INTERNATIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT
"Man's heart is in his weapons. He measures his strength by his destructiveness" (George Bernard Shaw)

    It's not all that important to understand the crazy math and alphabet soup of arms control, deterrence, nuclear races, and nonproliferation treaties.  Much of it is Cold War legacy, and the good news is that things have settled down a bit.  We haven't managed to blow ourselves up (Campbell et al. 2004), and nonproliferation has worked out quite well since only 4 states (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) have acquired nuclear weapons beyond the original 5 members of the NPT (U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China).  This means that there are only a handful of nations with nuclear weapons (although Iran and Syria are alleged to be developing them).  However, today's world still faces the risk of nuclear proliferation, and there are all kinds of proliferation, and all kinds of weapons.  It is now conventional to talk about a new field of study, called "international arms restraint" as its own discipline, defined by Lehman (2005) as "any deliberate actions -- unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral -- impacting beyond the boundaries of a single nation that result in de facto or de jure quantitative, qualitative, or operational restraints on weapons, their means of delivery, the organizations or individuals that use them, and the infrastructures and activities that produce and support them."

    As expected, there are some words that are going to need dictionary defining, but far more important is the need for some overall perspective on why anyone would want to restrict the quest for military superiority.  Let's address the need for perspective first, and call it "The Fundamentals of Arms Control" as Collins (2002) does.  It is a misconception that arms control is "soft" or weak.  Arms control is a military strategy designed to advance assorted alternatives which discourage one-upmanship (i.e., arms races) without undermining required capabilities.  Arms control is the way powerful nations exert influence in the world (Schelling 1967).  Arms control is taking the diplomatic initiative to leverage concessions out of enemies.  Arms control is an additional policymaking means to eliminate or control conflict, ultimately aimed at producing norms of acceptable behavior for states (Jordan et al. 1999).  As such, it has the following discrete goals:

    Now, as to definitions, Evans & Newnham (1998) provide the following ones for three (3) key terms:

    1. Disarmament is the term for both a process and an end state, typically referencing a specific weapons system but almost always hoping for establishment of a disarmed world.  Historically, it is the oldest term, and at one time the most comprehensive term, as evidenced by the name "United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" (ACDA).
    2. Arms control covers any measure which enables actors to conduct themselves in a more restrained way, and doesn't necessarily imply any goal of a disarmed world.  Despite some serious distinctions with other terms, it is customary and convenient for many writers to just use the phrase arms control to describe the whole field, but it is also the case that the phrase is increasingly confined to the topic of formal treaties that limit military force or weapons in some way.
    3. Nonproliferation (often simply referred to as proliferation which connotes a concern over the spread of weapons generally) refers to attempts at slowing down the spread of all kinds of weapons and technologies which result from arms races and the arms trade in general.

    It is customary to distinguish between "horizontal" proliferation, which relates to the spread to previous non-weapons states (i.e., the nuclear "have-nots"), and "vertical" proliferation, which relates to improvements in quantity or quality of weapons for existing weapons states (i.e., the nuclear "haves").  The word "nonproliferation" is sometimes used to describe the goal of prevention, in both horizontal and vertical proliferation; the word "counterproliferation" is sometimes used to describe a response after prevention has failed; and the phrase "anti-proliferation" is sometimes used, in the context of WMD (weapons of mass destruction), to refer to any and all methods at combating proliferation in that context.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL

    Arms control has been practiced throughout history.  It goes back as far as 500 BC with the Manu Law of War in ancient India ("let him keep his speech, his arms, and his belly under control").  The Manu law also outlawed poison, but historians focused on specifics usually trace the history of arms control to the ancient Greeks and Romans who condemned poison as a violation of ius gentium- the law of nations.  Noteworthy as the longest-lasting arms control measure on the planet is the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 between the US and UK which limits the number of naval vessels permitted on the Great Lakes.  The topic of arms control, to be sure, was talked about at the Hague conferences prior to WWI, and made up an important part of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended WWI and prohibited Germany from possessing certain quantities of weapons.  The goal of disarmament was central to formation of the League of Nations, but with the onset of WWII, it was evident that the League had failed in that purpose.

    Some of the disarmament agenda remained after WWII, but both the UN and the great powers started pursuing other avenues which gave arms control a completely new look.  For example, nuclear deterrence became the basis of the Cold War, and game theory came to play a key role in arms control theory.  Arms control theory, in this sense of the term, is usually discussed in light of the historical epochs known as Detente I and Detente II which characterized US-Soviet relations as follows:

    The post-1991 era ushered in the hope of START II for dismantling nuclear weapons, but this was rendered moot by the development of cruise missile and miniaturization technology.  Under treaties in force, the US and Russia are currently allowed to only possess about 10,000 nuclear warheads apiece (Jordan et al. 1999).  A Helsinki Summit in 1997 set the stage for a START III treaty which would reduce the number of deliverable warheads to 2,000 or 2,500 on each side, but talks stalled for a variety of reasons.  Americans complained that the START requirements for verification involved "cumbersome" paperwork, and Russians complained that the START requirement for sharing information would be overwhelming given the extent of the Russian arsenal.

    The current configuration of global arms control involves the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  This treaty originally entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995.  The NPT covers the five original nuclear weapons states (the U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia), where each party has agreed not to transfer or assist other states in acquiring nuclear weapons technology.  The NPT also covers several non-nuclear states who have agreed to not seek the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  Three states (Israel, India, and Pakistan) have refused to accept the NPT.  North Korea was a party to NPT until it decided to withdraw from it in 2003.  Iran is still a party to NPT.  Nonnuclear NPT states can legally carry out uranium enrichment and employ nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.  North Korea and Iran are certainly worrisome, but of more urgent importance, according to Shoenbaum (2006), is getting Israel, India, and Pakistan on board with NPT.  North Korea's withdrawal was technically illegal since withdrawal from NPT requires at least three month's notice, and North Korea withdrew immediately as well as maintained a nuclear weapons program while a NPT partner.

    Also part of current arms control is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, started in 1992 and officially housed in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  The purpose of CTR is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.  However, its mission has been expanding over the years.  For example, during 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was established within the Department of Energy, expanding the kind of work CTR does to the rest of the world.  Other important arms control treaties are the Biological Weapons Convention (in force since 1975) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (in force since 1997).  For its part, the United States plans to have no more than 2,200 strategic warheads in deployed alert status by 2012.  Whether or not this goal is reached remains to be seen.  In the meantime, the weaponization of outer space is an emerging issue.

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

    The 21st century has relied upon on-site inspection and verification procedures mainly under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded back in 1957 and headquartered in Vienna.  IAEA is the nuclear watchdog of the United Nations.  It played a major role in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and tried at least twice to uncover and dismantle Iraq's clandestine nuclear program before and during the Gulf Wars.  In the aftermath of 9/11, US presidential policy has been to regard the IAEA as a key player in the coalition against terrorism because the agency has always warned about the dangers of nuclear-related terrorism.  IAEA is headed by a Director-general, assisted by six deputies, a 35-member board, and all members (138 states) meet annually to formulate policy.  The agency has no authority to act on its own, but relies on the willingness of nations to cooperate with it, or on a United Nations mandate.  In 2002, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, and Pakistan has also been critical, accusing the IAEA of restricting the transfer of nuclear know-how to developing countries.  Other critics include environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, which are opposed to IAEA on grounds that the agency helps proliferate nuclear weapons technology.  IAEA inspectors primarily look for signs of highly enriched uranium.

    THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY  

    IAEA is an important international organization which operates under a 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which was originally entered into force way back in 1970.  Under the NPT, IAEA is given the specific role of defining and inspecting safeguards.  The NPT is one of the great success stories of arms control (at least from the Western viewpoint), and is essentially a nonproliferation measure (but more than that -- see Wikipedia Entry on NPT), assuring that non-nuclear states (like North Korea and Iran, which are suspected of being in violation of the treaty) will devote their nuclear programs exclusively to peaceful purposes.  Key provisions to the NPT are as follows:

• Under Article I, the nuclear weapon states undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

• Under Article II, each non-nuclear-weapon state pledges not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive assistance in their manufacture

• Article III obliges each non-nuclear-weapon state to accept comprehensive international safeguards through agreements negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the intent of which is to deter and detect the diversion of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes

• Under Article IV, parties may engage in peaceful nuclear programs in a manner consistent with Articles I and II and are expected to assist the nuclear programs of other parties, with special attention to the needs of developing countries

• Article VI obligates all parties to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race at an early date, to nuclear disarmament, and to achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

• Article VII recognizes the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties ensuring the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories                

 OTHER AVENUES OF NONPROLIFERATION  

    According to Saunders (2001), there are five (5) general types of nonproliferation measures, listed and explained below.  The first thru the fourth are known as "traditional" nonproliferation measures, which means they were used with relative success during the Cold War.  The fifth measure represents the increasing practice of the US to "go it alone" in defending itself.  It is sometimes argued that excessive reliance upon the fifth measure tends to erode the effectiveness of the traditional measures.  Each measure deserves separate explanation.

    (1) Multilateral treaties -- This approach has had mixed results.  For example, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended in 1995, and even some states which stand outside the treaty have acceded to it and/or agreed to abide by IAEA inspections for nuclear weapons development.  On the other hand, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not been signed by key states (most notably, the U.S. has not signed CTBT), and progress has been minimal on a verifiable Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).  With chemical weapons, there is more cooperation, with states even disposing their stockpiles.  At present, there are no international treaties on WMD delivery systems (ballistic missiles -- perhaps the biggest threat), but it should be noted it is difficult to sort out WMD delivery systems from "dual use" aircraft and (cruise) missiles.  Most multinational treaties include provisions for monitoring and/or verification.  The most common form of monitoring is called NTM (National Technical Means of verification) and is normally accomplished via electronic means such as space-based photoreconnaissance or seismic sensors.  Although face-to-face methods (e.g., routine visits, on-site inspections) are also a form of monitoring, these steps are normally considered part of verification, which occurs when something more than monitoring is needed.  Treaties also usually contain penalties for when a nation gets caught cheating, and this is called compliance.  Recent years have seen a new form of multilateral action, called Cooperative Threat Reduction, exemplified by the Nunn-Lugar Program which attempts to provide funding and technical assistance to the many former Soviet satellite nations with old and/or insecure WMD facilities within their territories, as well as help out with the "brain drain" (scientists from third world countries leaving for better opportunities elsewhere).  

    (2) Export controls  -- This refers to licensing procedures and other economic restrictions on the so-called "merchant of death" industry where the government (see State Dept. Munitions List) prohibits certain munitions and dual-use technology for sale, and the suppliers themselves (see Nuclear Suppliers Group) have regime controls.  Both the US and the developed countries have been largely successful at controlling exports of technology with military applications.  Despite some disputes between allies, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was a remarkably effective method of economic warfare during the Cold War.  CoCom was abolished in 1994, and replaced by the Wassenaar Agreement (WA) in 1996, where a much larger group of countries are involved and concern is institutionalized for the economic welfare of affected states.  Exports are often restrained rather than banned, for example, in the WA.  So-called "pariah states" are also identified by consensus in the WA.  In fact, membership in the WA is open to anyone who engages in "responsible" export policies with a WA-maintained list of pariah states.  According to one of the WA's High Level Meeting statements, a pariah state is one which has "suspected ties to terrorism, attempts to develop WMD, and has possible designs on territorial expansion or other forms of behavior that raise questions about their commitment to regional and global stability."     

    (3) Joint superpower actions  -- It is often argued that US pressure alone led to the abandonment of nuclear weapons programs by states such as Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Taiwan, and even South Africa's destruction of its nuclear stockpile.  However, the UN Security Council must also be credited with having some influence.  The Security Council approach to joint superpower pressure is the only approach accepted by some great powers, such as Russia and China.  When the UN Security Council acts (through IAEA special commissions and inspection missions), there is a mixed record of success and almost always ambiguous findings (as in the cases of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea).  However, the superpowers can, and do, act cooperatively themselves.  The history of relations between the superpowers is the history of confidence-building measures (CBM), which were widely seen as more doable than arms control treaties and the more restrictive confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM).  The so-called "nuclear hotlines" that exist as dedicated phone lines between nations are an example of a CBM, as are testing moratoriums and The Open Skies Treaty which permits overflights of national territory on a reciprocal basis to ensure compliance with existing or future arms control agreements.

    (4) Security assurances -- Security assurances are "no use" or "no first use" pledges by treaty parties to come to the aid of other parties in case of attack by a weapon specified in the treaty.  Nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties are the most popular kind where a party to the agreement (usually a nuclear power) agrees (in a protocol) to never to use a nuclear weapon in that zone.  Such "negative" security assurances are popular because they are demanded by many nations around the world; whereas the US prefers "positive" security assurances which promise to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for similar attacks (such agreements existing with NATO, Japan, and North Korea).  Advocates of the US approach argue that a position of strength is a potent nonproliferation tool, but the general consensus of scholars on the subject is that such security assurances have little effect on "hardened" rogue states, and in fact, may make them even more hardened.  Over the years, the world has collected a mix of both positive and negative security assurances, and although they are not all that well-coordinated, their existence is an integral part of arms restraint dialogue, despite being heavily debated (see NTI Issue Brief on Role of Security Assurances or Joseph Pilat's 2005 pdf article on Reassessing Security Assurances)     

    (5) Unilateral nonproliferation and counterproliferation -- When a country "goes it alone" or unilaterally, action can be overt or covert.  Overt action tends to take the form of offering a target country some "incentive" (or what they want) in return for NOT pursuing WMD.  Examples include small arms or some type of technology they want.  In addition, covert action might involve military strikes or at least interdiction of WMD components while in transit or shipment.  The word counterproliferation usually refers to passive defense measures such as the vaccination of troops, missile defense systems, and/or civil defense or homeland security actions.  Unilateral nonproliferation, it is sometimes feared, can backfire, prompting a target country to "use it or lose it," but this is a matter of debate among deterrence experts (Payne 1996).  There is also concern over the possibility for "WMD blackmail" where a country pursues WMD just to get something it wants from the US; and where a missile defense system (like a Star Wars-type shield) seems the only logical countermeasure.  "Going it alone" can also mean unilateral arms reduction where a state simply decides to cancel, eliminate, or not deploy some weapons system.  These types of measures work best when conducted in parallel with unilateral reductions on the part of another nation, but in practice, they are often done on the basis of domestic policy decisions, politics, budget constraints, and/or reports of inadequacies in a weapons system.  Sometimes, unilateral actions are taken as an adjunct to peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, examples being to remove weapons from the hands of terrorists or insurgents (disarmament, or turning over weapons, was a key issue with the conflict in Northern Ireland), or land-mine removal in a post-conflict or reconstruction (regime change or nation rebuilding) situation, which is the most common humanitarian form of arms restraint.  For those so interested, Chapter Six of the NATO Handbook deals with the role of arms control in peacekeeping situations and makes for interesting reading.

LANDMINES AND THE MORATORIUM APPROACH

    Landmines have been around since ancient times as a weapon of warfare, and when not used properly in their normal military application are uusually a tool of terrorism.  Mine construction can range from improvised to sophisticated [see Wikipedia List of Landmines].  Mine laying can range from casual to engineered.  Mine detection (and removal) can range from dangerous to more dangerous.  Efforts to ban landmines have met with mixed success.  The Ottawa Treaty (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction), signed in 1999, completely bans the most dangerous landmines -- anti-personnel landmines -- because these are the ones most likely to kill innocent people in a post-conflict situation.  As of 2007, the Ottawa Treaty has been signed by 158 countries, but 37 other nations (including China, India, Russia, the United States, Cuba, Iran, Burma, Pakistan, to name a few) are not party to the Convention.  The United States refuses to sign the treaty because it does not offer a "Korean exception" allowing the U.S. to maintain its DMZ between North and South.  India likewise has similar feelings about a "Kashmir exception."  Besides the Ottawa Treaty, there is the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed in 1983 and amended in 1996, which attempts to control the proliferation of landmine usage.  Advocates for the reduction of landmine use often highlight either the Ottawa Treaty or Protocol II of the UN Convention, or both, but there are big loopholes; e.g., both instruments only apply to conflicts between nations, not intra-state conflicts or insurgency situations; and the Ottawa Treaty (the one closest to an outright ban) allows the use of landmines for use in training or development of countermeasures. 

FACTS ABOUT LANDMINES      Landmines kill 800 people every month, and maim or kill about 26,000 people every year, meaning one casualty every 22 minutes.  In the early to mid-20th century, nearly 80% of landmine victims were military, but today, 90% of landmine victims are civilians, 40% being children under the age of 15.  In certain landmine-saturated countries, like Angola and Cambodia, the death toll and amputee rates are high.  Even in the developed world, like the Netherlands, about 12 people a year get killed by old WWII landmines. Most landmines last forever. There are an estimated 110 million landmines strewn indiscriminately throughout the developing world.  In Cambodia alone, it would take 250 years to remove them all.  A landmine that costs as little as $3 to purchase often costs as much as $1,000 in equipment and labor to remove. The presence of landmines not only threatens lives, but prevents ecomonic growth and development, and severely affects the ability of refugees or internally displaced people to return to their homes. Long after wars are over, landmines make land unusable for farming and set in motion an environmental degradation of habitat. The landmine crisis is a global problem and both a human rights and health issue.  [Main source of facts: Leahy (1993); the following websites: Landmine Monitor Report; No More Landmines; Adopt-a-Minefield; and selected references below.]

    Far more successful than the ban approach is the moratorium approach (which Russia and the United States, among others, have agreed to).  Technically, a moratorium refers to a period of time during which a certain activity is not allowed or required, but in practice, many moratoriums become permanent.  In most cases, the call for a moratorium is a grassroots initiative (see ICBL website).  In other cases, a moratorium is sponsored legislation in a Congress or Parliament.  In still other cases, manufacturers or conflict groups simply cease making or using such weapons.  Progress, although slow, is seemingly being made against the landmine crisis.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Arms Control Association
Arms Control Wonk
Beyond Intractability
Beyond Militarism: Arms Races and Arms Control
British American Security Information Council
Brookings Institution Nuclear Weapons Cost Study
Carnegie Foundation Proliferation Resources
Center for Defense Information
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey
Chemical & Biological Arms Control Institute
Confidence Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region
Control Arms.org
Council for a Livable World to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
FAS Arms Sale Monitoring Project
Georgetown Univ. Links for Arms Control & Disarmament
Human Rights Watch Arms Project
Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Campaign to Ban Landmines & US Campaign to Ban Landmines
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Kirsch Foundation Nuclear Disarmament Webpage
Landmine Monitor
MILNET's List of Nuclear Weapon Accidents
Monterey Institute Nonproliferation Databases
Nonproliferation Challenges Old and New (pdf)
Nuclear Files.org
Peace Action: Practical, Positive Alternatives For Peace
Ploughshares Fund & Project Ploughshares (CA)
Saferworld
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Stemming the Control of Small Arms (pdf)
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Wikipedia Entry on Arms Control
Wikipedia Entry on Disarmament
Wikipedia Entry on Proliferation
Wikipedia List of Countries with Nuclear Weapons
Worldwide Production and Export of Cluster Munitions

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