Definitions of Terrorism

DEFINITIONS, TYPOLOGIES, AND TYPES OF TERRORISM
"One man willing to throw his life away is enough to terrorize thousands." (Wu Ch'i)

Terrorism has been around as a major nuisance to governments as long as recorded history. The Bible advocates terror, assassination, and annihilation in several places (see the book of Numbers and book of Joshua). Regicide, or the killing of kings by rivals, and the brutal suppression of loyalists afterwards, has been an established pattern of political ascent since Julius Caesar (44 B.C.). The Zealots in Israel (100 A.D.) fought Roman occupation with hit-and-run tactics in public places. The Assassins in Iraq (1100 A.D.) fought the Christian Crusaders with suicide tactics. The Thuggees in India (1300 A.D.) kidnapped travelers for sacrifice to their Goddess of Terror, Kali. The Spanish Inquisition (1469-1600) dealt with Heretics by systematized torture, and the whole medieval era was based on terrorizing a countryside. The French Revolution (1789-1795) coined the phrase "reign of terror." The Luddites (1811-1816) destroyed machinery and any symbol of modern technology. A Serb terrorist (1914) started World War I. Hitler's rise to power (1932) involved terror as well as genocide. Nations like Ireland, Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia, and Israel probably would have never become republics if not for revolutionary terrorism, and more than a few people would say the United States was founded on terrorism. However defined, it is clear that terrorism has helped shape world history in a variety of ways, and it has long meant different things to different people. As a nuisance, terrorism forces societies to make hard choices between what Williams (1999) calls the only two things a society can do to cope with a nuisance: (1) liberty-oriented solutions -- where both offenders and victims are given the benefit of a doubt in terms of what rights they possess; or (2) tyranny-oriented solutions -- where one group imposes its preferences and rights over others.

The academic field of terrorism studies has grown substantially in recent years. Two scholarly journals focus almost exclusively on the subject -- Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. More and better empirical studies have been conducted, and in some ways, despite setbacks such as the U.N. failure to define terrorism (no internationally accepted definition of terrorism exists), better definitions of terrorism have been attempted. Certain areas of interest are of growing importance, such as: the role of the media in the spectacle of terrorism; whether 9/11 produced a paradigm shift in counterterrorism; and whether terrorism is nothing new; among other issues. There is a need to be cautious in tossing the terrorist label around, as most experts (e.g., Hoffman & Claridge 1998) suggest it is better to define terrorism by the nature of the act rather than by the identity or socio-demographics of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, reproduced below (noting there is no "one, best" definition) is the field's so-called "consensus" definition, devised in the early 1980s and probably adhered to by an estimated 75% of experts in the field, despite reservations about its failure to distinguish supporters of terrorism as well as differentiate terrorism-like criminal behaviors such as drug trafficking:

The Consensus Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims become targets of violence. Through the previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of a group are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). The victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers...which in turn creates an audience beyond the target of terror.... The purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demand or targets of attention. (Schmid 1983: 111)

One cannot avoid long-standing debates, going as far back as Aristotle, about whether it is politically and morally acceptable to use unconventional tactics to bring about political and social change. History is replete with the ideas of great thinkers who believed that, under the right circumstances, unconventional tactics were not only smart, but a moral or civic duty. Thought leaders over the centuries have contributed thoughts about just warfare, when "holy terror" is justified, and whether unconventional tactics mimic military tactics or not. Most terrorism throughout history has been directed against governments (in what is called political or revolutionary terrorism) or by governments (in what is called state terrorism), but terrorism can also be stateless and/or global as well as state-sponsored. These latter types occur, respectively, when governments turn on their own citizens, stir up trouble among the citizenry of another nation, or use a proxy group to do its dirty work. It is customary in many introductory terrorism books to point out the parallels between state terrorism and political terrorism, and of course, there are various ways to approach linkages between terrorism by the state and terrorism against the state. When terrorism by the state occurs in a global context, the usual form is proxy or surrogate warfare, which is also sometimes called silent warfare when intelligence agencies are involved. However, the more common term is "state sponsored terrorism," defined below.

State sponsored terrorism usually takes the form of propaganda, financial aid, training and/or assistance with intelligence and weapons. By contrast, state terrorism (what is more commonly thought of as terrorism by the state) usually takes the form of government action against dissidents in the form of assassinations, kidnappings, disappearances, and death squads. In point of fact, it was state terrorism that put the term "terrorism" into the English vocabulary.

The French Revolution Origins of Terrorism

The word "terrorism" traces its roots in the English language to the French Revolution (1789-1795) when British statesman Edmund Burke used the term to describe the actions of the Jacobin-dominated French government. During a period of the French Revolution known as the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) under the leadership of Maximilien Robespierre (Head of the Committee on Public Safety and Revolutionary Tribunal), thousands of "enemies of the state" were put on trial and guillotined. Scholars disagree on the numbers, but the larger estimates are that 500,000 citizens were arrested, 40,000 were executed, 200,000 were deported, and another 200,000 died in prison from starvation and torture. Arrests and convictions were made on the flimsiest of evidence, as France plummeted into a surveillance society with the moves of every citizen being watched. Robespierre himself was assassinated by a coup d'etat in 1794, and what followed was a period known as the White Terror, with the new regime hunting down the old regime as terrorists. Napoleon Bonaparte put an end to in-fighting when he took power in 1799 to recreate an empire-state.

The word "terrorism" took on a slightly different meaning after German philosopher, Immanuel Kant wrote about it in 1798 to describe a pessimistic view of the destiny of mankind. This idea of terror as the abandonment of all hope for a collective solution to life's problems, and the scary, yet liberating experience of only being able to count on yourself became the genesis of two mid-1800 ideas known as anarchism and communism. Anarchism was invented in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and expanded upon by Mikhail Bakunin in 1848 and Karl Heinzen in 1849. Anarchism supported terrorism with statements such as "if you have to blow up half a continent to destroy the enemy, do so with no scruples or conscience." Communism was invented in 1844 by Karl Marx contemplating the theses of Feuerbach, which were essentially Kantian ideas about the liberating potential of self-reliance and mass movements. Lenin expanded on communist theory by adding the notion of collectivist action, or mass acts of terrorism, having the most strategic effect. It was Lenin in 1908 who invented modern state-sponsored terrorism (or stirring up trouble among the citizenry of other nations) when he said "We cannot reject terror, as it is the one form of military action which may be perfectly suitable or even essential at a definite juncture in battle." The battle that Lenin and Stalin fought for many years was the Cold War (1922-1993), which sought to defeat capitalism and establish a world-wide communist regime. This Cold War contained many proxy "Dirty Wars" between the United States and Russia (proxy meaning fought on soil other than American or Russian), and helped establish many of the patterns and trends we know about in our understanding of international terrorism. Meanwhile, Lenin and Trotsky started up a Red Terror inside Russia from 1918-1923 with a vast gulag of concentration camps, which was extended by Stalin's purges in the mid-1930s with the Great Terror. The United States, for its part, engaged in a "Red Scare" roundup of suspected anarchists and communists in the late 1940s. Terrorism sponsored abroad and terrorism at home (domestic terrorism) went hand in hand during the Cold War.

The next phase in the history of terrorism involved nationalism and the desire to rid a country of colonial rule. The Macedonian insurgency (1893-1903) against the Turkish Ottoman Empire became the first anti-colonial group in modern history to systematically wage guerilla warfare, avoid conventional battle, occupy towns and villages, engage in propaganda, and use terrorism to gain control. Nationalist terrorism provided the notion that "there are no innocent non-combatants" since it was typical with this type of terrorism for many more innocent non-combatants to be killed than combatants. Perhaps the most well-known figure in the history of nationalist terrorism is Colonel T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia"), who organized the 1916-1918 insurgency by Arab irregulars against Ottoman Turks. Undoubtedly, another major figure was Mao Zedong, whose peasant army brought down what was left of imperial Manchu China in 1949 at the start of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's victory and guerrilla warfare tactics inspired revolutionaries and terrorists throughout the Third World, as did Fidel Castro and Che Guevara during the Cuban Revolution of 1959. In fact, it was in Latin America where terrorism became most closely tied to anti-colonialism. Carlos Marighella (1930-1971) wrote the Latin American handbook on terrorism (The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare), claiming it required adherence to a "higher morality," that one man's terrorist is another man's liberator, and in true Carlos the Jackal fashion, argued that terrorists should be well-trained, well-educated people of the world. It should be noted that the phrase "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" has unknown origins, and is not directly attributable to Marighella. In other parts of the world, different anti-colonial patterns emerged, such as those associated with the non-terrorist and non-violent tactics of Mahatma Gandhi. In Africa, terrorist tactics were successfully used to achieve the independence of states such as Kenya and Algeria. It was nationalist terrorism which popularized the phrase "freedom fighter."

Another period of time that brought a different meaning to terrorism was the World War II period with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Here, the word "terrorism" became to be associated with totalitarian regimes and police states. For example, when Hitler's minister of the Interior, Hermann Goering said in 1933 that "I will not be crippled by judicial thinking. I don't have to worry about justice. I shall use the power of the police to the utmost," this is pretty much an announcement of a police state that engages in terrorism against its own citizens. Words used to describe this kind of terrorism include state terrorism, state-imposed terrorism, or state-directed terrorism. This kind of terrorism became common in dictatorships across the world, and in many places with or without Fascist influence, such as Argentina, Chile, Greece, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. Such places have experienced "death squads" or "terror squads" (usually off-duty policemen) roaming the streets and countryside, intimidating and killing people as well as committing all sorts of human rights violations.

The year 1968 marked a radical shift in Middle East politics when Palestinian groups accomplished a streak of notable skyjackings. The imitative power of the Palestinian model cannot be overstated. It could, however, be argued that terrorism in the Middle East had earlier benchmarks, and indeed certain Jewish origins, but 1968 was undeniably a turning point. In the words of the PLO representative to the United Nations that year, "The first several hijackings accomplished more for our cause than twenty years of pleading." This illustrates that this turning point made all the world a stage for international terrorism. Dershowitz (2002) documents other twists and turns in Palestinian tactics, but another important date is 1974 when PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat eloquently argued before the U.N. that his people were "freedom fighters" not terrorists. The theory that this kind of spectacle terrorism has Jewish origins is discussed by Ahmad (2001), and usually involves the year 1944 as significant for when sympathy toward the Holocaust caused people to start referring to Jewish insurgency groups like Irgun, the Stern Gang, and Hagannah (who were clearly terrorists) as "freedom fighters." The 1960s and 1970s also saw the emergence of a new type of nationalism called separatism. This describes indigenous ethnic groups who have long lived in a province, but want to separate from their host nation and start their own country. Examples include Quebec, the Basque Homeland, portions of Indonesia, and certain Black American domestic terrorism movements. Like their anti-colonial predecessors, separatists sought to use the spectacle of terrorism to attract widespread sympathy and gain a perception of themselves as freedom fighters.

In the 1980s, the War on Drugs was launched by the United States, and the word "narco-terrorism" came into the vocabulary (Ehrenfeld 1990). The word meant that drug trafficking was being used to propagate the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations. Narco-terrorism was seen as a Communist plot at first. Eventually, it became seen as an economic threat, and then as something of a battle for hearts and minds. The War on Drugs forced the United States into building a military-police apparatus for intervening not only into privacy but into the domestic affairs of foreign countries. The U.S. also started paying attention to how elections were held in foreign countries, and has yet to learn that just because a country embraces elections doesn't mean it embraces democracy. As the 1990s were ushered in, America and the Western powers became aware of exactly how many "hot spots" (so-called trouble spots, low intensity conflict zones, or the gray areas) there were in the world. Places like the Balkans, Kashmir, Somalia, and the Congo had been sitting on powder kegs for years, some of it the result of dictatorship legacies, some of it the legacy of colonialism, and some of it not involving any kind of legacy at all but good, old-fashioned animosity toward ones neighbors. Places like Syria, Iran, and Iraq represent such places, and have long been suspected of secretly sponsoring global terrorism. Places like China, North Korea, and Pakistan also represent such places, and have long been suspected of proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Then, there is the problem of the broken-up former Soviet states which were allowed to go their own way and can't seem to decide what way to go, much like the many African nations after being freed from colonialism.

With overwhelming challenges abroad and a tendency to be easily distracted by a short attention span, the United States suffered a major attack by terrorism on September 11, 2001 (Dudley 2002). Two planes were hijacked and flown into New York's World Trade Center, a second plane flew into the Pentagon, and a third plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. It was the worst terrorist attack on American soil, and like Pearl Harbor, snapped America out of a false sense of security, and maybe even its complacency. Those responsible were identified as belonging to al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, headquartered in Afghanistan, and supported by a regime known as the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is only one of numerous Islamic militant groups, and some experts have argued for the need to classify al-Qaeda as Islamo-fascist for its extreme fundamentalist beliefs, but al-Qaeda prefers to think of itself as mainstream mujihadeen (holy warriors). Indeed, there is no question that the term "Islamofascist" is imprecise since Islamists are not technically fascists ("Jihadofascist" not being much better of a term), but the fact of the matter is that 19 hijacker-terrorists attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001 believing that by blowing themselves up they would receive 72 virgins in paradise. In response to such a threat and particularly to 9/11, the President announced a War on Terrorism in front of Congress on September 20th of that year (2001). The speech was very similar to Winston Churchill's famous 1940 "total war" speech before the House of Commons as Prime Minister regarding victory at all costs.

Presidential Declaration of War on Terrorism

We will direct every resource at our disposal, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the disruption and eventual defeat of terrorism. Every nation now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded as a hostile regime. We will do far more than retaliate. Americans should expect a battle unlike any other they have ever seen, not one battle, but a lengthy campaign, some visible, others secret. We will drive terrorists from place to place until there is no refuge or rest.

A declared War on Terrorism, sometimes abbreviated WOT (or GWOT, for Global) is probably not the best way to put it, although it doesn't really matter since the whole point of the war analogy is to get the job done (kill the snakes) and get it over with (drain the swamp). What matters for armed forces is whether they will fight for the things a nation stands for, and the nature of the enemy (terrorist or non-terrorists) also doesn't really matter much. From an intellectual standpoint and to be conceptually rigorous, one would NOT normally declare war on a tactic (like terrorism), but would instead declare war on the root causes (like extremism or fanaticism) of a problem. Definitional problems abound with root cause counterterrorism since goals are often nebulous (like a war on injustice). Wars are usually fought against nationalities, and to be brutally honest, against religions, or at least the radical elements of them, but how one waters this down to not offend Muslim sensibilities is difficult. The most common watered-down phrases include war with radical Islam, struggle against pestilential theocracy, intermittent struggle against Mohammedan violence. It is important to note that America is NOT at war with all Muslims, but it is at war with those who believe death in defense of the twisted tenets of a faith is the highest good, that cartoonists should be killed for caricaturing the prophet, and that any Muslim who loses his faith should be butchered for apostasy. War is the top gun in the spectrum of conflict any power can launch against another power, and GWOT calls for full-spectrum conflict. Spectrum of conflict is the term used to describe a graduation of conflicts on continuums of intensity and scope. Full spectrum wars can be fought absolutely or pragmatically. War is a word with forensic dimensions and legal implications. More appropriate language would involve the terms "confrontation" or "conflict." However, these terms are often confused, as both terms refer to the accomplishment of sub-strategic objectives, but a confrontation does so by attempting to influence an opponent, to change or form their intention (a clash of wills), and a conflict (like a struggle) attempts to forcibly attain a decisive outcome via the direct application of force upon an opponent who needs to be taken hold of because their intent is unchangeable.

The United States legal approach to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism involves the discovery of predicate crimes which count toward conspiracy offenses comprising the material support of terrorism. There is very little organized legislation one might call the law of terrorism, and typical perpetrators are not actually charged with terrorism but usually with other offenses. There is a long-standing legal code called Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2331 which is entitled "Terrorism" and attempts to define it, but it is essentially all about international terrorism and represents America's version of outlawing internecine conflict which describes international conflicts that spill over onto American soil. This law might seem weak, but it protected America well up thru the Clinton era. Physical jurisdictions are important within the law of terrorism, as they are in law itself. Constitutionally, it is not illegal to claim you are a terrorist, belong to a terrorist group, or be suspected of being a terrorist. Ninety percent of the time, suspected terrorists do nothing wrong until they commit an indictable act, the exceptions being what the criminal justice system curtly calls "suspect," "person of interest," or "unindicted co-conspirator." Indicted terrorists are usually charged with crimes such as planning for violence, raising funds illegally, and conspiring to carry out a violent act. The most common criminal charges against terrorists include bombing, arson, hijacking, assault, kidnapping, murder, theft, and sabotage. For terrorists who are captured before completing an act, the most common charges are illegal possession of explosives and weapons, illegal raising of funds, and conspiracy. International law only recognizes the criminal corollaries of terrorism, such as conspiracy, kidnapping, murder, and arson. State criminal laws recognize specific intent crimes, such as telephone harassment for terrorist purposes, along with other stalking and domestic violence offenses, but these are not really referring to terrorism but forms of personal intimidation. In short, there are an assortment of terrorism-related laws, none of which alone or in combination, make much sense in terms of understanding terrorism or getting a solid legal grasp on the phenomena. With few exceptions (Henderson 2001; Combs 2003), authors don't even attempt a chapter on law in their terrorism books. To keep up with terrorism law, a good place to do so would be to visit a website at the University of Pittsburgh which does a good job of tracking recent and pending anti-terrorism laws. Here's a list of statutory authority over various terrorism-related offenses which make up the so-called codified law:

Codified laws, like the above, have stood the test of time, and in addition have received the approval of various jurist associations. There is little chance of misunderstanding a codified law. Next in order of importance, are the court cases which have established precedent as binding and guiding forces of law (aka case law). The following are some selected examples of case law:

In addition to codes and cases, there is what is called "public law" which consists of legislation signed into law. Often, these have not yet passed constitutional muster, but represent what the legislative branch of government thinks ought to be done quickly. The following acts centered around the year 2001 are a select list of this public law:

Then, following codes, cases, and legislation, there are pronouncements made by the executive branch of government, called Executive Orders, Decisions, Declarations, or Directives. The most well-known of these are probably the Presidential Decision Directives, or PDDs, which have a long history going back to creation of various intelligence agencies and the launching of secret missions in Vietnam and elsewhere. Many documents in this category are classified, but others are easily found on web or elsewhere. They are considered "administratively" binding upon government employees who currently work for an executive branch agency. The following selected documents illustrate this administrative law:

Finally, there are Agreements, Treaties, Declarations, Resolutions, Conventions and Protocols entered into by the United States and other nations, or by all nations as a whole via the United Nations (which is not the world's legislative authority). There is considerable difference of opinion about whether such documents are legally binding on non-cooperating entities or groups at the sub-national level, but they do, to some extent, represent the international community's consensus on terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The following make up this international law:

With regard to a U.N. definition, the General Assembly's Sixth (Legal Affairs) Committee has been trying for a number of years now to obtain 191-nation agreement on a definition of terrorism. Such efforts have been largely unsuccessful because the Islamic countries and the non-aligned group, have been insisting on language that would exempt armed resistance groups which they see as struggling against colonial domination and foreign occupation. They also want to see any terrorist acts committed by regular armed forces covered in a definition, and have a particular interest in seeing that Israel's IDF can be declared a terrorist group. The closest thing to a workable U.N. definition is some of the language contained in financing terrorism conventions. Otherwise, it's safe to say an international definition of terrorism is lacking.

There is no one, good definition of terrorism. In fact, the phenomenon might be impossible to define because it is intangible and fluctuates according to historical and geographical contexts. Some forms of it are indistinguishable from crime, revolution, war, and fear. Other forms of it are easily distinguishable. Each and every person knows that they would in some way, some day, under some back-against-the-wall condition, support some form of terrorism (as a tactic of last resort) in the name of some deeply cherished cause or value. You may already be a supporter of terrorism, or you may live under a government that practices terrorism, and not know it. There is no universal or absolute definition of terrorism (Long 1990).

The Christian Science Monitor's special report, Exactly What is Terrorism? draws the user into a useful quiz over what they think qualifies as terrorism, and what does not. Here are some excerpts (think about how strongly you feel that each case is terrorism or not, and the answers will be hidden in the following paragraph).

Difficult Scenarios or Borderline Definitions of Terrorism

Case #1: A group, aiming to overthrow a corrupt political leader who has been raising taxes quite a lot lately, plans to carry out a bombing at the luxury hotel the leader owns and is staying at. They call ahead first, warning of the attack, but still a few innocent bystanders are killed.

Case #2: A group of soldiers go AWOL after a hard battle in which they lost some of their comrades, and because they don't know who's harboring the enemy or even who the enemy is, they go on a rampage, ravaging any fields, buildings, crops, shelter, and territory that might be giving solace to the enemy. They take care, however, to spare civilians and their homes.

Case #3: A group of revolutionaries break into an embassy, demanding the release of some political prisoners, and the government refuses to negotiate and sends in an elite team of commandos, who are repelled, but in the gun battle, some hostages are killed. The government says they were used as human shields, but the revolutionaries say differently.

The nature of terrorism is always changing. What is called terrorism one year may be called something else next year. Terrorism is an emotionally charged word that is frequently used to politically and socially denigrate one's opponents. In fact, about the only thing everyone except Carlos the Jackal types agree upon is that being called a "terrorist" is a shameful thing. It seems, if you sympathize or side with a perpetrator, then it is not terrorism, but if you sympathize or side with a victim, then it is terrorism. A lot of people think they know terrorism when they see it. Now, for the answers from that quiz - Case #1 is an example of inadvertent terrorism, at best, and if you think it's clearly terrorism, then all that's important to you is the harming of innocents, and motives don't matter. You're confusing assassination, accident, and manslaughter with terrorism. Case #2 is an example of reckless terrorism, at best, and you'll probably recognize it as Sherman's march to the sea. If you thought it was a clear-cut case of terrorism, then you're confusing war with terrorism. War is hell, but terrorism is less than hell. However, if you thought it was clearly not a case of terrorism, then you're too focused on body counts, and have neglected to consider that property damage is part of the codified law of terrorism. Case #3 probably comes closest to a clear-cut example of terrorism because the hostages were originally put in harm's way by the revolutionaries; that is, unless the embassy employees did something to cause the revolutionary reprisal against them. If the employees are totally innocent (say an embassy from Sweden), then it is the case that noncombatants were deliberately targeted. If the employees were involved in espionage or something that had to do with the political prisoners, then it's a different matter. You can probably now see that the traditional legal concepts of intent and causation are deeply inadequate for getting at the "truth" of the matter.

Don't worry if you're also confused on the whole good/bad thing. Philosophers have debated it for years without agreement on the moral consistency of intent and action. There are experts in criminal justice who say the act, not the motivation, should define terrorism (Jenkins 1985), and then there are experts who say the motivation, not the act, should define terrorism (Hoffman 1999). One of the implications of this motive/action dichotomy involves the "lawlessness" of terrorism. Take, for example, RAND Corporation Jenkins' (2005) definition of terrorism as "the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change" where freedom fighters could easily be included under that definition (as opposed to the FBI definition, which puts the word "unlawful" up front). Those who write encyclopedias of terrorism state that an adequate working definition ought to have three parts: method, target, and purpose (Kushner 2003). Others (Newman & Clarke 2005) say an adequate understanding ought to have four parts: targets, weapons, tools, and facilitating conditions. Few academic suggestions find their way into official definitions. Note also that different branches of government use different definitions, as follows:

Official Definitions of Terrorism

State Department definition, Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d): premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

FBI definition: the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Defense Department definition: the calculated use, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

United Nations definition: any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Article 2(b) of International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, May 5, 2004)

The State and Defense Departments conceive of terrorism as war -- "the premeditated" or “the calculated use of violence" (see Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, “DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,” April 1999). On the other hand, the Justice Department conceives of terrorism as crime -- “the unlawful use of force or violence" (see "Organization of the Department of Justice,” Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28—Judicial Administration, 2001). The State Dept. definition is the one used to officially count terrorism, and it is important to note that a "significant" terrorist event is one which meets the requirements of being "politically motivated" and "intended to influence an audience." This means that an "official" act of terrorism must be directed toward a symbolic target that is important to the political interests of a government somewhere. By contrast, the FBI definition (which is most often used in law enforcement training because it treats terrorism as crime) would classify random acts of violence and acts for personal gain as terrorism. The State Dept. definition comes closest to the FBI definition by the inclusion of an economic cost estimate, the threshold for economic harm being $10,000. Let's look at an example of how the State and FBI definitions differ:

*Differences between State and FBI Definitions*
State Dept. definition	A group that used a vehicle to smash an ATM machine and collect more than $10,000 from it would NOT be classified as a terrorist event, regardless of what the money was used for, unless they issued a communique indicating that they did it for the purpose of getting back at this economic symbol of the government.
FBI definition	A group that used a vehicle to smash an ATM machine and collect more than $10,000 from it would be classified as terrorism regardless of whether they pocketed the money for personal gain, as long as the FBI and law enforcement networks regarded this group as associated or linked with a pattern of known terrorist activity.

Simonsen and Spinlove (2000) do a good job of comparing and contrasting the different constructs, and note that the State approach emphasizes motives, the DOD approach emphasizes goals, and the FBI approach emphasizes methods. Combining the three would produce some overly complex definition like "Terrorism is the clandestine, criminal resort to violence or threat of violence on the part of a group toward innocent bystanders which seeks to accomplish some purpose against some recognized authority. The purpose is usually political and the target is usually civilian." Alex Schmid (1988) has attempted to analyze the frequency of different emphases in at least 109 definitions of terrorism, and finds that, in rank order, most definitions emphasize goals (political), purposes (fear), targets (victim reactions), and methods (combat strategy or tactic). Only a small number of definitions emphasize the publicity aspect, covert nature, or criminal character of terrorism. It is undoubtedly that case that political motivation ranks as the leading element in most definitions of terrorism. In fact, some years ago, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1976) recommended calling any crime that is politically motivated an act of terrorism. However, the problem with making something political into criminal goes beyond motivation (endless debates can be had over the presence or absence of instrumental or expressive motives in terrorism) as well as methods (Historical note: assassination was common in the 19th Century; bombing in the 20th; and techno-exotic forms such as cyber-, narco-, and eco- in the 21st). The idea of terrorism as crime rests upon having an adequate legal framework (which doesn't exist) as well as an understanding of the costs or impact of terrorism. Yet, that doesn't stop agencies from trying. The FBI, for example, guided by its definition, tends to be best positioned to go after extremism and fanaticism (the root causes of terrorism). However, it is handicapped or constrained by the need to protect civil liberties and rights. The Patriot Act helps law enforcement out a bit, but smacks of a centralized government solution when a far better remedy would be for states to pass their own anti-terrorism statutes. The Department of State, guided by its definition, is well-positioned to thwart terrorism diplomatically and symbolically, but is burdened with the need to designate certain groups and entities as terrorists or not (see State Department's website). The Department of Homeland Security basically favors a Defense Department definition, despite the fact that the military is severely limited by what they can do legally and domestically. For one thing, the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) prohibits the use of soldiers to enforce criminal laws against American citizens. Other Executive Orders and Presidential Directives (some secret; some not) similarly limit the use of military intelligence, such as Executive Order 12333 and PDD 39 (Presidential Decision Directive 39 - "US Policy on Counterterrorism"). The thing that most clearly distinguishes military from law enforcement action is that the military has mostly a free hand at preemption (preemptive first strike) while often the best that the criminal justice system can do is harass and thwart (given exclusionary rule and entrapment constraints). Differences in definitions of terrorism matter, and they matter to the agencies whose job it is to protect us.

Distinctions are easier to make than definitions. Jonathan White's (2002) approach is illustrative of this, placing terrorism along a continuum of conflict where related behaviors can be sorted out. This approach sees terrorism as between rioting and guerilla warfare, and the model is adapted/modified below:

Gus Martin (2003) also approaches the problem by making distinctions. He accepts the inevitability of political motivation as a common element of most definitions, and then distinguishes between the elements of method (force) and target, as follows:

Another approach might be to distinguish terrorists from others of their kind by how they perceive themselves. No group openly admits they are terrorists, and the most common self-preferred terminology includes guerrilla, fighter, or warrior. What follows is an alphabetical listing of the many terms terrorists use to call themselves (with the proviso that any errors or mistakes in definition are my own):

Other terms exist that one might encounter in studying terrorism. What is left out from the list would be terms such as: Liberationists; Pirates; Resisters; Propagandists; and Mercenaries. These may be terms that have some special meaning, but the process quickly gets redundant after awhile. Redundancy is evident in the phrase Freedom Fighter, because no side to any clash fights for anything but freedom. As an aside, it's often argued that parts of the American Revolution, like the Boston Tea Party, involved terrorist acts, and that this illustrates "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter." However, this argument misses the fact that the groundwork for the American Revolution was already underway in a variety of directions, and "legitimate" freedom fighting always contains advance warning, follows a warrior code, obeys the rules of war, prohibits certain kinds of weapons, does not use outlaw tactics, and takes steps to select targets that harm the least number of innocents.

Critiques of definitions are also easier than trying to tackle the definitional problem. An illustrative example here is William Dyson's (2001) approach to dissecting terrorism. He starts by criticizing dictionary definitions of "terror," and most certainly, some of the worst definitions of terrorism confuse it with fear, fright, alarm, being shocked, or scared. It is also easily distinguishable from acts of civil disobedience, marches, demonstrations, leafleting, picketing, protesting, and rioting. It is less distinguishable from guerilla warfare or revolutionary wars (which can be restricted or unrestricted, as Martin calls it). In fact, terrorism often escalates into war, a phenomenon that experts call the Sarajevo Effect (Lacquer 1999) in which the 1914 assassination led to World War I. Dyson (2001) adds that terrorism can evolve into insurrection (which is the same as civil war), and he speculates that a terrorist situation becomes revolutionary whenever 25% of the population is engaged in the violence. Fear is also not the same problem as terrorism. Fear is a "threat amplifier" not a force multiplier (explained below). Catastrophe causes fear, not terrorism, and fear is as much a result of imagination as an actual attack.

The most widely used definitions in criminal justice are simple ones created by Brian Jenkins (1985), Bruce Hoffman (1999), and Walter Laqueur (1999), all resting upon the idea of illegitimate force to achieve political ends by targeting innocent people. This is the simplest and most concise definition of terrorism possible. It is amazing how simple definitions suffice for understanding complex social factors, and how even a lack of inter-subjective agreement over them doesn't detract from their validity. It is important to note that the means used by terrorists are always illegitimate, even though their ends may be sometimes legitimate. Most of the terms similar to terrorism like freedom fighter and revolutionary often make use of the argument that the End Justifies the Means. Therefore, even a terrorist recognizes that there's something shady about the means they use since they have to "justify" it. The most unfortunate thing about the means they use is that they deliberately target innocents. To a terrorist, there's no such thing as innocent bystanders. Collateral damage is not a "risk" from terrorism; it is an absolute certainty.

One of the main objectives of terrorism is usually to gain publicity for some cause, and public fear, roused thru the media, often attracts the attention of scholars who think the study of fear may contain some key to understanding the psychology of terrorism. This may be true within some strands of criminology or victimology, but fear should NOT be the defining characteristic of terrorism. It's only a part of it, at best. The threat of harm to innocent bystanders is what makes terrorism powerful. Terrorists are only interested in the symbolic manifestations of fear; they much prefer action over psychology. There's no such thing as "psychological terrorism." To be sure, terrorism often has symbolic overtones, and is "media-motivated", but real people die and real property gets damaged. Those who think the media is what its all about are usually those who hope that they can somehow control terrorism thru the media, but they will find that terrorists may one day want to destroy the media about just as fast as they want to use it.

Terrorism should be distinguished from guerilla warfare since the latter is an acceptable form of combat. A terrorist should be distinguished from a guerilla (a term meaning "little war") because terrorists tend to have an urban focus and operate in small bands. An active terrorist organization is usually made up of "cadres" or "cells" of 3-5 members (the 9/11 attackers were organized into five-man cells) which themselves consist of "teams" of 1-2 members (who live and travel together). Some cells are larger, depending upon context. European terrorist cells are usually larger, with about 17-18 members on average. Guerillas are organized differently, and generally have quite large cadres and cells. Terrorism is generally a short-lived affair, while guerilla warfare is a long, drawn-out process. In addition (although this is debatable), terrorists tend to come from upper- rather than lower class backgrounds, as in the vigilante groups that make up right-wing, pro-government "death squads" in Latin America and Asia. Terrorists also tend (arguably) to be the products of over-permissive, wealthy families with whom they were in conflict, had inconsistent mothering, or were isolated from their parents in some way (Martin and Romano 1992). Some terrorists also tend to use religion as a context or cover for their activities, a characteristics they share with extremists. Fanatics believe they must purify the world, destroy others in the name of righteousness, or advance a religious cause of some sort. Even environmental terrorists have some kind of pseudo-religious belief system.

Terrorism should be distinguished from crime, at least in the sense that a war on terrorism is different from a war on crime or war on drugs. There are at least five good reasons for this, but the obvious one is that no law enforcement or criminal justice system needs to be nudged in the direction of becoming more like the military. There is also a long-standing tradition in the field of legal studies where one should distinguish the sociological manifestations of a phenomenon, in terms of its relation to societal structures and processes from "essentialist" shortcuts which comprise the definitional powers of authorities. On the crime-terrorism distinction, Geraghty (2002) is a good guide, as is Deflem (2005), Fuller (2006), and others. The primary differences between a war on terrorism versus a war on crime are as follows:

Deflem (2005) makes some good points about the current status of criminology on terrorism. He says that criminologists should not be embarrassed to learn from other research disciplines, but they must also seek to provide a distinctive contribution to the scholarship. Some issues, such as terrorism and the media and terrorism and foreign policy have already been well-explored by social scientists other than criminologists. But the relations between terrorism and counterterrorism in connection with criminal activity as well as with crime control remain at present underexplored and a field rich with potential for criminological research and theory. It is the specific province of criminology to study the patterns and dynamics of crime and social control from a social-scientific viewpoint in relation to their conditions and implications at a societal level. Terrorism is often connected with political, legal and military issues, often with deep-seated moral resonance. Counterterrorism is likewise a complex constellation much broader than police activities alone. However, issues of crime and social control are always and inevitably present in the reality and discourse on terrorism. The fact that the connection between terrorism and crime, on the one hand, and counterterrorism and social control, on the other, is not always neatly drawn nor evident does not mean that criminologists have no legitimate stake in their study. On the contrary, by bridging criminological scholarship with the existing literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism, a criminology of terrorism-related phenomena can be meaningfully connected to what is known from other social sciences and, at the same time, reveal the merits of its unique scientific focus and orientation.

Just as there is no one good definition of terrorism, typologies do not account for all forms of terrorism. Typology development in criminology and criminal justice scholarship seems to exist for the ease of teaching. Prof. Eskridge's Terrorism Page, from his course on terrorism out in Nebraska has some graphic examples of typologies, but it should be noted that typologies of terrorism are usually NEITHER motive-based NOR behavior-based, like they are in other areas of criminological study, such as the areas of profiling and street crime (the exception being Hacker's typology of terrorists by traits, included below). This is evident from the following examples commonly found in textbooks and/or in the strangely confused way the media reports what is going on in times of terrorist-related crisis or war (Hess & Kalb 2003). In the following typologies, notice in the headings how the types are classified in different ways.

Terrorism Classified by Place

1. Domestic -- by residents of a country within that country
2. International -- by representatives of a country against another country
3. Non-state -- extremism and revolution for its own sake
4. State-sponsored -- by a government against its own people or in support of international terrorism against another government
5. Internecine -- conflict that spills over into another country or fought on foreign soil

Terrorism Classified by Personality Trait

1. Crazies -- strong survival attitude, but not based in reality; self-centered; goals clear only to perpetrator; irrational and unpredictable; strikes at random
2. Crusaders -- sacrificial, death attitude; blends politics and religion; seldom willing to negotiate; task-oriented and indifferent to risk; seeks publicity and largest group possible
3. Criminals -- strong self-preservation attitude; selfish; seeks gain and is task-oriented; avoids high risk; predictably targets small groups (Hacker 1976)

Terrorism Classified by Purpose

1. Political -- for ideological and political purposes
2. Nonpolitical -- for private purposes or gain
3. Quasi-terrorism -- skyjacking and hostage taking
4. Limited political -- ideological but not revolutionary
5. Official or state -- used by nation against nation or people

Terrorism Classified by Target

1. Mass terror -- targets general population
2. Dynastic terror -- selective targeting of individuals or groups
3. Random terror -- targets anybody in wrong place at wrong time
4. Focused random terror -- targets specific public places frequented by opposition
5. Tactical terror -- attacks government or politically attractive targets (Combs 2003)

Terrorism Classified by Issue

1. Revolutionary -- aims to replace the existing government by drawing out repressive responses which can be exposed as inhumane (Red Army Faction, PLO, Hizballah)
2. Political -- heavily armed groups tending to be focused around supremacy, government intrusion, or religious revisionism (Aryan Nation, Posse Comitatus, Freemen)
3. Nationalist -- promotes the interests of a minority or religious group that has been persecuted under majority rule (Sikh radicals, Muslim fundamentalism)
4. Cause-Based -- groups devoted to a social or religious cause using violence to address their grievances (Islamic Holy War, Abortion clinic bombings)
5. Environmental -- groups dedicated to slowing down development they believe is harming animals (Animal Liberation Front, Earth 1st)
6. State-sponsored -- when a repressive regime forces its citizens into total obedience (Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti)
7. Nuclear -- outlaw states possessing nuclear threats (Libya, North Korea)
8. Genocide -- when a government seeks to wipe out a minority group in its territory (Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Iraq, Turkey)

What most typologies are attempting to get at are tactics unique to the modes of attack. There are five (5) tactics that terrorist use and four (4) modes of attack, or types of weapons used. The tactics can be either basic or advanced, depending upon how well-trained the terrorists are at guerilla warfare. The basic tactics are: (1) rolling, in which the terrorists drive a vehicle by in what amounts to a hit-and-run maneuver; (2) ambush, which is a standard platoon-level military maneuver drawing the enemy into a line of fire; (3) standoff, which is a back-against-the-wall maneuver, usually with an escape plan; and the advanced tactics are (4) boutique, which usually involve a combination of modes of attack, but are intended primarily to have a large impact; and (5) revenge, which also usually has a large impact, at least symbolically.

The modes of attack, or weapon systems, are (1) traditional -- when makeshift or ordinary weapons are used; (2) technological -- when weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, or biological, are used; (3) cyber -- when viruses, computer attacks, or destruction of information infrastructure occur; and (4) narco -- when flooding a market with drugs is used.

In addition, certain other factors are known as "force multipliers" which allow small groups to operate on a higher level. The four (4) force multipliers are: (1) technology; (2) transnational support; (3) media; and (4) religion. Transnational support may be in the form of a diaspora, or a refugee or migrant group dispersed abroad. Fund-raising among the diaspora is a major source of income, and likewise, terrorists often rely upon crime to raise money. The six most common terrorism-related crimes are: (1) bombing; (2) hijacking; (3) arson; (4) assault; (5) kidnapping; and (6) hostage taking. There may or may not be certain connections between the force multipliers and types of crimes chosen. There are well-established patterns of using terror to accomplish political and business ends, and along these lines, one can distinguish between "democratic" and "rogue" regimes. Domestic and international terrorism spawned by a democratic regime is always more episodic than the systematic and enduring terrorism spawned by rogue regimes.

The "Freedom Fighter" Debate

     Boaz Ganor, Executive Direct of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (www.ict.org.il), in "Defining Terrorism: Is one man's Terrorist another man's Freedom Fighter?" (published 25 Jun 01), proposes the following as a common definition and explanation:
     Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. There are three important elements:
     1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, violence. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence or a threat of violence will not be defined as terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
     2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal is to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity in question will not be defined as terrorism. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to terrorism. Some scholars tend to add ideological or religious aims to the list of political aims. The concept of “political aim” is sufficiently broad to include these goals as well. Specific motivations—whether ideological, religious, or something else—behind the political objective should be irrelevant for the purpose of defining terrorism. In this context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
     Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical regularities associated with terrorism. More often they simply confuse analysis.
     3. The targets of terrorism are civilians. Terrorism is thus distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla warfare, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against civilian targets. Terrorism is not the result of an accidental injury inflicted on a civilian or a group of civilians who happened to stumble into an area of violent political activity, but have instead had violence purposely directed against them. Hence, the term “terrorism” should not be ascribed to collateral damage, but only to the criminal aspects of the act which involved deliberate targeting.

Trend analysis is notoriously tricky. As the following table suggests, the United States has been pretty successful at keeping terrorist incidents down on U.S. soil since 9/11. In fact, it is customary to say that there have been no significant incidents of terrorism on U.S. soil since 2002. A lot of that reduction is due to FBI reluctance at defining something as terrorism (the FBI tallies contain other unusual stuff, like classifying some international incidents as domestic and vice-versa, and separating the counts of incidents carried out from incidents prevented). Redefining or reclassifying a lot of hate crime, murder with political implications, and random acts of eco- and cyber-sabotage is probably not the best way of keeping tallies or counts. However, the trends are clear if one goes back far enough. In the early 1980s, most incidents were by international groups. Then, around the mid-1980s, a shift occurred, and right-wing terrorism became more prevalent. By the early 1990s, single-interest (or special interest) groups became active. Hoaxes have escalated since 9/11. Funding for counterterrorism (as well as a "forward defense" strategy) since 9/11 may have contributed to the decrease in terrorist activity on U.S. soil. Left-wing terrorism may have been completely wiped out. Few people possess the ability to predict terrorism.

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Last updated: Dec 02, 2008
Not an official webpage of APSU, copyright restrictions apply, see Megalinks in Criminal Justice
O'Connor, T. (Date of Last Update at bottom of page). In Part of web cited (Windows name for file at top of browser), MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/rest of URL accessed on today's date.

*Jonathan White's Continuum of Conflict*
Folkway Violation	Civil Law Tort	Crime	Organized Crime	Riot	Terrorism	Guerrilla War	Low Level War	Total War	Mass Destruction

*Gus Martin's Typology of Conflict*
Indiscriminate force, combatant target (Total War)	Discriminate force, combatant target (Limited War)
Indiscriminate force, noncombatant target (Unrestricted Terrorism)	Discriminate force, noncombatant target (Restricted Terrorism)

Terrorist Incidents on U.S. Soil (FBI tallies)
Group Type:	1980-2001	2002-2007
International	164	0
Left-wing	130	0
Right-wing	88	(hate-related, racial)
Special interest	76	(eco-, cyber-)
Individual	15	(murders, hyper-)
Unknown	8	(hoaxes, pseudo-)