Peace and Humanitarian Intervention

PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
"The God of peace is never glorified by human violence" (Thomas Merton)

Peace means the absence of war, violence, and evil; and the presence of justice, quietude, balance, and harmony. This comprehensive definition is a synthesis of various definitions and conceptions across time and place. The definition with the longest historical legacy is the absence of war, expressed by the ancient Roman conception of peace as Pax. However, the Romans were only concerned with defining peace as the absence of armed struggle against external enemies. Certainly, there are contexts where internal conflict points out the limitations of this overly simple definition. Regardless, the absence of war needs to be part of any definition of peace if only because peace is so commonly thought of this way. The second term, violence, involves the victimological idea of peace where all forms of victimhood are abolished, such as the seven ways to harm, exploit, or oppress another human being (i.e., physically, sexually, verbally, psychologically, spiritually, economically, and socially). This is certainly a laudable goal, and further, is recognized as doable by at least some subfields of justice studies. Likewise, the third term, evil, admittedly has religious connotations, and it might never be possible to abolish sin, suffering, or death, but it is at least possible to talk about reducing the personification of evil in the form of psychopathic or sadistic personalities who contribute so much havoc, malice, and destructiveness in the world. This concludes the things that peace is defined as being against, or the negative parts of the definition. It should be clear that the absence of conflict is not peace.

The positive parts of the definition include justice, which might be said to include the concepts of equality, liberty, freedom, and fairness. A constitutional (and Aristotelian) approach to justice might add the concepts of due process (law for all), and equal protection (law for some). Certainly, these are ideals that most democratic societies strive for in their search for peace. Secondly, quietude (or tranquility) is part of a common conception of peace (as in the phrase "peace and quiet"); admittedly a subjective experience, but also something that people experience as a sense of peacetime when nothing disturbing seems to happen. Thirdly, balance is the intrapsychic experience of inner peace, whereby a person feels a psychological sense of wholeness or coordination of their body, mind, and soul. Admittedly, that's also a subjective experience, and describes a common perception (as in "peace of mind"). Harmony may be the most subjective part of the definition, describing a feeling of being "at one" with the rest of humanity, the natural world, and/or the cosmos. One might argue that even though this last conception sounds somewhat metaphysical, it should be part of the definition of peace nonetheless.

It's important to have a comprehensive definition of peace. Without one, you're left with nothing but cultural bias regarding perceptions of relative degrees of stability, or worse yet, what somebody with a hidden agenda tells you peace is about. Most academic studies of the subject tend to focus on violence because such a focus assumes there is some way a democracy legitimized by a system of laws can achieve peace by restricting violence or aggression in some psycho-socio-legal sense. In this lecture, we'll examine a selection of those academic approaches with an eye towards the legal and moral justifications for humanitarian intervention. Here, we approach the topic from what might be called a "scholastic" view, an approach which takes the concept of peace broadly, and considers religious and academic studies as similarly focused on pacificism and anti-war sentiments (as is often the case with much of Christian leftism in the United States but not necessarily with Western European socialist strands nor with American Christian anarchism, which sometimes justifies self-defense).

There's no way to properly list all the various religious denominations and their positions on peace since a lot of theology would be involved. To simplify matters, let's begin by taking a look at the field of "peace studies" which has not been without criticism for producing very little that is descriptively or prescriptively useful (only a few empirically testable theories and models exist, e.g., Hamson 1996). The field has also been criticized for its subjectivist and ideological "leftist" (in this sense, usually anti-American and anti-Israeli) position taken by some of its proponents (Cox & Scruton 1984, and see "Peace Studies' War Against America" for the mainline conservative viewpoint or Prof. Steinberg's Thin Line pdf article for an apologist approach). The fine points of these ideological controversies need not concern us much, but are somewhat important in other contexts of interest such as: discussions of academic freedom [see AAUP Position on National Security or Lecture on Future of Homeland Security]; assessments of peace movement activism [see Nationmaster: Peace Movements or Answers.com Peace Movements]; the antiwar movement from a defense intelligence perspective; or one of the hottest topics in international relations these days -- the role of NGOs and advocacy networks in international politics [see Doctors Without Borders or read Keck & Sikkink 1998). What is of more concern to us is ultimately getting to the mission objective of peace, which in many respects is a discussion about humanitarian intervention, or what might be called the relationship between human security and national security -- the virtuous goal of risking of life and limb to protect the helpless innocent AND protecting yourself at the same time. It is a collective security idea, to be sure, and you can call it peace operations, peacekeeping, or what have you; the name doesn't really matter. The twin goals of achieving both human and national security are called "idealpolitik" (Kober 1990; 2000). The underlying logic is that a country which does not respect the rights of its citizens is unlikely to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. Hence, some places might become a destabilizing threat in the region. One of the important lessons of 9/11 is that failed states and destabilized regions often become havens for terrorists with global reach.

The field of peace studies is "an applied science directed toward preventing, diminishing, or curing violence. Ultimately, it seeks to establish peace just as medicine seeks to establish health and well-being" (Barash 1991). Peace studies has been described by Thompson (1990) as an field of study which got started at a few small religious liberal-arts colleges in the 1940s as a reformist movement (for contemporary offerings, see Peres Center List of Peace Studies Programs or the Plowshares Project). Large and strong peace studies programs exist overseas, such as Bradford in the UK. The first Peace Studies program in America was established in 1948 at Indiana's Manchester College, a pacifist Brethren institution. Peace movements go back before then, of course, with some saying hundreds of years ago and others saying in the aftermath of WWI. A variety of topics are studied in peace studies, as well as ways of working towards peace and/or harmony in one's heart and in local communities through service learning (Diamond & McDonald 1996). Schools affiliated or associated with Quakerism (Religious Society of Friends), the Mennonite Church (Peace & Justice Network) and the Church of the Brethren (also Pax Christi in the Catholic Church or the interfaith Fellowship of Reconciliation) are likely to have a "peace studies" program, if only because these religions tend to adhere to that notable contribution of early Christianity called "religious pacifism." Big schools also have peace studies programs (Notre Dame readily comes to mind), many of which are well-funded by the philanthropist Joan Kroc, third wife of McDonald's CEO Ray Kroc, but the programs in small religious schools are far more interesting in their diversity and low-budget struggles (Quaker, Wesleyan, and Catholic schools in particular). Before we begin looking at such schools, it may be important to take a brief look at pacifism -- an all too brief look, I'm afraid, simply by saying most Christian pacifism is derived from Christ's Sermon on the Mount, as follows (for more on the spectrum of views, see Wikipedia Entry on Pacifism):

Christ's Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:38-46)

You have heard that they were told "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." But I tell you not to resist injury, but if anyone strikes you on your right cheek, turn the other to him too; and if anyone wants to sue you for your shirt, let him have your coat too. And if anyone forces you to go one mile, go two miles with him.... You have heard that they were told "You must love your neighbor and hate your enemy." But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for your persecutors, so that you may show yourselves true sons of your Father in heaven, for he makes the sun rise on the bad and good alike, and makes the rain fall on the upright and the wrongdoers.

Quakerism (Abbott & Wilhelm 1997) is the most well-known version of religious pacifism, and many Quaker schools have a peace studies program, like Earlham and Guilford (I apologize if I left anyone out). All Quakers reject just war theory in all its forms. There are a couple of different branches of Quakerism (evangelical and liberal), but most Quakers (Friends) believe that the spirit of Christ is present in all of us, and that the leadings of this divine light can be discerned by all who are open, humble, and seeking. Quakers started out in England as "seekers" or pilgrims who were never too sure they had found the "truth" (at least in ways associated with language and ritual). Over the years, they have kept this spirit of open inquiry, and are tolerant of many other "seekers" of different stripes, although there does tend to be a distinctive vocabulary with words such as clearness, discernment, and being a sojourner. Quakers prefer to dress simply without adornment. Quakers tend to worship using a silent/waiting/expectant mode, also called unprogrammed in contrast to the more conventional programmed mode. Friends tend to avoid fixed doctrines, and encourage up-to-the-moment continuing revelations. Orthodoxy consists of what are called "testimonies" which describe the common paths people usually find in their understanding of God's will. Most testimonies center around the virtues of Simplicity, Peace, Integrity, Community, and Equality. Peace is a central component of submission to God's will (an apocalyptic vision of peace, if you will). It is seen as presumptuous for anyone to try and make an unjust person just. Quakers believe that any use of force to try and change somebody is wrong because it intrudes upon the sovereignty that is God's, and no one should supplant God's judgment with their own. Justice is a matter best left in God's hands. In the face of a determined evil, the best course of action is nonviolent resistance. This, however, makes Quakers appear like martyrs, and the fact of the matter is that most Quakers would support diligently working for justice (e.g., in peacemaker teams on overseas missions at trouble spots around the world) as long as weapons and war-like behavior were not involved. Quakers also usually feel an obligation to denounce the evils in the world, and engage in lobbying and/or consciousness-raising to protest what is unjust, but in a way (thru civil disobedience) that recognizes the legitimacy of civil government and authority.

Wesleyan schools, like Quaker schools, have an interesting relationship with peace studies. Wesleyanism is a form of Methodist (non-charismatic, non-fundamentalist) revival which seeks to meet the religious needs of ordinary working people. There is no litmus test for becoming a member of the Wesleyan faith, and its open-endedness makes it more like a social movement than a religious denomination. Industriousness, diligence, thrift and obedience are key virtues, and in terms of morality, goodness is sought as opportunities arise. A dialogue with contemporary controversies is frequently regarded as more important than social activism, which is to say Wesleyanism is a low-grade, soft-spoken form of activism, almost perfectly compatible with the rational discourse one might find at a liberal arts college or university. That is one reason why so many states have Wesleyan liberal arts colleges. For example, a minor in Peace and Justice Studies is available at Nebraska Wesleyan; North Carolina Wesleyan has a major in Justice Studies; Ohio Wesleyan has a International Studies program with numerous peace courses; and Virginia Wesleyan has courses with titles such as War, Peace and Society. Other (non-Wesleyan) schools of note (I apologize if I left anyone out) include Siena College where peace studies is a minor attached to criminal justice, and Meredith College where courses in peace and justice studies can be found. Not only are justice and peace studies seemingly prevalent in small schools, but as the field gained momentum in the late 20th century, it spread to larger academic places (see American Univ. Center for Global Peace; Columbia Univ. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies), and gained an international following (see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). A number of prominent academicians work in the field, too many to name, and it could be said that peace studies, as a policy-oriented field, is just now starting to develop a wealth of insights that have been garnered scholarly status as well as some practicability in both national and international domains. Arguably the world's largest academic institution for the study of peace is the University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies (UK).

Catholic doctrine (Fahey & Armstrong 1992; Evan 2006) as well as Catholic schools with peace studies programs, like Catholic University, Georgetown, Holy Cross, King's College-Ontario, Notre Dame, St. Bonaventure, and St. Michael's (I apologize if I left anyone out) will admit that, ever since St. Augustine and other Scholastics, a defensive war can be morally justified, but the right to self-defense is not absolute (if forbearance or restraint serve the purpose of peace). Christ's Sermon on the Mount is seen as addressed to individual persons, not to societies or nations. All individual life as a Catholic is sacramental in character, striving for perfection such as "turning the other cheek" and compassion, defined as suffering with injustice. Where the Catholic pacifism movement has taken hold, such as within the Catholic Peace Fellowship, it is usually based on the example of the nonviolent Christ and somewhat focused on the issue of conscientious objection. Catholics, as a whole, however, usually adhere to a position on the separation of church and state which allows nations, as an autonomous whole, to use force in a proportionate and statesmanlike way to achieve the ultimate goal of peace, peace being defined in Catholic terms as "the tranquility of order, the right disposition of things according to their proper end" and according to other Papal documents ranging from the Rerum Novarum through the Centesimus Annus (Walsh & Davies 1991). A full account of these Papal documents is beyond the scope here, but suffice it to say that force by itself is never seen as capable of achieving peace. Peace on earth requires the union of justice and charity ("If you want peace, work for justice" - Pope Paul VI). Justice is actively working to help create a society that affirms, respects and nurtures human dignity and the environment, the environment seen as having a "carrying capacity" for only so much violence and harm. Charity is best exemplified by humanitarian relief (helping the poor), and in another respect, charity is much like mercy, a central component of the Catholic Church's position on criminal justice, which is to give offenders every single opportunity to redeem themselves and restore civility at the level of community (note: much of Catholic thinking is incorporated in peacemaking criminology as the call for reform of a harsh and punitive criminal justice system). Humanitarian intervention is rather strongly justified by other aspects of Catholic orthodoxy which obligate the rich to not be blind to the suffering of innocents in other lands. On a societal level, then, this requires passing judgment against those who are normally outside one's jurisdiction, to act as an "avenger" so to speak. This is the significant difference between Catholic and Protestant traditions, such as Lutheran doctrine (see Reinhold Niebuhr; e.g.) whereas in Protestantism, choosing armed intervention presents the believer with a serious moral dilemma; i.e., choosing the lesser of two evils. In the Catholic tradition, there is no lesser of two evils. A proportionate and restrained act of self-defense as well as an act of vindictive avenging, although imposed by circumstances which are regrettable, are both morally good. However, the injustice that is being avenged must not be imaginary, inadvertent, or due to ignorance. Likewise, avengers must not justify intervention on the moral high ground or out of hatred. There must be proof of moral culpability or evil intent, and the target of intervention must also be given an ultimatum or last chance to redeem themselves. Avengers who win at war must not use victory as a means of aggrandizement. They should also not seek unconditional surrender, but instead should concern themselves with helping heal the wounds of the defeated. One should be able to easily see from the above set of restrictions how much Catholic thinking has informed just war theory.

The modern justice and reconciliation approach is one of the "four pillars" of postconflict reconstruction and rebuilding, the latter phrase being a World Bank term becoming popular since 1995 as having less historical baggage than "nation building." The goal is, shall we say, "getting one's house in order" to sustain a lasting peace, and to do so without imposing too many non-indigenous processes and without relying upon "quick and dirty" Cold War-like actions such as arranging elections for a new leader. For clarification, here are the four pillars of postconflict reconstruction as outlined by Hamre & Sullivan (2003:176):

Justice and reconciliation can be used with any kind of intervention or international presence in a foreign country, although it's somewhat questionable if you can do it with military intervention alone. As Condoleezza Rice once said: "There's nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it's done by the American military." It's also somewhat unlikely that justice and reconciliation would be needed in a standard humanitarian relief operation following a natural disaster. It's further unlikely (although not impossible) that it would be successful if the world just let the civil war, crisis, conflict, or what-have-you run its course. At some point, an "intervention" is needed, and the sequencing and phasing of an intervention is important, if only for strategic reasons. Some interventions will have a clear American national interest at stake; others may involve the US in less than a lead role; and still others may simply be "other people's messes." We'll come back to these strategic issues later. The actual practice of justice and reconciliation, according to Flournoy & Pan (2003), involves four key components:

All too often, not all four key components are carried out. There is, perhaps most importantly, a shortage of qualified personnel with the range of linguist and CIVPOL skills needed, as well as inadequate mechanisms for summoning and deploying such personnel. Presidential Directive 71 spells out US policy in this regard, but it has not lived up to its lofty goal of creating a permanent US postconflict stability force. Likewise, State Department partnerships with IGOs and NGOs could be vastly improved (Aall et al. 2000), and the FBI's role with the Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) could be enhanced to train more indigenous personnel as well as expedite screening for subcontractors. There is also a need to coordinate economic aid via a system of "peace conditionalities" (Boyce 2002) which rewards states financially for keeping their peace agreements, but like with other sanctions, real punishments need to be placed on individuals who violate anticorruption norms as well as mechanisms to ensure that sanctions don't cause collateral damage.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
"You can't expect the United States to be a virgin in the Atlantic and a whore in the Pacific" (Dean Rusk)

Humanitarian intervention can be defined as the coercive intrusion into the internal affairs of another nation to do something about large-scale human rights violations (Evans & Newnham 1998), or better defined as "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice" (Fonteyne 1974). It's often the only form of military-assisted action condoned by peace activists and/or just war theorists. Care must be taken, however, to distinguish between genuine humanitarian intervention and aggressive intervention masquerading as humanitarianism. In this respect, Ocran's (2000) article on the distinction is instructive, which ties the issue into international law, but others (e.g., Boggs 2004) are more blunt about distinguishing humanitarianism from world domination. Although no article of the UN Charter specifically mentions humanitarian intervention, there are three (3) UN conceptions of the term: (1) an enforcement action taken under chapter 7 of the Charter; (2) peacemaking, or the active involvement of outsiders to being about a peaceful settlement; and (3) post-conflict peace-building, which often occurs before the end of conflict to seek a lasting peace. Only the first conception probably deserves to be called humanitarian intervention because the "enforcement" aspect means "coercive" force is used by third-parties in a hostile environment. As Nardin (2005) comments, a true humanitarian intervention requires the assumption of a hostile environment -- i.e., that it can safely be assumed that other nations are not disposed to intervene on behalf of the victims. This is the true humanitarian impulse, drawn from the fact that no one else seems to care. Mandelbaum (1996), however, warns against foreign policy being "social work" where no American interests are at stake (i.e., no American lives are at stake), and where a President is only seeking electoral advantage. In practice, what passes for humanitarian intervention takes one of three forms: material assistance through relief, aid, or sanctions; coercive, but nonmilitary pressure to end abusive practices; and dispatch of military forces to remedy massive human atrocities. Authorizations for Chapter 7 interventions are summarized below:

Authorizations for Military Interventions in the 1990s (source: Weiss 2004)
	Chapter 7 UN Mission	Chapter 7 UN Delegation	No Initial Security Council Authorization
Northern Iraq 1991-1996		Coalition	Coalition
Bosnia 1992-1995	UNPROFOR	IFOR & SFOR
Somalia 1992-1995	UNOSOM II	UNITAFUNAMIR II
Rwanda 1994-1996	UNAMIR II	Operation Turquoise
Haiti 1994-1996		MNF
Kosovo 1999-2000		KFOR	NATO
East Timor 1999-2000	UNTAET	INTERFET

An important assumption and/or basis of much thinking over humanitarian intervention is whether there are specific crimes (against humanity) being committed. One doesn't intervene in the affairs of another country simply because the leader can be called a "tyrant" or doesn't meet your liking of their leadership (that might be called reform or revolutionary intervention). It is further questionable whether preemption is justified unless "credible" evidence exists that the commission of a crime against humanity is imminent. Humanitarian intervention is only humanitarian in the sense that it is a response to past crimes as well as an effort to forestall future crimes, and the two (past and future) must be linked somehow. This "link" is the basis of most debates, as there will always be questions about how awful a state's crimes should be (or will get) before that state loses its presumed immunity from armed intervention. The standard is set high for a reason because armed intervention (like war) often brings injury and injustice in its wake. Therefore, prudence is the better part of policy, as no one-size-fits-all, utopian scheme exists for creating international order without salvaging some better parts of the Westphalian sovereignty system which have given us norms of restraint [Note: this position, or something like it, is the foundation for the so-called "English School" of international relations; see Bull 1977 or Jones 1981]. Different states will understand their commitment to human rights differently, but there is a point at which any atrocities committed will "shock the moral conscience of mankind." Humanitarian intervention can be carried out unilaterally (individual intervention) or by a group of states (collective intervention). Collective intervention is almost always preferred over individual intervention, and in fact, international law would place a requirement on individual intervention to obtain, if possible, the clear and unambiguous consent or invitation of the de jure government of the state where the intervention is to take place. Such invitation is not realistically likely to happen ("Invade my country, please"), so unilateral humanitarian intervention would have to be justified by other means; delicate means, to be sure, but involving the links between national security and collective security and at least some kind of prerequisite UN authorization, as Moore (1969) points out. It is important to avoid abuse, since if unilateral humanitarian intervention were allowed on a widespread basis, it would simply give powerful states an excuse to intervene in the affairs of weaker states for selfish political purposes.

Ironically, humanitarian intervention like the kind we've been discussing is above the law, as a high act of policy on the basis of principle and praiseworthy moral norms, almost as if a "compassion exemption" existed to the norm of nonintervention. There are those who argue precisely for such an exemption on the basis that sovereignty is dead and transsovereign problems demand new rules (see Love 2002; Cushman 2005; Thakur & Malcontent 2005). In another sense, restricting intervention into the domestic affairs of another nation seems like the perfect thing to do. The latter has been the UN position ever since 1945, with the following two documents directly restricting or limiting the practice -- (1) the 1965 General Assembly Resolution entitled Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty; and (2) the 1970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Even more important is the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) where the court categorically stated that the principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference. The norm of nonintervention is part and parcel of customary international law. Under current UN Charter arrangements, there are only two situations which might allow a humanitarian intervention exemption: (1) enforcement action ordered by the Security Council under Article 42; and (2) individual or collective self-defense in conformity with Article 51 which specifies a response to armed attack or the rescue of nationals trapped on foreign soil. It would seem from numerous UN General Assembly resolutions, declarations, and assertions that there is no clear right to humanitarian intervention under international law, but the UN has been practicing humanitarian intervention for many years. What is one to make of this paradox?

The answer may be found in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prevents intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state except for the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7 (Articles 39-51). This interesting link between Article 2(7) and those Articles in Chapter 7 is often pointed to as meaning that a wide range of interventions are tolerated, especially in the case of flagrant violations of human rights or prohibitions of the Charter, as well as "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." In other words, the UN will not allow some state to violate the human rights of its citizens under cover of the principle of nonintervention. Abuse of the nonintervention privilege can therefore lead to intervention. Articles 55 and 56, which talk about the universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, may very well constitute peremptory norms that trump the norm of nonintervention. This is all the more clear when humanitarian relief operations are considered. Even Nicaragua v. United States recognized that "there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law."

Likewise, Walzer (2000) points out that not all interventions are forms of aggression if the target nation is not a nation at all. In his words (Walzer 2000: 101), "when the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination seem cynical and irrelevant, and when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply." Walzer (2000) also says that humanitarian intervention is less than war, and more like civil war or an insurgency problem where there is no clear aggressor to repulse and punish. Any intervention to prevent massacre, mass starvation, enslavement, etc., would probably be justified under any plausible revision of the noninterventionist doctrine. It is important to note that the motivation to intervene comes from acts of state and not of individuals. Again, it is not the savagery of the leader(s) but the savagery of the government which matters. As Ocran (2002) points out, there is a "disinterestedness standard" which requires there be no unnecessary “affectation” of the authority structure of the target state. In all aspects, the intervention should reflect humanitarian goals, and be no longer or more forceful than necessary. Regime change, or the overthrow of a government in power, is not supported by any standard of international law, and further outlawed is the frequent (postcolonialist) practice of partitioning a state, or breaking it up along ethnic or ideological lines. However, there has been a recent resurgence of popularity in partition as a solution, especially in wake of the Dayton Agreement of 1995 which ended the War in Bosnia by getting parties (meeting in a hanger next to a stealth bomber at Wright-Patterson air base) to agree on a partition of the former Yugoslavia. It was the first time three-dimensional satellite image technology and digital cartography were used to determine and delineate borders. For more on partition theory in international relations, see Kumar (1997).

An understanding of crimes against humanity makes for a good prerequisite to this reading, at least with respect to the peacekeeping problems of refugee operations and the handling of displaced persons. It is a tragic reality that there are more outbreaks of conflict in the world than there is a capacity to police such conflicts. Many conflicts have been tolerated or simply ignored, while only a select few have resulted in intervention. To name a few recent examples, mass murder has been committed in Burundi, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda; ethnic cleansing in Bhutan, Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, Cambodia, Zaire, and Afghanistan; brutal insurgencies in Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka; bloody wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and India and Pakistan; and violent separatist campaigns in Georgia (Abkhazies and Ossetians), Indonesia (East Timorese), Iraq (Kurds), Mexico (Chiapans), Ireland (Catholics), Russia (Chechens), Spain (Basques), and Turkey (Kurds). Death tolls run into the millions every year, and this isn't even counting the endless civil wars going on in some countries, the immense refugee or displaced persons problem in other parts of the world (e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Middle East Palestinian problem); and places where the reasons for constant strife isn't clearly known (e.g., Algeria, Burma, Guatemala, India, Moldova, Tibet, and elsewhere). In addition, Palmer (2003) is brave enough to list 45 dictators who run countries (the "real" Axis of Evil) where human rights violations are standard practice. It is quite possible that the US alone or even in combination with any of its regimes (e.g., US-UN; US-NATO, etc.) would become over-extended if it tried to intervene in each and every conflict which conceivably justifies humanitarian intervention. However, there are those who argue differently -- that the US does have the power to intervene in any conflict everywhere, but interventions are lopsided and biased (see Chomsky 1999). Bandow (2000:38), for example, argues that the following criteria guide American policy on the choice of armed crusades:

The Brahimi Report is often cited as evidence that more and more nations are refusing to cooperate with UN peacekeeping missions because of a perceived American bias. UN policy, for example, dictates that a minimum of a large brigade (approximately 5,000 troops) is needed for most peacekeeping operations, but it has been difficult to raise even that minimum. The reasons, however, may NOT be a loss of American credibility or decline in "soft power" (Nye 2004), but instead organizational problems with the way the UN calls up troops from cooperating nations. "Wet lease" agreements have helped, allowing troop contingents to bring their own equipment and supplies, but still, many troops arrive in theatre underequipped and undertrained. They arrive in battalion strength (300-900 troops), lack a common operating procedure, and have differing interpretations of the mission’s rules of engagement. There is also almost always a shortage of civilian police, which is an absolute necessity in any postconflict situation. Shortages exist with other civilian experts and personnel, and although lots of well-wishers would like to help out (like peace activists), many cannot get vetted or pass the background check required (e.g., see FBI Procedures for Screening Iraqi Subcontractors). Even members of the Peace Corps are often prohibited from involvement because of a longstanding tradition of not helping agencies which might be involved in intelligence gathering. Corporate contractors and private military firms have moved in to pick up the slack.

USAID contractors like the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) have been used to help fine-tune democracy-building. RTI's approach is known as "democratic decentralization" which is a type of institution building based on analytical identification of diverse interest groups and selection of leaders for those groups. No self-nominations or interviews are conducted to select leaders as the whole idea is to create a system of checks and balances by having many relatively powerless leaders rather than having a few popular warlords in power. Federalism of the kind where you have decentralized authority in provinces and towns and centralized authority in the nation's capital appears to be the main democracy export these days. Rebuilding depends heavily upon what engineers from companies like Halliburton and five other companies can do to get infrastructure up and running, and lots of other companies are involved in both large and small construction projects as well as management consulting; companies like Aegis Defense Services, DynCorp, Erinys International, and Vinnell Corp. Another whole industry has evolved with Private Military Firms (PMFs) which play a key role doing jobs that, in many cases, involve tasks too dangerous for regular soldiers to do and/or low-profile yet critical missions. Singer (2003) was the first to document the rise of this industry, and as of 2005, over 60 firms do private military work for the US government. It is also the case that the death of private soldiers doesn't carry the same political baggage as the death of American G.I.s (as heartless as that sounds). A significant PMF presence exists in places like Latin America and the Middle East with firms like MPRI, Blackwater, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), and CACI. Others, like DynCorp have removed their web presence. PMFs provide the outsourcing often needed to conduct effective nation re-building. For the most part, these firms operate very professionally, and only a small number of "bad apples" have been involved in scandals. PMFs should NEVER be called mercenaries because mercenaries are prohibited by Geneva Conventions. Most private soldiers have military training, frequently special forces training, and while some came out of retirement for patriotism, others are attracted to the money, making more than $250,000 a year. The U.S. government is billed around $1,000 per man per day, but that is still cost-effective because there are no recruitment, education, or training costs. It's also a bargain compared to what foreign-based PMFs charge, as much as $2 million a month. It remains to be seen what the long-term impact of this growth industry will be.

Domestic affairs and Presidential politics also drive American foreign policy in ways which make humanitarian intervention seem lopsided. For example, anticipated refugee flows might impact immigration, or alternatively, as O'Hanlon (1999; 2003) puts it in his article "Deciding When to Go" -- America tends to intervene when the death toll in another country rises above America's own murder rate. American isolationism can run as deep as American exceptionalism, and politicians know that their political future is on the line if they put American sons and daughters in harm's way. Under the Carter Doctrine, the US would intervene anywhere, anytime in the name of human rights, but with UN approval; under the Clinton Doctrine, the US would intervene whenever it can do so without suffering substantial casualties, and without UN approval; and under the Bush Doctrine, the US would intervene where the best chance of spreading democracy exists, after exhausting attempts at UN approval. The bottom line, which happens to be what most analysts seem to agree on, is that the death tolls in a foreign country, which are almost always suspect, tend to be the criteria of most significance when the decision to intervene is made, which supports a "shock the conscience" standard backed up by "credible" evidence. It may be that human rights do trump sovereignty, at least sometimes (Cohen 2004), and it may also be that this priority was there from the beginning, implicit within the Treaty of Westphalia (Kober 2000).

The dangers of rampant humanitarian intervention are many. What's needed, as Anonymous (2004) argues, are systems and procedures which attempt to understand the world and its diverse ways of life from the eyes of native peoples, not American eyes. If we continue to exoticize what we don't understand and Americanize what we think we understand, we are doomed to nothing more than "missionary democracy" which assumes, often incorrectly, that people everywhere share our fundamental values in freedom and liberty. In some parts of the world, those things may not be as important as tribal loyalties, ethnic ties, or other things that are just totally foreign to us. In the long-run, it may not be in America's best interest to become an empire or imperial nation (but see On a Mission: The Uses of American Power for a review of the neoconservative position which argues the opposite). The following quote is provided for thought:

Speech by John Quincy Adams on July 4, 1821

"America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher of freedom and independence to all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benign sympathy of her own example. She well knows that by once enlisting under banners other than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, ambition, which assumed the colors and usurped the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.... She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."

An intriguing subject area involves questions of when "victory" occurs or how it should be defined. It is always important to declare victory in war, especially in the contexts of what some refer to as a "shadow war" (Miniter 2004) or "ghost war" (Coll 2004). The Tigerhawk blog has a post on this subject, especially as to how it relates to the ideology of terrorism, but for purposes here, parallels will be drawn to what might be called the "war for peace." Foregoing the practical elements of when peace can be declared in any given situation, it might be helpful to talk about peace as victory from a more abstract point of view.

When "victory" is the goal, it is important to have a good strategy first. If good strategy is in place, the conditions and meanings of victory will almost write themselves in the end. The problem, of course, is that most war as well as peace movements have multiple objectives, not all of which are relevant for any declarations of victory. There will always be battles left to fight; and there will always be battles which are already "won." However, there will also (almost always) be a wider sense where it can be said in that wider war or struggle, victory remains elusive. Declarations of victory when the wider war is not yet won triggers a sense of disappointment that the fight has been given up too soon. This "wider war" generally involves ideas, and in the long-term, it is the existence of ideas worth fighting for which makes peace as victory elusive, including, ironically enough, peace itself as one of those ideas.

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