Terrorism Investigation

TERRORISM INVESTIGATION
"The only things worth learning are the things you learn after you know it all" (Harry S. Truman)

Police and intelligence agencies are, 40% of the time, responsible for bringing terrorist groups to justice (43% of the time the political process absorbs them, 10% of the time the military kills them, and 7% of the time the terrorists declare victory and quit). Those are the figures of Jones and Libicki (2008) who examined 684 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006, and those are the numbers behind the oft-cited claim that nearly half of terrorism can be fought with "good old-fashioned" police work. Yet, ordinary criminal investigations are usually reactive (after a crime has been completed) and a proper terrorism investigation is, or should be, proactive (before a crime has been completed). With regard to "normal" crime investigation, there are many things done the same and many things done differently in carrying out a terrorism investigation. A wide range of investigative methods are used. Some of the things done similarly include records checks, polygraphs, trash covers, pretext calls, mail cover, collection of evidence, and professional and ethical conduct at all times. Some of the things done differently include: surveillance, interviewing, infiltration, use of informants, preparing for trial, and the trial itself. It is important to remember is that some terrorists will likely know quite a bit about law enforcement methods, but others will have quite a few misconceptions about law enforcement. They're not likely to be the "cop wannabes" one might find among serial killers. More than likely, terrorists will have a strong antipathy toward law enforcement, suspecting all sorts of extreme police measures are being carried out against them. It's difficult to characterize the variety of offenders, but one characterization that is fairly accurate stems from the "political" nature of terrorism. In short, these are offenders who see themselves, or come to see themselves, as celebrities. They want media attention drawn to their case, and in particular, to the justice of their cause. Simultaneously, they want attention drawn to the injustices inflicted upon them by authorities. These factors and many others make up the challenges of terrorism investigation. McCormick (2005) does a good job of describing the prototypical case as follows:

FISA and CIPA are covered later in this lecture. For now, it is appropriate to begin with the "other" so-called "cultural sensitivity" factor, since that is likely where the most important lessons will be learned. The section which immediately follows paraphrases procedures excerpted from Attorney General guidelines which were issued to law enforcement soon after the 9/11 attacks. It will become apparent that these guidelines were devised with the goal of maintaining at least some good police-community relations in predominantly Muslim communities. The guidelines are not presented as any arbitrary set of procedures, and indeed, better models of Muslim community-police relations do exist, particularly some exemplary ones at the local level, and especially now since some time has elapsed since the initial 9/11 panic. Updated below, however, is information on record systems reflecting current databases, but the interviewing guide is mostly word-for-word from 2001.

"Pulling names" is the law enforcement phrase for checking databases to see if there are any wants or warrants on individuals. Such standard queries should be done, and with terrorism, there will likely also be agencies, usually intelligence agencies, "pushing" names out to state and local law enforcement. Whether "pulling" or "pushing" is the preferred method of information sharing, or some combination thereof, has been one of the more troubling and largely unsettled issues in homeland security since 9/11. The NCIC (National Crime Information Center) has always been the first stop for law enforcement, and the last stop currently is the consolidated Terrorist Screening Database maintained by the TSC (Terrorist Screening Center). TSC also maintains the government’s no-fly lists and is the key point of contact to determine whether someone applying for a visa could be a suspected terrorist. There are other databases of relevance. For example, DHS (Department of Homeland Security) runs the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (USVISIT) which is concerned with getting prints and other biometric indicators in the system. There are also classified databases, such the one maintained by NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center which began life as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center). It is called the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database. The purpose of TIDE is to use all-source information to clear up the problems of aliases and transliteration to improve finding the unique identities that "connect the dots" and can be extracted to the TSC for purposes of compiling complete and congruent watch lists. NCTC also manages a secure website where intelligence products can be shared with appropriately-cleared analysts around the world. There are also classified records systems maintained by the FBI, the State Department, and many other agencies, including state and regional entities.

Most likely, anybody picked up for a terrorism investigation is, initially, or at some early point in the process, only a "person of interest" and not a regular suspect. This means that they are not suspected of involvement in any criminal activity, and the interviews will have to be conducted on a consensual basis, where they are free to decline to answer questions. It is important for law enforcement agents to be truthful and complete in giving their name, affiliation, and clearly explaining the purpose of the interview. Permission to speak with the individual will have to be obtained. As these interviews do not constitute "custodial interrogations," there is no need to seek a waiver of Miranda rights. If the interviews are to be conducted on college campuses, protocols exist regarding coordination with campus security forces.

If possible, "field interviews" are preferred, with interpreters present and obtained from any source approved by supervisors. It is desirable that they, and members of their communities, clearly see that they are not being taken into custody and that the interviews are being conducted on a consensual basis. In the absence of any probable cause to the contrary, investigators should avoid implying that any individual might be potentially liable to the criminal law for anything. It is acceptable to talk about reward money, if any is involved in an ongoing, related case. Also, it should be made clear that the primary purpose of the interview is not to ascertain the legality of the individual's immigration status, although it is acceptable to find out about this and report it to the appropriate authorities. Further, and perhaps most importantly, investigators should be careful not to inquire into an individual's religious beliefs. It is appropriate to ask whether the individual has witnessed or heard any persons advocating the use of violence or terrorism. However, it is not appropriate to question or otherwise challenge the validity of religious beliefs or practices. It is only appropriate to ask about any topic that would elicit information that could "reasonably assist" the effort to learn about those who support, commit, or associate with persons who commit terrorism.

"Culturally Sensitive" Topics to Cover During Interviews

a) Identity --Obtain full name, date and place of birth, citizenship and any other identifiers that can be provided. The individual should also be asked about any other names that he has used, in this country or elsewhere. To the extent possible, the individual's identity should be verified by reviewing any identification that the individual is able and willing to provide. In light of the availability of false identification documents, you may wish to request more than one form of identification. You should specifically ask to see the individual's passport and visa, and you should take note whether he appears to be residing in the United States within the time period allowed by the visa. If the individual produces a passport or other document that records past travel, you should make an effort to note where the documentation was issued and any information that it provides about the individual's travel history.
b) Telephone --You should obtain all telephone numbers used by the individual and his family or close associates.
c) Residence --You should ask the individual where he is residing and about any other residences that he has used since his arrival in this country. If he lives with others, you should inquire as to their identities. You should note any information that would assist in locating the individual in the future.
d) Employment -- Inquire about the individual's current employment and source(s) of income.
e) Education -- Inquire about the individual's educational background, including whether he has any professional licenses or scientific expertise.
f) Travel -- Ask the individual what foreign countries he has visited, the dates of those visits, and the reasons he went to those countries.
g) Armed Conflicts -- The individual should be asked whether he or anybody else he knows has ever participated in an armed conflict. If he answers in the affirmative, you should probe for details of the role that he or the other person or persons played in that conflict.
h) Reason for Visit -- The individual should be asked about his reasons for visiting the United States. If the individual is here to attend school, you should learn what you can about his studies and future plans. If the individual is here as a tourist, you should inquire as to the cities, landmarks and other sites that he has visited or plans to visit. You should ask when the individual plans to leave the United States and where he plans to go. You should also ask the purpose of any trips the individual has made outside of the United States since his entry.
i) Threats or Violence -- You should inquire whether the individual has suffered any violence or threats because of his religion or nationality. If the individual claims to have been a hate crime victim, you should obtain all relevant information and take appropriate action to investigate the allegation.
j) Knowledge of Events [of any recent terrorist attack] -- You should ask the individual whether he knows, or is aware of anyone who knows, anything about the [attack].
k) Reactions to Terrorism --You should ask the individual if he noticed anybody who reacted in a surprising or inappropriate way to the news of the [attack]. You should also ask him how he felt when he heard the news.
l) Involvement in Terrorism -- You should inquire whether the individual knows anybody who has had involvement in advocating, planning, supporting or committing terrorist activities, and whether he has ever had any personal involvement in such activities.
m) Knowledge of Terrorism --The individual should be asked whether he knows anyone who is capable of or willing to carry out acts of terrorism; whether he is aware of any plans or discussions about the commission of terrorist acts in the future; and whether he has any ideas about how future acts of terrorism could be prevented. You should also ask him if he recognizes the names of any suspects or targets who have been the subject of investigations in your jurisdiction.
n) Financing of Terrorism --The individual should be asked whether he is aware of anyone raising money for terrorist activity, and whether he or anyone else has contributed to an entity which the individual knows or suspects to be a front for funding terrorism. You should ask if the individual is aware of anyone engaged in systematic criminal activity to raise money, like drug trafficking or fraud schemes.
o) Training of Terrorists --The individual should be asked if he is aware of anybody, including himself, who has received any training which could be applicable to terrorist activities, whether in the United States or abroad.
p) Sympathy for Terrorists --You should ask whether the individual is aware of any persons who have sympathy for terrorists, or for the causes those terrorists espouse. You should also ask the individual whether he shares those sympathies to any degree.
q) Advocates of Violence --You should inquire whether the individual has heard of anyone recruiting persons to engage in violent acts against the United States or its citizens. You should ask the individual if he has knowledge of anyone who is advocating "jihad" or urging others to overthrow the government or to attack Americans, either under the guise of religion or otherwise.
r) Knowledge of Weapons -- The individual should be asked whether he or anybody he knows has access to guns or to any explosives or harmful chemical compounds, or has any training or experience in the development or use of such weapons. You should also ask if he knows of anyone who is capable of developing any biological or chemical weapon such as anthrax.
s) Sources of False Documents -- The individual should be asked if he is aware of anyone who possesses or is involved in selling or supplying others with false identification documents, such as driver's permits, visas, social security cards and credit cards.
t) Knowledge of Terrorists Overseas -- You should ask whether the individual is aware of any persons or groups in his homeland who might be planning or advocating terrorist acts against the United States, and whether he knows anyone in his homeland who could help the United States in its fight against terrorism.
u) Other Suspicious Activity -- The individual should be asked if he is aware of any other suspicious activity in his neighborhood, community, or circle of acquaintances that might suggest the undertaking or support of terrorist activities.
v) Others with Information -- Ask if he is aware of any other persons who might have information about the above topics.
w) Knowledge of Any Criminal Activity -- Remember to ask the catch-all question whether the individual is aware of any criminal activity whatsoever, whether related to terrorism or not.
x) Willingness to Provide Information in the Future -- Explain that the United States needs everyone's help to prevent future terrorism, and you should encourage the individual to contact you if he sees or hears anything suspicious, or if he comes across anyone who has information that would be relevant and useful. You might want to inquire whether you can contact the individual periodically in the future to see if he has obtained any more information. In other words, if the individual is positioned and willing to provide useful information, you should attempt to develop him as a source in the same way that you would recruit any source related to more traditional criminal activity.

One might ask why all this "cultural sensitivity" is necessary, and the answer lies in the fact that within days of the 9/11 attacks, some 200 incidents of serious hate crime, vigilante action, and/or civil rights violations occurred across America against people of Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian heritage (the same pattern happened after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). For example, in California, Arab grocers were shot and killed inside their stores; in Tennessee, Arab motel managers were assaulted; in Wisconsin, Arab restaurants were set on fire; in Cleveland, somebody drove their car into the entrance of a mosque; and in Seattle, a mosque was set on fire. Even Hispanic Americans were singled out for attack because of their physical similarities to Arabs. Within weeks of 9/11, the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) received over 600 complaints of workplace discrimination by Arab Americans, predominantly discharges. Some cities, like Chicago, Patterson, NJ and Washington DC had political leaders who stepped up and spoke out against the American backlash against Arab Americans. Groups like the Korean American Coalition lent their support to Arab Americans; elementary schools across America started holding diversity workshops; college sociology classes started visiting mosques; in Louisville, KY, the "green armband movement" got started to escort people who were afraid to patronize Arab American businesses; and in Evanston, IL, groups like Neighbors for Peace were formed. Numerous other groups, like AmeriDream reached out to help rebuild Arab communities. Cultural sensitivity efforts aim to produce understanding and tolerance.

Arab Cultural Sensitivity Issues

     Cultural sensitivity efforts range from strong TV ads, like the one at right from the NY-based Ad Council aimed at decreasing hate crime toward Arabs, to workshops or training programs where recipients receive specific advice. It is necessary to see the cultural sensitivity movement as distinct from "cultural competence," diversity, multiculturalism, and the controversial notions of "political correctness" and "culture war." A veritable industry exists with trainers, writers, facilitators, and consultants who are, for the most part, unregulated and not on the same page. Some basic rules common to most efforts include things like: watch your humor (this varies a lot); connect with difference (don't try to find the common); and respect others' values (don't label or stereotype values held dear).
     Different cultures contain different signs or semiotics. For example, to Iraqis, the American OK sign means the evil eye, and the thumbs-up sign means someting obscene, but things are changing. Handshakes vary.
     Many Americans have "had it" with cultural sensitivity, but there is evidence that it makes a difference (Bhawuk & Brislin 2000). Surely, there are equity strains when one party does more than its part, but mastering cultural sensitivity (however defined) has long-term mutual benefits and helps deal with complex cross-cultural realities.
     In today's world, a large segment of Arab peoples are attempting a return to "traditional" values within Islam. Regardless of how one might feel about this attempt, it is within their right to try, without the unnecessary burdens of anti-Arabism and Islamophobia. However, global jihadism is another thing, and radical groups like CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations) who claim to be the "Muslim NAACP" should be watched closely for they walk a thin line in support of terrorism (see Anti-CAIR, DiscovertheNetworks, MEForum). It is a terrorist tactic to scream "foul" every time authorities get closer to the crime.

Certain aspects of post-9/11 investigations were less than exemplary. A Gallup poll conducted shortly after 9/11 found that 71 percent of blacks and 57 percent of whites supported racial profiling of Middle Easterners, and the Patriot Act, passed little more than a month after 9/11, granted the government expanded powers. More immediately, hundreds of men of Middle Eastern origin were rounded up and detained under authority of a Sept. 20, 2001 Justice Dept. memo authorizing such detention without charge for a period of 48 hours or an "additional reasonable period" in the event of extraordinary circumstances. Just 10 days after 9/11, chief immigration judge Michael Creppy issued the “Creppy memo” which required immigration judges to close all immigration hearings where detainees are of “SPECIAL INTEREST” to a terrorism investigation. In 2002, an appeals court found that the Creppy memo violated the First Amendment in the case of Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, stating that "democracies die behind closed doors." And in the related case of Haddad v. Ashcroft (2002), a district court found that the Creppy memo violated the Due Process right to a fair hearing. The Supreme Court, however, in 2003 refused to hear these cases, presumably siding with the government, which had by then, largely stopped using the memo to justify special interest cases anyway.

Meanwhile, a Bureau of Prisons memo, released on October 31, 2001, allowed eavesdropping of attorney/client conversations where there is "reasonable suspicion...to believe that a particular inmate may use communications with attorneys to further or facilitate acts of terrorism." In the month of November, 2001, not only did the President authorize military tribunals for alien detainees, but the U.S. Attorney General ordered his first round of interviews on a list of 5,000 immigrants, ages 18-33, who came from countries where al-Qaeda has a "terrorist presence or activity." People on this list received rather scary letters to report to the nearest FBI office or be picked up by local law enforcement within 24 hours. Some local law enforcement agencies balked at this. In early 2002, the FBI announced it was targeting small businesses owned by Arab Americans to search for terrorist money trails. Muslim charities operating in Texas, Chicago, and Michigan were the first to be targeted, resulting in freezing of assets and seizure of records. In all, the offices and homes of individuals related to 14 Muslim organizations were raided with federal agents entering at gunpoint, handcuffing residents during the raids, and carting off boxes of materials, all while using affidavits which were "secret and sealed." A number of Muslim students and scholars left the U.S. before a new reporting system, SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System), came online, and the INS announced its "Absconder Apprehension Initiative" which was nothing less than a deportee sweep aimed at finding persons from "al-Qaeda harboring countries" who might have overstayed their visas. Clearly, the environment for effective terrorism investigation had been made all the more challenging by the way Muslim communities were alienated after 9/11.

FISA represents many things, but above all, it represents a "wall of separation" between foreign intelligence collection and domestic intelligence collection. It provides for the domestic clandestine surveillance of espionage suspects, including electronic intercepts, communication taps, and break-ins to plant wiretaps. The executive branch initiates a FISA request, and a secure district court (usually in the Washington DC area) holds a closed session to decide if the government should have the authority to conduct such activity. This closed session is referred to as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC. Whenever national security demands a domestic intercept, FISA is usually relied upon, and on average, about 600-1000 warrants are approved every year. FISA powers were expanded greatly by the Patriot Act.

A significant case involving the legality of FISA was U.S. v. Sarkissian (1988) which involved wiretaps which paid off against a suspected Armenian terrorist group who were traveling within the U.S. with bomb parts. The wiretaps revealed that bomb parts were coming into Boston airport, so agents scanned luggage on the carousel there, found the bomb components, and returned them to the baggage claim carousel. The pickup suspect became aroused by all the police activity, and avoided picking up their suitcase. The FBI arrested him without a warrant hours later. This case is notable for the question of whether police endangered the public by leaving the bomb parts on the carousel, but the more valuable legal question involves whether police can simply let a conspiracy unfold to the "danger point" where exigent circumstances are reached, justifying a warrantless arrest? On the FISA wiretap issue, the court ruled it legitimate on the basis of a pre-FISA 1980 case called U.S. v. Truong Dihn Hung) which established the legitimacy of the "primary purpose test." This test holds that wiretaps may only be used when the government's primary purpose is in pursuing foreign intelligence information and not criminal prosecution. A related case, U.S. v. Duggan (1984) makes the same holding. Although the Armenians in this case were U.S. citizens, the terrorist group they belonged to was international, and their target was a Turkish embassy. FISA wiretaps are authorized whenever the suspect is an agent of a foreign power, but when the suspect is also a U.S. citizen or resident alien, FISA requires the government minimize the collection of nonpublic (secret) information. In this case, intelligence information was shared with law enforcement, presumably for arrest purposes. In upholding the validity of FISA in this case, the court seemed to be creating a new category called "foreign intelligence crimes," as per the following excerpt of legal reasoning:

It may be noted that the Patriot Act's modification of FISA is entirely in this direction, to break down the "wall of separation" between intelligence and investigation, to give authorities the flexibility to conduct an ongoing intelligence operation whenever they want to and/or to pursue a criminal investigation in pursuit of criminal prosecution at any time. This means that the Patriot Act gives authorities the option to use wiretap information at any time for criminal prosecution purposes whenever an intelligence operation uncovers behavior which is, it could be said, "part criminal, part espionage." To fully understand the significance of this, it is necessary to understand what practices existed prior to the Patriot Act, and in particular, how wiretaps were conducted differently under Title III. A table highlighting some significant differences might be informative:

*Wiretap Procedures under Title III*	Wiretap Procedures under FISA (now Patriot Act)
used when primary targets are U.S. citizens required a court order showing particularity required showing of probable cause if used against terrorism, predicate offense must be committed wiretaps turned off when innocent third parties involved parties notified in 30 days they've been wiretapped considered a "warrant" under 4th Amendment law minimized sharing of information gathered at trial, extent of government activity fully disclosed	used when primary targets are non-US citizens required Attorney General certification of primary purpose required showing of national security interest (< probable cause) if used against terrorism, no need for espionage as a predicate wiretaps never turned off (and "roving" too) parties never notified they've been wiretapped not really considered a "warrant" in the constitutional sense widespread sharing of information gathered at trial, extent of government activity disclosed ex parte in camera
Note: ex parte is a Latin term meaning "on or from one party only, usually without notice to or argument from the adverse party," and in camera means "in secret" or privately, usually in the judge's chambers.

The courts had for many years been unable to come up with a workable definition of "primary purpose." Several court cases tried, and opinions ranged from concepts such as "sole purpose" to "dominant purpose" to "any purpose." Congress settled this judicial controversy when it passed the Patriot Act in 2001 which used the statutory language of "significant purpose." The ACLU and other critics of the Patriot Act have seized upon this language to warn of danger to civil liberties. Where the standard seems to come from is counternarcotics law, in that a 1997 case called US v. Soto-Silva is usually pointed to in explaining that a defendant could maintain a house for a "primary purpose" of taking care of family members, but a "significant purpose" could also be present by using the house to grow and distribute marijuana. In practice, the standard probably means, as McCormack (2005) thinks, a foreign intelligence operation which uncovers criminal activity by non-foreign suspects would probably allow the information gathered to be used for criminal prosecution when evidence of ordinary crime (meaning serious crime, like murder) is discovered, but the danger here, as the ACLU and others have noted, probable cause is being bypassed.

Some interesting practices existed prior to the Patriot Act. One of these was the so-called "chaperone requirement" which was established back in 1995 by procedures established for contacts between the FBI and foreign intelligence investigators. It is still practiced by the government in some quarters, and is mentioned here only for its homeland security implications. What way it worked was that a team of lawyers from the FBI would be liaisoned or "invited" to meetings where the intelligence agency would disclose the details of when an intelligence operation uncovered criminal activity by US citizens. The "chaperones" would ensure that the FBI did not come to direct or control the operation to enhance the possibilities for criminal prosecution. In other words, intelligence agencies could not take direction from the FBI to zero in on this or zero in on that. All that has changed since the Patriot Act.

Also, prior to the Patriot Act, there were extensive so-called "minimization requirements," and there were three kinds of these: (1) minimization of acquisition, where the government would turn off the wiretap when an innocent third party got involved; (2) minimization of retention, where the government would destroy records when feasible; and (3) minimization of dissemination, where the government would restrict any information sharing with other agencies. All these have changed since the Patriot Act, and in fact, the Attorney General in 2002 announced that "the complete exchange of information and advice" between intelligence and law enforcement officials would be the current practice. It is questionable if this interpretation is correct -- that all minimization procedures have been replaced by the Patriot Act -- and the issue is making its way through the courts presently.

Congress passed CIPA in 1980 to prevent the problem of "greymail" where defendants would press for release of classified material in order to extort the government into dropping prosecution. CIPA allows the trial judge to determine the admissibility of classified evidence beforehand (U.S. v. Smith 1985) while simultaneously allowing the government to assess the risk to national security by making such evidence open. Rarely does the government drop a case because it doesn't trust a judge, but it can happen. More likely is the scenario where a redacted version of the classified information is made available. There are several reasons for why secrecy would be everyone's best interests, as McCormack (2005) outlines as follows:

When secret information (at the top secret, secret, or confidential level) must be disclosed to a judge, CIPA procedures kick in, attempting to balance the defendant's right to a "best defense" with the government's right to a "national security" privilege. A trial judge would rule on the admissibility and relevance by inspecting beforehand in secret (ex parte in camera) the material in a attempt to accommodate both sets of rights. Normally, it is the defense which files a motion for discovery to force the government's hand in revealing secret information. If the judge thinks that the information would not be helpful to the defense, that is the end of the matter. If the information can be helpful, but a redacted version, a summary, or a substantial equivalent will do, the judge orders the necessary disclosures. If the government cannot accept such disclosures, the prosecution must be terminated. Needless to say, CIPA procedures and what trial judges deem relevant or not relevant have been a major ground for appeals for many years, and a lot of terrorism cases have been dropped. McCormack (2005) thinks a balancing test developed in Roviaro v. U.S. (1957) should be the standard. It holds that a right to best defense ought to be balanced against the public interest instead of national security interests. The Roviaro standard goes to the issue of materiality (whether it would make a critical difference in the outcome of a trial) as well as the real-life issue of whether the secret agents or informants at issue might have reason to resent the disclosure. This is a concern similarly expressed in the case of CIA v. Sims (1985) where revealing an intelligence source might well cause that source to "close up like a clam."

It is important to note that no new rules of evidence admissibility exist within CIPA. The standard rules of evidence apply, which means that there is a way around CIPA via the introduction of hearsay evidence thru one or more exceptions there (see Lecture on Hearsay rule). However, the problem there is the temptation to exaggerate or misstate the truth, as might be the case in certain instances of redaction or summaries of what "really" happened. The bottom line is that it's just plain hard to come up with any good way of figuring out ahead of time how much should be disclosed of intelligence investigations. Arguably, one cannot figure out materiality if one does not know what all the material says. Otherwise, everything would end up being taken out of context.

No good scholarly writing exists on CIPA, yet it has been at issue in several trials. For example, in U.S. v. Moussaoui (2004), the defendant wanted to call witnesses who were detained illegal combatants, arguing that disclosure of their statements would make a "plausible showing" of materiality, but the government avoided this by arguing that Moussaoui's compulsory process rights (to call any witness he wanted) were limited. Likewise with redacted disclosures, the government won a ruling which said, essentially, that while there may be problems with the manner in which substitutions were provided, the fact that the government only attempted to provide as much as it could should not be held against it.

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Last updated: Sept. 27, 2008
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