is a vivid proof of faith.  These acts of terrorism ought to be publicly condemned, but unfortunately, are probably secretly admired by many Muslims, even moderates.  Any terrorist acting in the name of Allah (particularly within the strict Wahhabi view that the world ought to be Muslim) is to be revered and admired.  Cult-like hero worship is a powerful force, running deep in Muslim thought, but it is probably best not to make too much of it, although in one sense, it can be said terrorists are the Middle East's longed-for superheros, with many seeking to be as great as Saladin (the inspiration for anti-Zionism) or the next best thing to the Mahdi or Twelfth Imam.  The Twelfth Imam figure is either the Antichrist or the Christ, depending upon how you look at it (Richardson 2006).  Muslims believe that the antichrist will come first, this antichrist being Christianity's second-coming Christ.  Many Muslim leaders have called upon god to hasten the emergence of Al-Mahdi so that the final conflict (end days) can come and Muslims can finally experience a world without America and Zionism.  Such beliefs inspire an extremism that is not deterred by weapons, for they know that weapons will not destroy their cause.  The terrorist longing for union with god thru carnage is inseparable from the impulse toward annihilation.  Their goals and ambitions soar above logic.  They have created a fantasy world (a second reality) in their minds about an angry god who wants to pat them on the back for slaughtering apostates or nonbelievers (shunning the usual religious response to apostasy as not being good enough).  America is hated precisely because its power and the Western viewpoint threatens much that is central in the promises of their faith.

 THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ISLAM IS INHERENTLY VIOLENT

    At the outset, it must be noted, as Khan (2006) does, that this particular hypothesis -- that puritan Islam is inherently violent and Muslim militants are addicted to carnage -- has had a counterproductive effect in international law, such as expansion of preemptive war doctrine and other reactionary practices (e.g., declining civil liberties, prescribed extra-judicial killings, torture, renditions, indefinite detentions, and numerous other human rights violations).  There is danger in claiming a whole religion is violent, although anybody who would say this might also say that Islam is not a religion but a creed or manifesto disguised as a religion.  There are many ways Islam easily serves as a mantle or cover for terrorism, although might not go so far as to say Islam always and inevitably leads to terrorism, as some have said who advocate this hypothesis (Wright 2001; Lewis 2003).  Some hypocricy is evident in the claim that Islam is a religion of peace when, after all, peace only comes when all nonbelievers are converted and there is no occasion for war; i.e., when the final command of Mohammed in the Quran is carried out -- to conquer the world in the name of Islam (9:29).  As Mohammed said: "We must fight and slay the Pagans wherever we find them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war."  Those who argue that all Muslims are terrorists say there are only two websites you need to understand this: (1) prophet of doom; and (2) the history of jihad; and likewise, those who claim to have Muslim psychology fully understood (e.g., Hitchens 2004) say that the three hallmarks are self-pity, self-righteousness, and self-hatred.  At least sixteen (16) passages of the Quran justify the killing or mistreatment of nonbelievers, and most religious scholars (e.g., Tyerman 2006) say the self-loathing in Muslim psychology is due to never having gotten over the Crusades.   

    Islam is not a pacifist religion which respects passive witnessing, but in all fairness, other religions have been quite pushy about how they go about their witnessing (see Gabriel 2002 for a comparison with Christianity).  Islam, however, seems to have particularly assembled all the right ingredients for being extremely violent-prone and non-democratic in its method of conflict resolution.  Under almost all interpretations, warfare of some kind is always mandated against nonbelievers.  Twenty-six (26) chapters of the Quran deal with jihad, a fight able-bodied believers are obligated to join (Surah 2:216), and the text orders Muslims to "instill terror into the hearts of the unbeliever" and to "smite above their necks" (8:12).  Further, the "test" of loyalty to Allah is not good acts or faith (as is common in Christian religion), but martyrdom which results from fighting unbelievers to the death (47:4), fighting the good fight being the only assurance of salvation in Islam (4:74; 9:111).  Much of this is, of course, subject to scholarly debate (the most frequent grounds for such debate being that passages are takenout of context, but that is something all religious doctrines are subject to).

    Just by looking at certain passages, one can easily find support for the "violent Islam" hypothesis -- passages such as the following: the sins of any Muslim who becomes a martyr are forgiven by the very act of being slain while slaying unbelievers (4:96), and those who are unable to do jihad, such as women or the elderly, are required to give "asylum and aid" to those who do fight unbelievers in the cause of Allah (8:74).  Then, of course, there is the so-called X-rated vision of Paradise, to wit: martyrs are rewarded with virgins, among other carnal delights, in Paradise (38:51, 55:56; 55:76; 56:22).  Regarding asylum privileges, it is unknown why the Muslim practice of asylum never developed along the forty-day rule of medieval Western common law, yet seems to have evolved into some sort of lenient, international law approach to political asylum.  Likewise, it is unknown why Islam never developed anything similar to Christianity's Fifth Commandment.  Life isn't necessary cheap in the Muslim world; its value is just relative.     

    Fifty-seven (57) nations in the world support Islam as part of their dictatorship or theocracy.  It is the world's second-largest (20%) and fastest-growing religion (by birthrate).  Its followers tend to live in countries where the lives of many citizens can be called oppressed and disenfranchised  There are no formal denominations to speak of (other than Shiite and Sunni; all mosques being ostensibly non-denominational), and it is perhaps more accurate to talk about schools of thought, sects, or cults.  Even then, those terms don't fully capture the richness and depthness of Islamic variation since there are: (1) "religious" schools of thought (Sunni and Shiite); (2) "political" schools of thought (chronological and geographical Renaissance periods); (3) "legal" schools of thought (Islamic jurisprudence about Qur'anic interpretation); and (4) the traditional distinctions between sects (offshoots such as Salifism) and cults (breakaways such as Qutbism). 

    To be fair, some strange offshoots of Islam do seem to "insulate" their society from terrorism, or at least produce a different variety.  For example, take the peculiar religion of the Omanis, who are followers of Abdallah ibn Ibadah al-Maqdisi's branch of Islam, a breakaway from the Khariji ("quietist") movement in Basra in 650 AD. Some experts suggest that the movement is an offshoot of a dissident Shiite sect hailing originally from Ibadh in Saudi Arabia, which was introduced to Oman in the eighth century.  Experts also believe Oman (a 25% Sunni society that is fairly open to Israel) has been relatively free from terrorism precisely because of its religion, with Janardhan (2006) explaining this as follows:  Oman is the only Ibadhi country in the world, with its tenets closely linked to the Maliki Sunni school.  Ibadhism rejects primogeniture succession and asserts that the leadership of Islam should be designated by an imam who is capable and elected by the people, where both political and religious leadership are vested in an imam. What little terrorism exists in Oman is usually seeded from the ideology of imama ("rule of the imam") and its values, and most dissidents typically argue that their intention is not to overthrow the regime, but to spread the Madhab ("Islamic jurisprudence") of Ibadhi.  Jails and pardons are the typical punishments.  Many Muslims consider the Ibadhi orientation unorthodox, but it has conditioned the society in such a fashion that it is extremely conscious of sectarian affiliations and avoids disorder along divisive lines.

    The ascetic monotheism in Islam insists that the religion be defined more by opposition than affirmation.  As such, Islam and Islamic extremism are undeniable social movements to be reckoned with, as believers think their prophet being the last to appear in the Holy Days makes Him the real messenger of God, and that anyone believing otherwise is an "infidel" or apostate deserving of less-than-human dignity and worth.  There is a strong anti-secular thrust in Islam along with a belligerent superiority that makes it dangerous, but perhaps no more than certain puritanical or reconstructionist strains in other religions.  What Islam needs is a Reformation period like the Protestant Reformation that occurred in Christianity (An-Na'-Im 1996), but it has only had a Renaissance period with Ba'athism -- that fascist, pan-Arabic, secular movement which started in Syria during the 1950's - Ba'ath meaning "renaissance" or "rebirth" in Arabic.

    Important events in Muslim history were the Mongol destruction of Baghdad in 1258 and killing of the last Caliph.  Muslims believe this brought down God's scourge upon them, and the appropriate response is to recover the purity of the early companions [Salafs] of the Prophet, called Salafism after the term for "venerable forefathers" or "early companions."  A central component of this response is the notion of jihad, but far more important for Westerners to try to understand is the fairly-complicated concept of "caliph" which is, again, a term Muslims would prefer non-Muslims not meddle with.  Muslims strongly prefer that non-Muslims stay "within their limits" which means that classic Islamic law stipulates that non-Muslims may live in peace as long as they accept their second-class status as "dhimmis," not hold any authority over Muslims, pay a jizya tax, not build new churches or repair old ones, and not insult Allah or Muhammad.  Insulting the prophet is a call for mob action.

    With respect to the political (in)correctness over terms like Islamofascism, it is important to call things by their right name since not doing so is the first cause of confusion, if not defeat.  Schall (2007) says those who use the "fascist" label are trying to avoid admitting the war on terror has religious roots.  Much like the phrase "hate crime" covers up the true name of something, "Islamofascism" represents a more scientific and understandable way of referring to an "inner-worldly political mission for world domination powered by a quasi-mystical devotion to a cause."  No one is likely to understand the senselessness of the latter, but using shorthand terms like Islamofascism makes it seem all political, like war should be, and almost as if there were some place on the map called "Terroritoria" where "terrorists" dwell plotting our demise.

    It would help if Muslims themselves would clarify what they find insulting and which things they think they can just get over.  Cartoons are only one example, but so is a general disdain for genuine socio-cultural differences.  You can't hide intolerance behind a demand for tolerance.  Arabs need to stop hating Jews, period, and the presence of Israel is more than a thorn in the side of Arabs since it daily thwarts their global aspirations. There are twenty-one (21) nations where some form of Arabic is the national language, and although not all Arabs are Muslims, the notion of an "Arab world" or "Muslim world" has great appeal to believers.  There is Western concern about Muslim expansionism in the form of an umbrella game plan called "the Project" (see 20-Year Plan for USA: Islam Targets America).  Muslims see themselves as belonging to a super-nationality that goes beyond traditional nation-state boundaries (it's called the Muslim umma or Ummah, the community of believers).  It's not that they aren't patriotic to their native country; it's that their allegiance to this super-nationality is greater.  Collectivity arguments aside, much of this is because they desperately want a counterpart to the Jewish notion of Zionism.  It's almost impossible to understand the Arab or Muslim mindset without reference to an intense hatred of most Jews and all of Zionism.  Even if the Jews were to leave the Middle East, Muslims would still feel threatened by Zionist conspiracies because many Arabs see Jews as subhuman criminals who hide behind democracy and work in the shadows.  Christians are seen as a more insidious threat - an irredeemable, immoral, corrupt, greedy, selfish, sinful, crusading people who hide behind the name of capitalism (See Answering-christianity.com).  America is seen as the second Israel, because it supports the Zionist entity.  In the Muslim mindset, concepts like tolerance, democracy, pluralism, and freedom are meaningless when spoken by a Westerner because Arab trust, as among many in the Third World, has been broken by years of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and globalism.  Most Muslims see the noble intentions of the West as mere slogans that disguise the true goals of political domination, religious conversion, and economic exploitation.        

    Sociologically, most Muslims function under a rather unique patriarchal, extended family system, unlike other extended family systems that might be found around the world.  In a traditional extended family system, aunts, uncles, cousins, grandparents, etc. are treated as immediate family, but a Muslim household or co-joint household might be larger, the defining attribute being that there can only be one breadwinner.  Patriarchy is evident in name-giving.  All Arabs have at least three names, and they keep their father's last name for life.  Cultural prescriptions and prohibitions abound.  For example, standing close to one another, extended handshakes, feeling a person's breath, and looking deeply in the eyes is approved of for men, but not for women.  The oppression of women in Islamic society has been extensively studied by many and has basically reached no significant conclusions nor good recommendations for reform (Ahmed 1993; Haddad & Esposito 1997).  Local customs continually perplex Western visitors.  Some Arab nonverbal gestures are the complete opposite of those in the West.  For example, shaking your head up and down means "No" instead of Yes in many contexts.  Muslims are extremely sensitive to insult by word and gesture, and probably more so with words (some common English words are considered profanity).  They believe words have power.  Like any converted religion, Islam tends to look backward for inspiration, but Muslims scholars seem to systematically neglect any liberal, progressive, or Western-friendly scholarship from their own history, such as from the Arab Golden Age (CE 750-1400, where CE stands for Common Era, a more inclusive term than AD, or anno domini; with BCE replacing BC).  Most Islamic extremists want to go back to the Golden Age or even before, perhaps to the period of Islam's expansion (CE 622-750).

Once upon a time, Islam built a huge empire within its first century of existence, taking Spain in 711 and almost France in 732. By 750, from its capital in Baghdad, the Abbasid caliphate ruled all of North Africa, Arabia and the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, plus Persia and the western edge of India. A non-Abbasid group, the Umayyad, ruled from Spain, and the Abbasids from other points. Throughout the Abbasid era, most Muslims followed Sunni Islam, although the Shi'ite sect remained strong as did Sufism via underground brotherhoods. The Shi'ite sects later established the Buyid dynasty and the Sunnis consolidated the Seljuq dynasty. Christians eventually retook lost ground with the Reconquista (910-1492) and the Crusades (1096-1297).

THE THESIS THAT EXTREMISTS HAVE HIJACKED MAINSTREAM ISLAM   

    This thesis -- that Islam is inherently good but perverted in some way -- rests upon multiple hypotheses that (1) there are so many varieties of Islam that one of them has to be good; and (2) any perversion is a symptom of backwardness, poverty, or the influence of bad leaders who have "brainwashed" the populace.  Interviewing and negotiating with terrorists (ideally, ex-terrorists) are probably the only ways to prove at least some of the many forms of this hypothesis -- that radical extremists have "brainwashed" the Muslim population in some way.  It is also true that increased American understanding is vital for any improved understanding of the religious underpinnings of Islamic extremism of most relevance or interest, and for that, a delineation of the scope of concerns is needed.  As anyone on the receiving end of terrorism has the right to be, victims are deservingly concerned with understanding at least the following: (1) how easy it seems for some Islamic extremists to justify the senseless slaughter of innocents in the name of religion; (2) how blowing yourself up with as many other people around you can possibly be seen as religious obligation or martyrdom; and (3) like El Fadl (2002) asks, how can a morality be so blindly convinced it's the only way of life that it tramples all over the rights of others.

    There are many extremist groups active in the Muslim world, and it is the thesis of writers like Esposito (1999) and other defenders of Islam (Gerges 2005; Armstrong 2006; the website of Umar Lee) that such extremists have engaged in hijacking mainstream Islam.  To be sure, the best examples of hijacking come from the history of African-American Muslims, as for example, when Elijah Muhammad hijacked Islam to claim whites were a race created by an ancient evil scientist (see Nation of Islam homepage).  American Black terrorism reached its peak from 1967-1972 with over 120 incidents a year involving the assassinations of police and mayors, and the vast majority of these incidents had Black Muslim justification (Hewitt 2003).  Today, conventional wisdom holds that America has less to fear from traditional Black Muslims and more to fear from dangerous splinter groups like the Five Percenters (an ideology popular with hip hop and rap artists), Jamaat al-Fuqra (one of many not-yet-designated terrorist groups operative among immigrant communities), or Tablighi Jammat (a Muslim missionary group suspected to be a conduit to al-Qaeda).  Discussion of any extremism, of course, begs the question "extreme to what?" and one would be hard pressed to define "extremism" or "mainstream" given so many cases.  Sunni Islam and Salafism (explained below) are the most likely contenders to be considered "mainstream," but Salafism is often considered too extreme in many circles.  To be mainstream, all it takes is to believe in the Six Beliefs, practice the Five Pillars, and take an oath.  To be extreme may very well depend upon how fervently one practices their religion.  It is the translation of belief into practice that has produced the most opportunities for extremists to hijack mainstream Islam.   

• Islamism is a term describing the worldwide puritanical Islamic revival movement that seeks to replace secular governments with Shari’a law and establish theocracies throughout the world via relatively peaceful means; it's not exactly a Muslim version of Zionism, but a throwback to the ideas of the 1928 Muslim Brotherhood that created an Islamic version of communism 

• Islamofascism is a rather uncomplimentary term used to describe certain extremists with political agendas who happen to be Muslims or use the cover of Islam to seek an end to democracy, capitalism, individuality, human rights, and modernization within a particular nationality and ultimately on the global stage; with few exceptions which make something out of the fact that Yassar Arafat's uncle worked for the Nazis (Trifkovic 2002), most experts believe there are no meaningful historical connections between Islam and fascism

• Jihad is a controversial term in Islamic thought which technically refers to any kind of struggle in the name of Islam, the means for spreading Islam and truth, and fighting for what is right and condemning what is wrong; Muhammad said there were two types of jihad, "little jihad" or battle with one's attackers in holy war, and "greater jihad" or purification of self by fighting a battle for what is right; Koranic interpretation says jihad is of three kinds: against a visible enemy, the devil, and one's self; depending upon context, jihad can mean good deeds, personal struggle, armed defense, or holy war

• Jihadism, which might be called the religion of Jahiliya (a term referring to the pre-Islamic era in Arabia, literally meaning ignorance), is a backward-looking strand of Islamic extremism developed by the Pakistanis and Taliban which considers itself the true Islam and sees a war of Armageddon or Plague of God coming in which all non-Jihadists deserve to be killed and the Jihadists themselves will benefit from rewards in both this life and heaven, but mostly in heaven (See islamic-awakening.com)        

• Qutbism is a radical form of conservative Islam developed in Egypt that advocates armed struggle against any government which usurps God's authority; many experts assume this to be Osama bin Laden's personal belief or part of his twisted distortion of Islam; it is the intellectual foundation for the Muslim Brotherhood and consists mainly of the tenets that Islam has been in decline for too long and a violent vanguard is needed to re-conquer or re-cleanse the world; in practice, many forms of Qutbism tend to involve a rejection and/or recombination of ideas from Sufism and Wahhabism

• Salafism is a mainstream type of Sunni Islam and fairly moderate belief about being on the right path and the addition of analogue reasoning to a literal interpretation of text, but it is quick to condemn those who innovate too much from doctrinal interpretation; it considers the right path straight and fixed, to be always followed, no matter how much much this trumps the rights, well-being, laws, values, or morality of others, especially infidels; it maintain control over believers, in part, by borrowing from Wahhabism (Salafism being considered a broader form of Wahhabism by some), a denying of the right for believers to contemplate any of the Divine attributes of God or what He looks like (see The 99 Names of Allah); but on the other hand, there is a strong anti-terrorist element within this facet of Islam (see Islaam.ca)

• Sufism is a rather mystical, esoteric sect of Islam, possibly pre-dating Islam, which consists of a combination of moderate and extreme beliefs, for example, that God dwells in the hearts of men, texts have hidden messages, and a personal means of worship without public prayer is possible; other less commonly held beliefs include faith in divine manifestations, the existence of invisible beings such as a genie, certain magical practices, and an anti-technology bias; Sufis have historically been the most common victims of Muslim genocide; i.e. fundamentalists, particularly Wahhabis, regard Sufism as a type of heretical pseudo-Islam; and although much of Sufism is about love, spiritual journey, and having keen insight, militant versions of it have been known to exist, or emerge from it, such as the Mahdist movement (see MahdiWatch) in odd places like Chechnya, Sudan, Morocco, and Thailand

• Wahhabism is a rather totalitarian-oriented form of Sunni fundamentalism practiced mostly in Saudi Arabia and among many American Muslims (Malcolm X 1987) and European immigrants which calls for a purification of Islam by returning to basics, enforcing the women's dress code, removing corruption from politics, restoring a Golden Age, and engaging in jihad as an obligation when it comes to protecting Islamic interests or promoting the true purpose of Islam; like the Shiite denomination and other sects, it relies upon the fatwa, or point of law by a recognized authority, as a binding obligation of all Muslims, and since the Rushdie affair, a fatwa has become associated with ordering a death sentence

    THE BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

    These have been rather complex characterizations of complex movements, so perhaps some further background is in order to understand them better.  For centuries, young Muslim men have gathered at neighborhood madrasas (religious schools), run by headmasters and mullahs (religious teachers) to study Islamic holy works and receive free meals.  The free meals really draw people out, even when they are offered to celebrate some terrorist act of martyrdom, the families of the martyrs also being rewarded with financial gifts.  The centuries-old history of Islamic hatred toward the West is well-documented by Andrew Bostom and Robert Spencer, among others.  Recent history indicates that sometime around 1979 (the date of the Iranian revolution), the content of teaching at the madrasas took a violent turn.  It was the purpose of the Iranian revolution to spread Shiite fundamentalism throughout the world, and the first enemy was the Sunni ruling parties in most Arab countries (hence the 1980-1989 Iran-Iraq war since Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni socialist).  Iranian-style Shiite fundamentalism is characterized by dominance of the clergy (mullahs) in all sectors of life, the eradication of all voices of opposition, and a kind of mindless fanaticism to follow the orders of the Shiite leader - in this case Ayatollah Khomeini, who represented what all Shiites believe - that there are twelve descendants of Muhammad's cousin Ali who were handpicked to lead the Muslim world in jihad, or holy war (Sunnis, by contrast, believe leaders should rise up from among the people).  Khomeini had long been preaching the virtues of suicide bombing (heavenly rewarded terrorism) to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in his pre-1979 exile days.  Anyway, Shiite fundamentalism spread throughout Asia and Africa like wildfire, especially in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan where Mullah Omar (a Shiite madrasas dropout) created the Taliban in 1995.  Usama bin Laden joined Mullah Omar and based his al-Qa'ida organization in Afghanistan during 1996.  Usama bin Laden masterminded the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, and the next month (October 2001), the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, and in March of 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq.

    While the Shiite branch of Islam experienced a revival as early as 1979, the Sunni branch of Islam started experiencing it's own revival of fundamentalism around 2001, and an interest developed in ideas that had been around a long time, like Wahhabism, which in many respects is the official ideology of university professors in much of the Middle East.  Recently, Sunni extremism has increased while Shiite extremism has declined.  Usama bin-Laden was raised a Sunni, and even though the Taliban rode the coattails of the Shiite revolution, the Taliban also executed many Shiite citizens and diplomats on soccer fields.  To reconcile the tendency for Shiite extremism to result in so many dead Shiites, people like Usama bin Laden embraced another ideology, Qutbism, which allowed for a complimentary Sunni extremism which justifies a lot of dead Sunnis.  Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the most well-known Sunni nations, and Sunnis in general are sometimes considered more "reasonable" and moderate than the fanatical Shiites.  Fascination with martyrdom defines Shiites.  Their central holiday remembers the martyrdom of Hussein, one of Muhammad's descendents, and Shiites commemorate by flagellating themselves with whips, a ceremony that some experts say spawns suicide bombers (at least according to Jewish sources).  Egyptian- and Saudi-style Sunni fundamentalism is quite different, more rational, and more homicidal than suicidal.  To be sure, it, too, celebrates the idea of martyrdom, but Sunni fundamentalism is more like a warrior religion that glorifies violence, brute force, or what Muslims call the "greater jihad" -- a purification of self by fighting a battle for what is right.

    Also, of course, no explanation of Islamic extremism is complete without pointing out the high levels of Jew-hatred.  "O Muslim, there is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him" is a sermon staple in mosques throughout the Arab and larger Muslim world.  There is an absence of moral prohibition against the total and complete annihilation of Jews.  The prophet Mohammed insisted that the time of judgment will not come until all Jews are eliminated.  Leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have said that if all Jews would come to Israel it would save their supporters and allies the trouble of having to hunt the Jews down worldwide to eliminate them.  The levels of Jew-hatred run so deep they have psychodynamic qualities, the most common explanation being that Arab paranoia and narcissism reinforces the distorted feeling of being under attack by a readily available scapegoat, the Jews.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF JIHADISM

    Jihad is an Arabic word that literally means "combat" or "striving" and jihad is sometimes regarded along with allegiance to the Iman as the violent Sixth Pillar of Islam, although orthodox Islam only recognizes Five Pillars.  The idea of jihad being the violent Sixth Pillar comes from the Khawarij sect, which was part of the fundamentalist Islamism movement that started in the early 20th Century.  The Khawarij sect is named after Dhul-Khuwaysarah, a man that Muhammad prophesied would have an overprotective love of religion.  The Khawariji interpretation of the role of excommunication is completely the opposite of the Salafist interpretation of excommunication (takfir).  Salafism is rather restricted about who should be declared an infidel and therefore excommunicated.  Followers of the Khawariji interpretation, or Jihadists, see few if any restrictions on who can be declared an infidel, and therefore justify unrestricted warfare or terrorism against infidels.  Even traditional Qur'anic interpretations hold that those who reject Islam reject God, and one of the principal characteristics of rejecting God (kufr) is the inclination toward violence and oppression, encapsulated by the broad concept zulm, which means transgression against one's own soul or human nature.  Now, many if not most Muslims reject the duty to propagate Islam by force and limit jihad to self-defense (Hashmi 2006), but then again, there is no such thing as a pacifist movement in Islam, and most Muslims respect the necessity of a continuous tension between incessant warfare and peace.  There is, however, the so-called "greater jihad" (the one with an ascetic and pacific meaning), but Cook (2005) points out that this was an apologetic device not well connected to the hadith literature and that most militant conceptions of jihad are legitimate expressions of Islam.

    Historically, there have been three Great Jihads.  The first Jihad was from 632 A.D. up until about the time of the Spanish Inquisition of 1480.  During this time, the Muslims conquered much of Europe, although they were partially turned back at the Battle of Tours in 732.  The second Jihad is usually considered to be the Ottoman Empire which spanned more than six centuries from 1299 to 1923, influencing much of Asia.  The third Jihad can be said to consist of Wahhabism (currently preferred term: Salifism) which started when the al-Saud dynasty conquered Mecca and Medina in 1924, creating the royalty known as Saudi Arabia.  It's influence was first felt in the Persian Gulf, but has also attempted to be influential in the Western world.   

    There is some controversy in Islamic thought as to whether jihad can be declared before or after an enemy attacks, or in other words, in a pre-emptive strike or in self-defense.  A strict and literal reading of the Qur'an says self-defense only, but Islamic law has always justified a first-strike position.  Just saying that women ought to have a right to vote is a crime of violence against all of Islam, and this can trigger a Jihadist reaction against not only the person who said that, but against whomever they got that idea from -- a kind of scorched earth policy or nipping things in the bud.  The basis for most anti-Americanism among Muslim extremists is part of the notion that any country that would give women the right to vote, or all minorities equal rights, is probably a country populated by infidels who are ready to attack Islam with crimes of violence.  It may be important to note the quite popular opinion in the Muslim world that it was under attack by America first.  Globalization, for example, is regarded by the Muslim world as an attack upon it, but Gerges (2005) says that global jihad is not something embraced by all Muslims.

    Jihad is a word which figures prominently in the names of terrorist groups.  Before there was al-Qaeda, there was a shadowy group called Islamic Jihad (Egypt) which developed millions of supporters throughout the Islamic world and these supporters largely agreed with militaristic interpretations of jihad.  Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad merged in early 2001.  The two most well-known groups are the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both formed in the mid-1970s with origins going back to the 1928 Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood also has millions of supporters around the world, but its groups tend to have be more traditionally political and have names like Islamic Action Front (Jordan), National Islamic Front (Sudan), Libyan Islamic Group (Libya), Hamas (Palestine), Al-Menbar (Bahrain), Al-Islah (Somalia), the Movement for the Society of Peace (Algeria), and although disputed, the following organization in North America: the Muslim Students Association; the North American Islamic Trust; the Islamic Society of North America; the American Muslim Council; the Muslim American Society; and the International Institute of Islamic Thought.  The jihadist groups tend to be more extreme than the brotherhood groups.         

Suicide bombings gained popularity around 1985 and are a trademark of jihadists.  The religious element involves believers thinking they will attain heavenly rewards for their sacrifice.  The political element involves sending a message of desperation.  Expert opinion is mixed on effectiveness of the tactic, but few people deny its photogenic value.  Experts also find it hard to profile a suicide bomber.  Some say the tactic backfires by turning public opinion against the cause, but support often comes in the form of charitable donations to the families of suicide bombers.  Because of this, many poor parents in jihadist areas may be inclined to encourage their children to become suicide bombers.  Use of women and children is not only an abominable act of cowardice, but a crime against humanity.

The Guarantee of Heaven for Islamic Martyrs

    Suicide, under orthodox Islam, is a sin.  However, Jihadists consider the circumstances to cleanse the sin, making it the act of a holy martyr, not a suicide.  The actual percentage of Muslims who agree with this interpretation is hotly disputed, as is the concept of martyrdom.  A martyr is technically someone who dies for their religious faith, but the outcome also matters, in terms of who gets to write history.  Martyrdom, therefore, is intimately tied up with Islamic arrogance that their goal of religious domination will be victorious in the end.  The study of all things in the end is known by the religious term eschatology, and Islam contains strong elements of Zoroastrianism, the world's first religion to have a full-blown eschatology.  Many experts believe that Zoroastrianism, a religion that existed from 1500 BC to 700 AD in Persia and still popular in parts of Iran and India, had a significant impact on Islam.  In a nutshell, the basic idea that Zoraster had is that earth is a battlefield between good and evil, and that good is destined to win out over evil, and anyone who allies themselves with good is guaranteed to be part of this destiny.  What Mohammed took from this is the idea that whoever martyrs themselves for the sake of good goes directly to a special place in heaven, or in a worst case scenario, goes to hell for a short time and then goes to heaven.  Satan, as the embodiment of evil, also plays a big role, as a real entity who tempts people to renounce their faith, and the martyr with the most guarantee of a special place in heaven is the one who fights Satan.

    Demonizing America as the "Great Satan" makes it a fitting opponent in the predestined war between good and evil.  Heaven is more than a transcendental place to Muslims. Orthodox Islamic eschatology holds that the afterlife is physical; people are said to have bodies, and they will experience material pleasures, including unlimited food, drink and sex.  Heaven is known to some Muslims as the Gardens of Paradise where unimaginable spiritual and sensual pleasures await.  To other Muslims, the rewards are quite imaginable, such as the 72 virgins waiting to have sex with each martyr every day (their hymens miraculously regrow the next day).  This account was popularized by the media in 2001 when a CBS reporter interviewed a Hamas recruiter who talked about it.  According to one translation, the Koran 78:31 reads "As for the righteous, they shall surely triumph. Theirs shall be gardens and vineyards, and high-bosomed virgins for companions."  Some Islamic scholars argue this is a false translation, and that passages like that are referring to angels or heavenly beings.  Other Islamic scholars argue it's only 70 virgins instead of 72, and that your wife is always one of them.  Technically, the "houris" (as they're called) are some kind of virginal beings with black eyes and alabaster skin dedicated to attend to the martyr's every desire in paradise.  Some Islamic scholars say the whole thing is intended to be taken in a transcendental way, the pleasures of heaven being so great it's like having an eternal erection or first-time sex all the time.  See The X-Rated Paradise of Islam for examples of other passages and translation controversies, but be warned this is a very controversial area.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF QUTBISM

    Qutbism is named for the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb (pronounced SIGH-yid KUH –tahb) (1906-1966) who himself was a protégé of the Pakistani journalist Abul Ala Maudoodi, and their collective ideas are sometimes called Maudoodi-Qutbism.  It is difficult to categorize their ideas collectively, as some scholars regard them as romantic idealists longing for a return to a "purer" form of Islam, and others regard them as the architects of militant fundamentalism in Islam (Ruthven 2002).  To be sure, both men at first experimented with ways to incorporate Western thought into Muslim philosophy, but ended up creating the Muslim equivalent of a holy war on decadence.  Qutb was radicalized sometime around 1949 after visiting the United States where all he found was crass materialism, greed, and unbridled sexuality.

    Upon his return to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood and wrote radical books denouncing all things materialistic, modern, and Western.  Further, he glamorized the idea of dying for your religion while fighting against permissive things that the West represents.  His ideas would become the theoretical basis or philosophical underpinning for almost all forms of Islamic extremism and anti-American terrorism.  However, while Qutb achieved status as a top theoretician in the Arab world, he eventually got arrested, imprisoned, and executed in Egypt.  The story is that Nasser in 1954 passed Qutb over for a chance to become minister of education, and Qutb became outraged, leading to Nasser jailing Qutb for 10 years, releasing him for a few months, and then having him hanged in 1966.  Qutb's ideas were passed along by Sayyid's brother, Muhammad Qutb, who was a Saudi professor that once had Osama bin Laden as a student.  It should be noted that even though there is an al-Qaeda connection, for public image purposes, al Qaeda does not want itself to be known as committed to Qutbism because Qutbism is regarded somewhat as a heretical ideology within most parts of the Muslim world, at least officially.

    Qutb feared that decadent American influences, like jazz and dance, would invade Egypt and all the Arab world unless something was done to stop it.  It didn't help that America was starting to support Israel around 1951.  From a Qutbist viewpoint, the U.S. replaces colonial Europe as the embodiment of evil, and the U.S. is the source of all the ills and misfortunes in the Arab world.  This radically changed the Muslim Brotherhood, which was originally set up to hate communism, but gradually came to hate America.  To get some idea of how mainstream these ideas are, ask any Arab or Muslim if the U.S. somehow tipped the balance of power in the Middle East to favor Israel at the expense of Arab well-being, and you'll get a resounding "Yes" that this is exactly the case, and that idea is Qutbism.  Ask any Arab or Muslim if they think American fads and fashions in music and dress are corrupting the morals of Muslim youth, and you'll also get a "Yes" and that idea is Qutbism.

    America is not only seen as decadent according to Qutbism, but as a pagan state.  American religious denominations are regarded as nothing more than providing entertainment ceremonies.  According to most mainstream Muslims, America is not a religious society that takes God seriously.  Americans commercialize religion and worship material things like prosperity instead of God.  Perhaps worst of all, America has no sense of justice.  A popular Muslim story goes like this: a couple once approached Mohammed to ask for forgiveness in the eyes of Allah.  Mohammed asked them "forgiveness for what," and the couple said adultery.  Mohammed asked if they were drunk at the time, and the couple said no.  So, Mohammed order them stoned to death.  The moral of the story is that Mohammed at least inquired about drunkenness as a possible excuse for the crime, but even though the couple were surprised by the stoning, they went to their death knowing that they carried no sins with them as they met Allah.    

    Qutb is also famous for being an outspoken critic of secular Islamic governments (empty shells with an Islamic flag, he called them).  He felt that most Muslim societies including Egypt were lost in an Age of Ignorance, and the solution was for the faithful to emigrate away from this ignorance and form a new Islamic society.  He also predicted a great battle would ensue between the Muslim nations.  Qutb did not go so far as to declare his fellow Egyptians apostates (a word describing those who have denounced their faith), but he did call them sinners.  It can be seen, then, how important and pivotal a figure he was in getting Muslims to call other Muslims the equivalent of infidels (apostates).  He did this by creating a whole new revolutionary ideology of takfir (excommunication).

     Qutbism is the declared ideology of Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, Bin Laden's "number two," widely regarded as the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.   While in Egypt before meeting Bin Laden, Dr. Zawahiri founded the At-Takfir w'al-Hijra movement which declared that most Muslims are apostates because of their sins.  By the late 1970s, Dr. Zawahiri founded another group called Al-Jihad, also based on Qutbism, which reached out to Palestinians, such as Abdullah Azzam, who served as Bin Laden's teacher and mentor.  By this time, the ideology had evolved into a conception of all Muslim governments as illegitimate and needing to be replaced by terrorism to restore the essential nature of Islam.  Qutbism is also the primary ideology of Omar Abdel-Rahman, leader of an Egyptian terrorist group who assisted Bin Laden in Afghanistan.

    Abdullah Azzam, had originally been a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, but became disillusioned with its secularism.  Azzam studied law and the ideas of Sayyid Qutb to become a teacher in Saudi Arabia.  There, one of his students was Osama Bin Laden, and this teacher and student both came up with the idea to move to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.  Dr. Zawahiri joined them a bit later, and al-Qaeda was born.  They rallied troops and supplies, using Bin Laden's money and ironically enough, CIA support, and defeated the Soviets, with Azzam dying in battle during 1989.  Then, al-Qaeda set up shop in Sudan, but were expelled from there, so they set up training camps back in Afghanistan for exporting terrorism.  The ideology at this time was that the "forces of ignorance" against Islam had to be fought militarily anywhere in the world.  al-Qaeda conceives of all jihad as military, and all Islam as jihad.  Anyone considered an apostate would be put to death by al-Qaeda.  Dr. Zawahiri became adept at using false passports, masquerading in disguise around the world, and placed sleeper cells all over Europe and the U.S.  The network known as al-Qaeda is "base" for a number of Sunni extremist groups who are the direct beneficiaries of Osama Bin Laden's resources and leadership.  The most well-known splinter groups are: the al-Zarqawi network; the Ansar al-Islam movement in Iraq (the link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda); the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Jemaah Islamiyad in Asia, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.  Senior personnel of al-Qaeda are being hidden in Iran and include strategic planner Saif al-Adel and spokesperson Sulaiman Abu Ghaith.  For awhile, it looked like the al-Zarqawi network (aka al-Tawhid) was going to emerge as the "new" al-Qaeda.  Led by a one-legged Jordanian named Abu Musab Zarqawi (real name Ahmed Fadil Nazzal al-Khalayleh), the al-Zarqawi network was experienced at bombing synagogues throughout Europe, plotting to use biological weapons in Britain, and beheadings.  Zarqawi was called the "second bin Laden" until he met his death at the hands of coalition forces. 

Old and New al-Qaeda Leaders
"A conflict between the Muslim nation and the United States is unavoidable. Israel is only the American spearhead in the war against Islam. The forthcoming terrorist Jihad will not be limited to strikes against Israel. With Allah's help, we know the United States well, and we also know its weaknesses. The most vulnerable spot of the United States is to send them the bodies of their sons. Therefore, we should throw in their faces the flesh of their sons, minced and grilled. The United States must pay the price, and it must pay dearly." (Ayman al-Zawahiri)
Baitullah Mehsud is the man many people believe will be the "next" Osama Bin Laden, and who arguably at present is the top terrorist in the world.  Currently, he is a Pakistani warlord, unofficial "emir" of South Waziristan, and friend to Taliban and al-Qaeda.  His personal army is well-organised and contains special assassin squads which target pro-American Afghanis.  Since being paid $20 million by Pakistan for cooperating in a 2005 ceasefire, he has used the money to build a training camp for suicide terrorists, launch (foiled) terrorist attacks throughout Europe, and carry out the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 (although he denies it, the CIA says he was behind it).  His training camp specializes in producing Western-looking terrorists who can slip across borders.  He has gone on record saying he wants to "eradicate the White House, New York, and London."  He is very secretive, and doesn't issue many public statements.  At right is one of the rare photographs of this man (with his long black hair parted down the middle).

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF WAHHABISM

    Wahhabism is named for Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), leader of a movement to bring back the sternness and austerity that once existed in Islam before the Arab Golden Age.  Wahhabism is also the official religion of Saudi Arabia.  In the late 18th-century, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab joined forces with those who would become rulers of Saudi Arabia (especially Muhammad bin Saud), and together they conquered the Arab peninsula in what historians have called the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance, wiping out thousands of people because they loosely interpreted the Koran.  This alliance (and the Saudi royal family) attempted to take control of the whole Persian Gulf, but met with British resistance in 1865.  The alliance managed to increase its territory in 1915, and in 1917 forced the British to pay them five thousand pounds a month to cease their expansionism.  The next significant date was 1932 (when the state of Saudi Arabia got its name; also called the second Wahhabi conquest), and the Saudis rounded up 400,000 people and carried out mass executions and amputations (resurrecting the old lex talionis law of "an eye for an eye").  The regime invented petrodollars during the 1960s with newfound wealth from oil, and by this time, Wahhabism became associated with Salafism, making it appear less like a warrior ideology and more like mainstream Islam.  Theologically, Wahhabism is similar to Hanbalism (based on the ideas of Ibn Hanbal), who argued with the Shiites and the Khawarij sect about the Sixth Pillar of Islam among other things (Lang 2003).  Wahhabism has been the inspiration for Islamic reform movements around the world, from Indonesia to Africa, and, of course, with the Taliban of Afghanistan.  Some 80% of mosques that exist in the United States are funded by Saudi money, but most American Muslims practice a more peaceable and tolerant version of Sunni Islam that, in most cases, is opposed to militant Wahhabism.     

    Wahhabists do not like being called by that name, as they prefer to think of themselves as a Sunni or Salifi sect and be called "servers of the divine unity" or unitarians.  The Wahhabi-Saudi movement is a simplified and conservative form of Sunni Islam that aims to cut down on luxurious living habits.  Accordingly, Wahhabi-oriented mosques are simple and without minarets.  Adherents dress plainly and do not smoke tobacco or use drugs.  Television and photography are also looked down upon as artificial two-dimensional representations of human beings (Algar 2002).  It should be noted that the so-called "Wahhabi lobby" is quite powerful and wealthy.  Wahhabi activists in Washington D.C. pose as workers for lobby groups such as the American Muslim Council and American Muslim Foundation and contribute thousands of dollars every year to the campaigns of American politicians in hopes of getting American counterterrorism laws, like the Patriot Act, reversed.  As examples of this powerful influence, the Bush administration regularly orders the redaction (classification) of intelligence reports linking Saudi wealth to the financing of terror, and the FBI has faced numerous setbacks in the war on terror because the Wahhabi lobby persuaded Congress to force FBI agents through sensitivity training (read news story).

    Wahhabism is an extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism that is undeniably violent, intolerant, and fanatical beyond measure.  The Wahhabi mindset does not allow for any conception of jihad other than "death to infidels" (they particularly dislike the United States and regularly call it the "Great Satan") and Wahhabism doesn't conform to any conception of fatwa that allows debate or argument.  All who do not accept the Wahhabi way must suffer the consequences.  For example, strict punishment is prescribed for those who listen to music other than the drum, or don't pay attention to the precise details of their facial hair.  The death sentence is given out for drinking or sexual transgressions.  Their goal is to take over the Muslim world and be the only voice of Islam.  They have many schools and organizations for teaching the Wahhabi way, such as the Muslim Student Association, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Islamic Assembly of North America, some of which have been investigated by the FBI for suspicion of terrorist financing (read news story), and they seem to support crimes other than terror.  The following excerpt is from a typical fatwa issued by a untypically radical Wahhabi cleric, which gives you some idea of the level of fanaticism:

Quotation by Sheik Saad Al-Buraik (April 2002)

"People should know that Jews are backed by Christians, and the battle that we are in is not with Jews only, but also with those who believe that Jesus is the son of Allah. I am against America until this life ends, until the Day of Judgment. I am against America even if the stone liquefies. My hatred of America is so strong, if part of it was contained in the universe, it would collapse. She is the root of all evil and wickedness on earth. Who else implanted the tyrants in our land, and who else nurtured oppression? Make no allies, and show no mercy or compassion toward them. Their women are yours to take, legitimately. God made them yours.  Why don't you enslave their women? Why don't you wage jihad? Why don't you pillage them?"

    The worst sin in Islam (see Shirk: The Ultimate Crime), according to Wahhabism, is "shirk" and the meaning is exactly as it is in English - when one avoids doing their duty, work, responsibility, or fighting.  Shirk is conceived of as similar to associating partners with Allah, or polytheism.  Wahhabism maintains that there are three kinds of shirk: (1) major shirk, which relates to aspects of worship, intention, obedience and fidelity; (2) minor shirk, which relates to the act of showing off, even in a minor way; and (3) hidden shirk, in which a believer might fall into inadvertently.  Penalties for the third kind, which could happen to you even without your knowing it, in your dreams, for example, including killing you and everyone around you.  That's a rather extreme way of enforcing discipline, and it's more than the political purpose of making an example out of someone; it's justified by religious underpinnings.

WHAT CAN PREVENT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM?

    Self-restraint and internal reform would be the ideal remedies.  The voices of moderates need to be heard.  Another thing that might work is for the Muslim world to develop a sense of humor, or at least some type of cultural sarcasm.  Sure, there are TV shows, movies, and music in America that seem so real, it's hard to tell the difference between reality and fantasy, but consider that 98% of the Muslim population sees and hears "hidden meanings" in almost everything, and you've got a good description of Muslim oversensitivity mindset.  Conspiracy theories abound.  In the West, we think of them as bad jokes, silly urban legends, or the kinds of things only an idiot would believe.  In the Muslim world, people are deadly serious about their conspiracy theories, and everything from litter on the streets to dogs that roam the West Bank are all part of a Jewish plot to humiliate Palestinians (Davis 2003).  Muslims seriously believe President Bush started a war to avenge the assassination plot against his father, and after 9/11, Muslims seriously denied any Arabs were involved, and that the attack photos were doctored by Hollywood special effects technicians.  Try as you will, there's no way to convince Muslims that their beloved conspiracies are something otherwise.  Visit the Pew Global Attitudes Project for other examples of weird public opinion in the Muslim world, or read the following quote to understand why Muslims have no sense of humor.

    Speaking of humor, one of the best weapons against Islamic extremism is ridicule since terrorists fear that more than death.  They fear losing at psychological warfare, at having their leaders appear as bumbling idiots.  Even dictators cannot survive a climate of free speech characterized by satire and ridicule.  One of the first things Fidel Castro did, for example, after taking power was to put up signs saying "No counterrevolutionary jokes here."  In the Muslim world, pride, honor and shame are profoundly important, so ridicule as a weapon might have some effect, although backlash can be expected.  Mike Waller's Fourth World Blog has long advocated the weapon of ridicule.    

    So, what do the extremists want?  If it were possible to list the "demands" of Muslim extremists, and from a hostage negotiation point of view, it should always be possible to list some rational demands, then this would be the list:

• A complete pull-out of all infidels from the sacred territories (translation: more land)

• An end to any and all American and Western support for Israel (translation: kill all Jews)

• A change in the way international organizations treat the Muslim world (translation: just send money)

• A pan-Islamic super-state consisting of many nations and territories (translation: a Muslim empire)

• A purging of all Western-style influence (translation: the right to harsh Islamic justice)             

    Islamic conceptions of just war are likely to be unfamiliar to most Westerners.  Khadduri (1984) provides a neat little description of the Islamic approach as follows:

 IS MISOGYNY BEHIND ISLAMIC EXTREMISM?   

    Just as Islamic jurisprudence makes no distinction between civil society and the state, Islamic fundamentalism makes no distinction between church and state, and further, just like socialism, Islamic extremism makes no distinction between the individual and the collectivity.  Muslims realize that they have duties vis-a-vis the community (umma), but their religion precludes any conception of those duties being intertwined with individual rights, especially any rights in the form of entitlements (what Western civilization calls positive freedoms).  Many scholars have criticized Islam for its overemphasis upon duties, not rights, and the failure of Islamic societies to "bundle" duties and privileges together in some way says a lot about what a sociologist might call the "role structure" of such societies.  Surely there are better ways to prevent Western-style status-seeking than by trammeling over human rights.  Nowhere is this phenomenon more apparent than with the lowly STATUS OF WOMEN in Muslim societies.  Only in Islam is wife-beating and sexual slavery divinely sanctioned.  Amnesty International reports that "according to the Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences, over 90% of married women report being kicked, slapped, beaten or sexually abused when husbands were dissatisfied by their cooking or cleaning, or when the women had failed to bear a child or had given birth to a girl instead of a boy."  Four reasons exist to beat your wife: if she refuses to beautify herself; if she refuses sex when asked for it; if she refuses to pray or perform ritual ablutions; and if she goes out of the house without a valid excuse.  Prof. Hughes has a good roundup of how sex slave trade works in Iran, and Dr.Sanity goes further to suggest the reasons for more peculiar phenomena include the possibility that sexual abuse of young boys is prevalent (why else fly into a rage at the sight of a woman's ankle or prohibit young boys without facial hair into a man's private quarters).  Such speculation aside, covering women head to toe in clothing seems to be a sure route to vitamin D deficiency.  Misogyny (a hatred of women) is the world's oldest prejudice (Holland 2006), and misogynistic cultures operate on a belief in the mother/whore dichotomy (women can only be one or the other).  Such cultures have existed from time immemorial, and misogyny is, of course, familiar to anyone in criminal justice who has studied sexual predators.  It could be that Islam simply has some Calvinist idea that women cannot govern, or the explanation could involve Freudian castration anxiety (who knows?).

The Barbarism of Taking Child Brides

Every year in the Muslim world and in third world countries, some 60 million girls (often around the age of 11, but sometimes younger) are forced into marriages with older men (often around the age of 40, but sometimes older). The photo at right is typical and was named Unicef Photo of the Year for 2007 (photographer: S. Sinclair). These are not marriages of charity (for poverty purposes) or accession (to cement family ties), but marriages intended for consummation. Not only did Islam's founder teach that taking child brides and having sex with them is appropriate, but Islamic theology teaches that doing so when a child starts their first menses (often as young as 8) helps improve reproductive chances and helps "purify" a family line. Child marriage ought to be considered  a human rights violation that has disastrous health consequences and no moral standing. Research by Lloyd DeMause in the Journal of Psychohistory also shows that sexual assault by a family member (against girls and boys) runs as high as 36%.

    Although some variation exists nationally, Islam holds that a woman's worth is half that of a man, any man.  According to Islamic law, a woman is supposed to be seen outside the home only three times in life: when they are born, when they get married, and when they die.  In Islam, the age of majority for a girl is 9 years old (under the lunar year, which is ten days shorter than a regular year).  According to the great Khomeini, "the most suitable time for a girl to get married is the time when the girl can have her first menstrual period in her husband's house rather than her father's."  A Muslim man can have four permanent wives, and if he is from Shi'i sect, he can have as many temporary wives (with predetermined expiration dates) as he wants.  Men who don’t have the money to marry believing women can also marry as many slave girls as they want.  A Muslim wife must meet all her husband's desires immediately, and if she refuses, he has the right to deny her food, shelter, and all of life's necessities.  A Muslim woman can get arrested, beaten, or executed if she wears makeup, nylons, bright colors and particularly the color red.  Muslim women are not allowed to swim, ski, ride a bike, dance, learn to play musical instruments, practice gymnastics, participate in any sport, and are not permitted to watch men play sports.  Like all Muslims, women have to pray five times a day and fast one month out of the year, but they must additionally cover themselves from head to toe in yards of black fabric; i.e., the hijab (Arabic for "cover" implying a headscarf or veil along with a gigantic square of clothing like a nun's habit; the more extreme burqa which is an all-enveloping garment; or the less extreme niqāb which is a simple head and partial face covering.  Several international Muslim organizations pay "reverse assimilated" Muslims in other countries to have their daughters wear the hijab.  Compensation ranges from $600 to $1500 a month, the purpose being to annoy non-Muslims and win the ongoing Islamic dress controversy which rages in Europe and elsewhere.  What parent can resist this income opportunity? It would seem that even taking socialization privileges away from parents is not beyond Islamic extremism.

    Regarding the Koranic allowance to take four wives, polygamy (or multiple marriage) is common among Muslims, especially those who live in the United States.  Estimates are that 100,000 American Muslim men have multiple wives, the extra wives being illegal immigrants in most cases.  Polygamy is quite common among conservative, less educated immigrants from Africa and Asia, but it is rarer among middle-class Muslims from the Middle East.  The way it works is that the husband usually springs it on #1 that he is getting married tomorrow to a #2 (or #3 or #4), and American law is circumvented by only one of the marriages being recognized under civil law while the others are conducted in religious ceremonies by imams who claim they conducted proper background checks and the marriages ought to be recognized by the state.  This doesn't sit well with American authorities.  For one thing, the husband usually mistreats the extra wives, sharing nothing equally with them as the Islamic ideal says, and sometimes, the extra wives are kept in a basement to clean or cook.  The other thing is that, legally, these extra wives are invisible since immigration authorities are never going to recognize them, and if the husband is a green card holder, he can't sponsor them, nor get them asylum if the husband seeks asylum.        

ARE MODERATES AND RADICALS DIFFERENT?

    Perhaps the most famous of all Muslim scholars and preachers is Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ph.D. (see ADL Website Profile, BBC Profile, and Wikipedia Profile).  He is a Sunni and considered a "moderate" in the Arab world, probably because he condemned the 9/11 attacks and urges Muslims to pray less, but teaches that women can be suicide bombers too (and he's in favor of female genital mutilation).  His hard-to-classify "progressive" ideas run counter to his otherwise unwavering support for terrorism, such as with his 2003 fatwa calling for the targeting of American civilians and his personal advocacy of suicide-bombing as the perfect vehicle for extending "Allah's democracy" around the world.  He runs the website IslamOnline.net from Qatar and is a regular figure on al-Jazeera with his weekly TV show, Sharia and Life, which attracts millions of viewers.  His reach is felt throughout the world via his presidency of the Dublin-based European Council for Fatwa and Research as well as the many other boards and committees he chairs.  Despite his popularity, he is not without his critics in the Arab world.  Some see him as too dogmatic and out of touch with the modern world, while others see him as too lax on many issues (minor issues mostly, like whether being photographed is OK).  What makes him popular is that he is an articulate preacher and good communicator.  What makes him famous is that he preaches the underlying message which unites all factions of believers -- that Islam has the answer to all of life's problems.

"Moderate" Muslim Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi

Sheik Yusuf Qaradawi employs thousands of writers for his website, TV show, radio shows, books, and study-at-home tapes. He is the most popular, leading, political, Islamic thinker in the world today. While claiming to be advancing a vision of "moderate" Islam, he actually advances an extremist form of Islam which sees the whole world as a playground for Muslim believers who should not have to obey any laws, recognize any borders, or respect any nation's customs. He even says that killing other Muslims is acceptable if done in the name of bring about total Islamic domination of the world.  Notable quote: "Through his infinite wisdom, Allah has given the weak a weapon the strong do not have and that is their ability to turn their bodies into bombs as Palestinians do."

    One of al-Qaradawi's most well-known quotes is as follows: "Israelis might have nuclear bombs but we have children bombs, and these bombs will continue until liberation is achieved."  Quoting Mark Steyn's joking interpretation of this, the Imam is saying: "Thank heaven for little girls; they blow up in the most delightful ways."  Mark Steyn also quips "There may be moderate Muslims, but there is no moderate Islam."

    The idea of boosting Islamic moderates to cut down on Islamic extremism may be a myth.  There are other examples besides Sheik Qaradawi.  Consider the case of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the richest man in Iran who will most likely be Iran's president again one day.  He's considered "extremely moderate" compared to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but Rafsanjani once implored Iranians to kill Westerners (Americans or Frenchmen) wherever they could find them because they were easier to kill than Israelis.  Also, consider Hezbollah or Hamas, who have achieved electoral victories in politics.  One would assume that once in political power, they would get about the business of governing (like how to fill up potholes in roads), but instead they squander their time devising ways to make outrageous claims and demands against the Western world and the international community.  Moderates fuel extremism whenever they are more interested in ruling than in governing (Cook 2007).       

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Dictionary of Jihad
A Field Guide to Islamic Activists
About.com Guide to Islamic Extremist Groups
Al Qaeda Training Manual
Al-Qaeda's Egyptian Prophet: Sayyid Qutb
Answers to 7 Questions about Islam for Non-Muslims
Ariel Center for Policy Research
Bat Yeor's Website on Dhimmitude
BBC Article on the Roots of Jihad
BBC Special on Islam and the West
Dr. Godlas' Islamic Studies Website
Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims
Islam's Medieval Outposts: What's Taught in Muslim Madrasas
Muslim Public Affairs Council Review of Counterterrorism Policy (pdf)
Muslim Women's League
Muslims Against Extremism and Fundamentalism
PBS Special on Muhammad, Violence, and Jihad
Ridicule as a Weapon of War
Ridiculing Terrorists as a Weapon of War
The Arab Gateway: News of the Arab World
The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs as Fashionable Thinking
The Doctrine of Heaven (Paradise) Behind the Veil of Islam
The Roots of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World
The Saudi-Al Qaeda Connection
The Wahhabi Movement: History and Beliefs
The Wahhabi Myth: Is Osami bin Laden a Salifi or Wahabi?
Virgins? What Virgins?
Who Was Sayed Qutb?
Wikipedia: The War on Terrorism as a War on Islam
Wikipedia: Wahhabism and Islamist Movements

PRINTED RESOURCES
Ahmed, A. (2002). Discovering Islam. London: Routledge.
Ahmed, L. (1993). Women and gender in Islam. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Algar, H. (2002). Wahhabism. NY: Islamic Publications International.
An-Na'-Im, A. (1996). Toward an Islamic reformation. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press. [sample pages]
Armstrong, K. (2006). Muhammad: A prophet for our times. NY: Harper Collins.
Bertolacci, A. (2006). The reception of Aristotle's metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā'. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill.
Boot, M. (2003). "Exploiting the Palestinians: Everybody's doing it." Weekly Standard (Jan 28). [available online]
Catherwood, C. (2003). Christians, muslims, and Islamic rage. NY: Zondervan.
Cook, D. (2005). Understanding jihad. Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press.
Cook, D. (2005). Contemporary Muslim apocalyptic literature. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press.
Cook, S. (2007). Ruling but not governing: The military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
Cooper, B. (2004). New political religions, or an analysis of modern terrorism. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press.
Davis, C. (2003). The middle east for dummies. NY: Wiley.
DeMause, L. (2006). "If I blow myself up and become a martyr, I'll finally be loved." Journal of Psychohistory (Spring) [online].
Dien, M. (2004). Islamic law. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press.
El  Fadl, K. (2001). Speaking in God's name. NY: Oneworld Publications. [sample pages]
El Fadl, K. (2002). The place of tolerance in Islam. NY: Beacon Press. [sample pages]
Ernst, C. (1997). The Shambhala guide to Sufism. Boston: Shambhala Publications.
Esposito, J. (1999). The Islamic threat, 3e. NY: Oxford Univ. Press. [sample pages]
Esposito, J. (Ed.) (2001). The Iranian revolution. Miami: Florida International Univ. Press. [sample pages]
Esposito, J. (2002). What everyone needs to know about Islam. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Esposito, J. & Burgat, F. (Eds.) (2003). Modernizing Islam. Newark: Rutgers Univ. Press.
Esposito, J. (2003). Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Esposito, J. (2004). Islam: The straight path. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Esposito, J. (2006). Islam in transition. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Fukuyama, F. (2006). America at the crossroads. NY: Yale Univ. Press.
Gabriel, M. (2002). Islam and terrorism. NY: Charisma House. [sample pages]
Gerges, F. (2005). The far enemy: Why jihad went global. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Gregorian, V. (2005). Islam: A mosaic, not a monolith. Washington DC: Brookings.
Habeck, M. (2006). Knowing the enemy: Jihadist ideology and the war on terror. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Haddad, Y. and J. Esposito (Eds.) (1997). Islam, gender, and social change. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Harris, L. (2007). The suicide of reason: Radical Islam's threat to the west. NY: Basic.
Hashmi, S. (2006). "Interpreting the Islamic ethics of war and peace." Pp. 64-69 in W. Evan (Ed.) War and peace in an age of terrorism. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Hewitt, C. (2003). Understanding terrorism in America. NY: Routledge.
Hitchens, C. (2004). Love, poverty, and war. NY: Nation books.
Holland, J. (2006). Misogyny: The world's oldest prejudice. NY: Carroll & Graf.
Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations. NY: Simon & Schuster.
Janardhan, N. (2006) "Islamists stay clear of Oman." Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 4(5) [article online].
Jansen, J. (1997). The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism. NY: Cornell Univ. Press.
Khadduri, M. (1984). The Islamic conception of justice. Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press.
Khan, L. (2006). A theory of international terrorism. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill.
Kibble, D. (1996). "The threat of militant Islam." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19(4): 353-64.
Lambert, S. (2005). The sources of Islamic revolutionary conduct. Washington DC: JMIC.
Lang, P. (2003). "Wahhabism and jihad." America 188(8): 10-13.
Levitt, M. (2002). Targeting terror. Washington DC: Brookings.
Lincoln, B. (2002). Holy terrors. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Lewis, B. (1977). The Cambridge history of Islam. NY: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Lewis, B. (2003). The crisis of Islam. NY: Modern Library.
Malcolm X. (1987). The autobiography of Malcolm X. NY: African American Images.
Marshall, P. (Ed.) (2005). Radical Islam's rules. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Palmer, M. & Palmer, P. (2004). At the heart of terror. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Paz, R. (2004). Tangled web: International networking of the Islamist struggle. Washington DC: Brookings.
Peters, F. (2003). Islam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Pipes, D. & K. Elst. (2003). The Rushdie affair. NJ: Transaction Books. [author's website]
Poole, J. (2004). Tactics of the crescent moon. Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press.
Post, J. (2004). Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.
Richardson, J. (2006). Antichrist: Islam's awaited messiah. Enumclaw, WA: Pleasant Word Books.
Rubin, B. (2002). "The real roots of Arab anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs 81(6): 73-85.
Ruthven, M. (2002). A fury for God: The Islamist attack on America. NY: Granta Books.
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press
Satloff, R. (Ed.) (2002). War on terror: The Middle East dimension. Washington DC: Brookings.
Schall, J. (2007). The Regensburg lecture. Chicago: St. Augustine's Press.
Schanzer, J. (2004). Al-Qaeda's armies. Washington DC: Brookings.
Shay, S. (2001). The endless jihad. Herzliya, Israel: ICT. 
Sivan, E. (1990). Radical Islam. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Spencer, R. (2002). Islam unveiled. NY: Encounter.
Spencer, R. (2006). The truth about Muhammad. Washington DC: Regnery.
Stern, J. (2003). Terror in the name of God. NY: Harper Collins.
Streusand, D. & Tunnell, H. (2006). "Choosing words carefully: Language to help fight Islamic terrorism." Washington DC: National Defense University, Center for Strategic Communications Working Draft.
Tibi, B. (1998). The challenge of fundamentalismr. Berkeley: Univ. of CA Press.
Trifkovic, S. & S. (2002). Sword of the prophet. NY: BHB International.
Tyerman, C. (2006). God's war: A new history of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Voegelin, E. (1938). The political religions. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press.
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam rising. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wright, L. (2006). The looming tower. NY: Knopf.
Wright, R. (2001). Sacred rage: The wrath of militant Islam. NY: Touchstone Books.
Ye'or, B. (1996). The decline of eastern Christianity under Islam. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press.
Ye'or, B. (2002). Islam and dhimmitude. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press.
Ye'or, B. (2005). Eurabia: The Euro-Arab axis. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press.

Last updated: Nov 06, 2008
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O'Connor, T.  (Date of Last Update at bottom of page). In Part of web cited (Windows name for file at top of browser), MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/rest of URL accessed on today's date.