THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
He who commits rape, murder and kidnapping shall be put to death. - God (Deuteronomy 22:25, Exodus 21:12,16)

    In the early days of the founding of America, and during congressional consideration of this provision, tortures and barbarous punishments were much on the minds of the Members.  Several objected to the words being too indefinite and one Member said: ''it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off."  However, most Americans wanted to copy the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which indicated a concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments and specifically put forward a right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.  Other documents guaranteeing the same freedom are Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The mere existence of the death penalty is believed to have an significant relationship to the concept of political sovereignty, and may very well be an institution which enable the law to be "violent" in other ways (Sarat 1999).

    At first, the Court was inclined to take the customary and historical view on interpretation, determining whether or not a punishment was ''cruel and unusual'' by looking to see if it or a sufficiently similar variant was considered ''cruel and unusual'' according to 1789 standards.  However,  it soon became clear that the framers had not merely intended to bar the reinstitution of procedures and techniques condemned in 1789, but had intended to prevent the authorization of ''any coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment.''  The Eighth Amendment therefore took on "an expansive and vital character'' and, in the words of a later Court, must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.  Nevertheless, the proper approach to an interpretation of this provision has been one of the major points of debate and controversy among Justices in capital punishment cases.

    It is safe to affirm that punishments of torture [such as drawing and quartering, emboweling alive, beheading, public dissecting, and burning alive], and all others along the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.  In thus upholding capital punishment inflicted by a firing squad (1857), the Court not only looked to traditional practices but examined the history of executions in the territory concerned, the military practice, and current writings on the death penalty.  The Court next approved, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, electrocution (1890) as a permissible method of administering punishment.  Many years later, a divided Court, assuming the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the States, held that a second electrocution (1947) following a mechanical failure at the first which injured but did not kill the condemned man did not violate the proscription.  Lethal gas (1924) (cyanide) was first used by Nevada while the person was asleep in their cell, but public outrage gave rise to the invention of gas chambers which became popular in the 1950s.  A coalition of civil rights and civil liberties organizations mounted a campaign against the death penalty in the 1960s, and lethal injection (1977) was embraced even by death penalty foes and anesthesiologists as a more humane method.

    In McGautha v. California (1971), bifurcated proceedings were required, and with considerable surprise, the Court held in Furman v. Georgia (1972) that the death penalty, at least as administered, did violate the Eighth Amendment.  There was no unifying opinion of the Court in Furman; the five Justices in the majority each approached the matter from a different angle in separate concurring opinions (see FindLaw's Furman v. Georgia).  Two Justices concluded that the death penalty per se was ''cruel and unusual'' because the imposition of capital punishment ''does not comport with human dignity' (Justice Brennan) or because it is ''morally unacceptable'' and ''excessive' (Justice Marshall).  One Justice concluded that because death is a penalty inflicted on the poor and hapless defendant but not the affluent and socially better defendant, it violated the implicit requirement of equality of treatment found within the Eighth Amendment (Justice Douglas).  Two Justices concluded that capital punishment was both ''cruel'' and ''unusual'' because it was applied in an arbitrary, ''wanton,'' and ''freakish'' manner (Justice Stewart) and so infrequently that it serves no justifying end (Justice White).  Dissenters Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist believed that the court was engaging in a legislative act to strike the death penalty down, and hence opposed striking down the death penalty on those grounds.

    In the days following Furman, those who wished to reinstate the death penalty usually concentrated upon drafting statutes that would correct the faults identified in the majority opinions of Furman.  Enactment of statutes by 35 States following Furman attempted to resurrect the death penalty.  This led to renewed litigation, and the Court seemed firmly on the path that first-degree murder was the only criminal act meriting the death penalty (except rape, see Coker v. Georgia 1977, felony murder, see Enmund v. Florida 1982, and also hijacking and treason -- by legislative acts).  The Court chose several different paths in attempting to delineate the acceptable procedural devices that must be instituted in order that death may be constitutionally pronounced and carried out.  To summarize, the Court determined that the penalty of death for deliberate murder is not per se cruel and unusual, but that mandatory death statutes leaving the jury or trial judge no discretion to consider the individual defendant and his crime are cruel and unusual, and that standards and procedures may be established for the imposition of death that would remove or mitigate the arbitrariness and irrationality found so significant in Furman.  Divisions among the Justices, however, made it difficult to ascertain the form which permissible statutory schemes may take.  Inasmuch as three Justices in Furman who did not altogether reject the death penalty thought the problems with the system revolved about discriminatory and arbitrary imposition, legislatures turned to enactment of statutes that purported to do away with these difficulties provided by automatic imposition of the death penalty upon conviction for certain forms of murder, and, more commonly, providing specified aggravating and mitigating factors that the sentencing authority should consider in imposing sentence.  Several cases in 1976 rejected automatic sentencing, and other cases approved or rejected the specifying factors for jury consideration, the most important of these being Gregg v. Georgia (1976).

THE POST-FURMAN PERIOD

    In Gregg v. Georgia (see FindLaw Gregg v. Georgia), first, the Court concluded that the death penalty as a punishment for murder does not itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  While there were differences of degree among the seven Justices in the majority on this point, they all seemed to concur in the position that reenactment of capital punishment statutes by 35 States prevented the Court from concluding that this form of penalty was no longer acceptable to a majority of the American people; rather, they concluded, a large proportion of American society continued to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.  Neither is it possible, the Court continued, for it to decide that the death penalty does not comport with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Eighth Amendment.  Courts are not free to substitute their own judgments for the people and their elected representatives.  A death penalty statute, just as all other statutes, comes before the courts bearing a presumption of validity which can only be overcome upon a strong showing by those who attack its constitutionality.  Whether in fact the death penalty validly serves the permissible functions of retribution and deterrence, the judgments of the state legislatures are that it does, and those judgments are entitled to deference.  Therefore, the infliction of death as punishment for murder is not without justification and is not unconstitutionally severe.  Neither is the punishment of death disproportionate to the crime being punished, i.e., murder.  However, because death is a unique punishment ("death is different"), the sentencing process must provide an opportunity for individual consideration of the character and record of each convicted defendant and his/her crime along with mitigating and aggravating circumstances (note: this is often called the Stewart plurality in Gregg v. Georgia).

    While the imposition of death is constitutional per se, the procedure by which sentence is passed must be so structured as to reduce arbitrariness and capriciousness as much as possible.  What emerged from the prevailing plurality opinion are requirements (1) that the sentencing authority, jury or judge (in 1995 it was decided the 8^th amendment is not violated when the judge has only to consider a jury's death recommendation) be given standards to govern its exercise of discretion and the opportunity to evaluate both the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the accused (only Justice Rehnquist was against standards and the Stewart plurality); in assessing character and record of the defendant, the jury may be required to assess future dangerousness, and hypothetical responses from psychiatrists who have not examined the defendant may be used) (2) that to prevent jury prejudice on the issue of guilt there be a separate proceeding after conviction at which evidence relevant to the sentence, mitigating and aggravating, will be presented; (3) that special forms of appellate review be provided not only of the conviction but also of the sentence, to ascertain that the sentence was in fact fairly imposed both on the facts of the individual case and by comparison with the penalties imposed in similar cases. The Court later ruled, in 1984, that proportionality review is not constitutionally required, but many state correctional departments still retain sentencing analysts wo do such reporting.  Gregg, Proffitt, (see Proffitt v. Florida) and Jurek (see Jurek v. Texas) - three of five death penalty cases collectively referred to as the Gregg decision -- did not require proportionality review, but the Court suggested that proportionality review is one means by which a state may ''safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences.''

    Most states responded to the requirement that the sentencing authority be given standards narrowing discretion to impose the death penalty by enacting statutes spelling out ''aggravating'' circumstances at least one of which must be found to be present before the death penalty may be imposed.  The standards must be relatively precise and instructive in providing guidance that minimizes the risk of arbitrary and capricious action, the desired result being a principled way to distinguish cases in which the death penalty is imposed from other cases in which it is not.  Thus, the Court invalidated a capital sentence based upon a jury finding that the murder was ''outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman,'' reasoning that ''a person of ordinary sensibility could so characterize almost every murder (1980).  Similarly, an ''especially heinous, atrocious or cruel'' aggravating circumstance was held to be unconstitutionally vague (1988).  The ''especially heinous, cruel or depraved'' standard is cured by a narrowing interpretation requiring a finding of infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death (1990 - see Gregg ''outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;" or see Proffit v. Florida 1976 - ''especially heinous, atrocious or cruel'' where aggravating circumstance are interpreted to include only ''the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim;'' or see Creech 1993 - ''exhibited utter disregard for human life.'')

    The proscription against a mandatory death penalty has also received elaboration.  The Court invalidated statutes making death the mandatory sentence for persons convicted of first-degree murder of a police officer (1977), and for prison inmates convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole (1987).  On the other hand, if actual sentencing authority is conferred on the trial judge, it is not unconstitutional for a statute to require a jury to return a death ''sentence'' upon convicting for specified crimes (1985).

    The overarching principle of the post-Furman Gregg period was that a jury should not be ''without guidance or direction'' in deciding whether a convicted defendant should live or die.  The jury's attention was statutorily ''directed to the specific circumstances of the crime . . . and on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime'' (a Gregg standard).  Discretion is to be channeled and rationalized.  This means that the death penalty must be individualized and particularized.  For example, North Carolina's mandatory death sentence for persons convicted of first degree murder was declared invalid in that it failed ''to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant.'' (Woodson v. NC 1976).  Woodson (see FindLaw Woodson v. North Carolina) has since been endorsed by a Court majority (1982).  Thus, a great measure of discretion was again accorded the sentencing authority, be it judge or jury, subject only to the consideration that the legislature must prescribe aggravating factors.

    The requirement that aggravating circumstances be spelled out by statute serves a narrowing purpose that helps consistency of application; absence of restriction on mitigating evidence helps promote fairness to the accused through an ''individualized'' consideration of his circumstances.  In the Court's words, statutory aggravating circumstances ''play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition by circumscribing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty,'' while consideration of all mitigating evidence requires focus on '''the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense''' consistent with '''the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.''  As long as the defendant's crime falls within the statutorily narrowed class, the jury may then conduct ''an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.''

    So far, Justices who favor abandonment of the Woodson approach have not prevailed.  The Court has, however, given states greater leeway in fashioning procedural rules that have the effect of controlling how juries may use mitigating evidence that must be admitted and considered.  States may also cure some constitutional errors on appeal through operation of ''harmless error'' rules and reweighing of evidence by appellate courts.  As a result of these trends, the Court recognizes a significant degree of state autonomy in capital sentencing in spite of its rulings on substantive Eighth Amendment law.  This autonomy or discretion takes at least three forms.

    Discretion in the form of jury instructions.  Juries are not allowed to weigh the severity of an aggravating circumstance in the absence of any consideration of mitigating factors.  They may recommend a death sentence if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or if the jury finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.  Further, a court may instruct that the jury ''must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling,'' since in essence the instruction merely cautions the jury not to base its decision ''on factors not presented at the trial.''  However, a jury instruction that can be interpreted as requiring jury unanimity on the existence of each mitigating factor before that factor may be weighed against aggravating factors is invalid.  Instead, each juror must be allowed to give effect to what he or she believes to be established mitigating factors.

    Discretion with appellate review.  Appellate review under a harmless error standard can preserve a death sentence based in part on a jury's consideration of an aggravating factor later found to be invalid, or on a trial judge's consideration of improper aggravating circumstances.  If the jury relied on a ''totally irrelevant'' factor (defendant had served time pursuant to an invalid conviction subsequently vacated), a death sentence may not stand in spite of the presence of other aggravating factors.

    Discretion with habit and character evidence.  Focus on the character and culpability of the defendant led the Court initially to hold that introduction of evidence about the character of the victim or the amount of emotional distress caused to the victim's family or community was inappropriate because it ''creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner.''  Victim impact statements are not barred from evidence by the Eighth Amendment, and a state may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.  States are barred, however, from offering "a glimpse of the life" which a defendant "chose to extinguish."

ISSUES OF RACE AND STATISTICS

    A capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.''  A strong statistical showing of racial disparity in capital sentencing cases is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation (see this analysis of McCleskey v. Kemp 1987).  Statistics alone do not establish racial discrimination in any particular case, the Court concluded, but ''at most show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions.''  More important than the outcome is the Court's application of the two overarching principles of capital punishment cases: that a state's system must narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty (e.g., by carefully defining ''aggravating'' circumstances), and must not constrain consideration of mitigating factors relating to the character of the defendant.  The Court sees the need to narrow discretion in order to reduce the chance that racial discrimination underlies jury decisions to impose the death penalty.  Reliance on statistics to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court feared, could undermine the requirement that capital sentencing jurors ''focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant."

    Whether or not the death penalty deters crime is a question caught up in complex criminological critiques of research methodologies.  Indeed, Isaac Ehrlich's research, conducted back in 1975, is considered flawed, and even with modern research, it is difficult to tease out the impact of the death penalty in terms of other factors, such as unemployment, per capita income, the probabilities of arrest and conviction, and more.  Many, if not most, criminologists seem to think that the research is "inconclusive," but then again, there are legitimate findings uncovered by research which are not particularly well-accepted, except for most economists, for which the matter is closed.  A brief review of the economic research indicating the death penalty "works" is as follows.  According to researchers at Emery University and the University of Houston, anywhere between three and 18 lives could be saved by the execution of each convicted killer.  Various studies have estimated the deterrent effect per execution at three, five, 14, and 18.  Speeding up executions would strengthen the deterrent effect, specifically in that for every 2.75 years cut from time spent on death row, one additional murder would be prevented.

ISSUES OF MENTAL CAPACITY

    The Court has consistently grappled with several cases involving application of the death penalty to persons of diminished capacity.  The first such case involved a defendant whose competency at the time of his offense, at trial, and at sentencing had not been questioned, but who subsequently developed a mental disorder.  The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from carrying out the death penalty on an individual who is insane, and that properly raised issues of execution-time sanity which must be determined in a proceeding satisfying the minimum requirements of due process.  The Court noted that execution of the insane had been considered cruel and unusual at common law and at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights, and continues to be so viewed today. And, while no states purport to permit the execution of the insane, a number leave the determination to the governor, the governor's decision being based on reports of state-appointed psychiatrists.

    By contrast the Court in 1989 found ''insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people.''  While the Court conceded that ''it may indeed be 'cruel and unusual' punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions,'' retarded persons who have been found competent to stand trial, and who have failed to establish an insanity defense, fall into a different category.  Consequently, the Court was unwilling to conclude that execution of a mentally retarded person is ''categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.'' This line of thinking goes along with the notion of individualized consideration of culpability; that a retarded defendant would be offered the benefit of an instruction that the jury may consider and give mitigating effect to evidence of retardation or abused background.

    However, in 2002 with Atkins v. Virginia (see FindLaw Adkins v. Virginia), the Court reversed itself, and found that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, effectively banning any execution of the mentally retarded.  In making this historic decision, the Court reasoned that many states were moving in this direction anyway, and questioned whether either of the two justifications for the death penalty - retribution and deterrence - really applied to the mentally retarded.  In dissent, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas argued that the Court was really giving in to enormous pressure from lobby groups.  Atkins was a case where the defendant had an IQ of 59, but the Adkins standard creates a special class of individuals protected from capital punishment -- anyone with an IQ of 70 or below and who over an extended period of time have manifested some difficulty in day-to-day functioning and can be considered mentally retarded.  Roughly 1 to 3 percent of the US population fall into this category.

ISSUES OF AGE

    There is also controversy over the execution of juveniles.  A closely divided Court has invalidated one statutory scheme which permitted capital punishment to be imposed for crimes committed before age 16, but has upheld other statutes authorizing capital punishment for crimes committed by 16 and 17 year olds.  Some states like Indiana and Oklahoma set no minimum age for capital punishment, and many, by separate waiver provisions, allow juveniles to be treated as adults.  Four Justices favor a flat ruling against execution of anyone younger than 16 with Justice O'Connor casting decisive votes on modern cases.  To Justice O'Connor, the critical difference is that there clearly is no national consensus on capital punishment for juveniles.  Justice Scalia's concern is whether states have set age limits.

    The Court has continued to tinker with the law of capital punishment throughout the years to reduce the many procedural and substantive opportunities for delay, and to give the states more leeway in administering capital sentencing.  The post-Furman creation of procedural protections for capital defendants, premised on a ''death is different'' rationale, has given way to increasing impatience with the delays made possible through procedural protections, especially those associated with federal habeas corpus review.  Having consistently held that capital punishment is not inherently unconstitutional, the Court seems bent on streamlining procedures so that states who choose capital punishment may do so without inordinate delays.  Strong differences of opinion remain, however, over such issues as the appropriate framework for consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in juvenile cases.  However, in 2005 with the case of Roper v. Simmons (pdf), most anti-death penalty advocates heralded the decision that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional for anyone under the age of 18 (see ABA Page on Juvenile Death Penalty, ACLU Page on Juvenile Death Penalty, or Roper v. Simmons Resource Page).  The three dissenting opinions (Scalia, Thomas & Rehnquist) in Roper did not take issue with the majority arguments that an evolving consensus toward decency existed, that juveniles could not form a culpable mental state, nor with the idea that it serves to deterrence or retribution, but dissent was over how much influence international law should have on domestic law.    

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
"That's what capital punishment really means - those who ain't got the capital, get the punishment." (Mumia Abu-Jamal)

    The federal government and most states (38) have the death penalty.  The only jurisdictions that don't have the death penalty are: Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Some states have the death penalty, but don't ordinarily have very many inmates on "death row."  Illinois and New Jersey, e.g., have formal moratoriums on capital punishment.  Other states, however, are known as big users of the death penalty, and include states like California, Texas, and Florida.  Harris County, Texas, e.g., sentences a lot of people to death, as well as the rest of Texas, and all this despite the police DNA lab in Houston having been shut down since 2002 because an investigation found problems with poor training and contaminated evidence.  In the last 28 years, the U.S. has executed on average one person every 10 days.  Currently (at the end of 2005), 3,400 prisoners, including 118 foreign nationals, sit on death row in the U.S.  Also, currently since 1977 (the year after the Supreme Court validated state "reformed" capital punishment systems, 1,000 people have been executed.  Death sentences nationwide have dropped by 50 percent since the late 1990s, with executions carried out down by 40 percent, according to the Death Penalty Information Center.  64 percent of Americans support use of the death penalty, but that is the lowest level in 27 years, down from a high of 80 percent in 1994. 

    Since 1973, 122 prisoners have been freed from death row.  The vast majority of those cases came during the last 15 years, since the use of DNA evidence became widespread.  While there is no official proof an innocent person has been executed, opponents of the death penalty say the number of prisoners whose convictions have been reversed should fuel skepticism.  Barry Scheck, of the Innocence Project, says using post-conviction DNA evidence, the Innocence Project has helped in more than half of the 163 cases vacated — 14 of which were from death row -- clearly "demonstrating that there are too many innocent people on death row." 

Gary Mark Gilmore (12/4/40 – 01/17/77) was the first person legally executed in the United States after the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. Gilmore was convicted of killing a motel manager in Provo, Utah; he had also been charged with murdering a gas station employee in Orem, Utah, the previous day, but that case never went to trial.      Gilmore's record was actually that of petty crime, but he did kill a motel manager and made suicide attempts in prison.  Gilmore was shot by a firing squad after angrily telling his lawyers to drop the appeals they had filed in defiance of his wishes. Gilmore had spent 18 of his last 21 years in jail and prison, and he wanted the justice process hurried along. During his wait, Gilmore attempted suicide twice. The execution was stayed three times. His life was the basis for Norman Mailer's book "The Executioner's Song" and a TV miniseries.  Following his execution, his eyes were used for transplant purposes, inspiring the British punk rock band The Adverts to write and release "Gary Gilmore's Eyes." (Photo: Ron Barker AP)

    Most death row inmates are male and black; i.e., at least a disproportionate number of them (since 1976, 58 percent of those executed in the U.S. were white while 34 percent were black, according to the Death Penalty Information Center; non-Latino whites make up 75 percent of the U.S. population, while non-Latino blacks comprise just over 12 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau).  Somewhere between 50%-75% of death row inmates are never married.  They typically have to wait an average of 7-9 years before their sentence is carried out.  A few state governors do intervene from time to time and commute some death sentences to life without parole.  Usually, each inmate is given a choice between one or more means of execution.  The most common means of execution are as follows:

• lethal injection (27 states)

• electrocution (12 states)

• gas chamber (7 states)

• hanging (4 states)

• firing squads (3 states)   

    At constitutional law, the "death is different" rule automatically triggers consideration of the cruel and unusual clause in the Eighth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has long held that a sentence of death is not cruel and unusual as long as the judge or jury have considered both mitigating and aggravating factors. Looking at seriousness of the offense and prior record (which are the two main factors in most sentencing) is not enough when the death penalty is at stake. Mitigating and aggravating factors are also used in the sentencing of other crimes not carrying the death penalty, but they are central to the sentence of death. Mitigating factors are background factors that work in the defendant's favor at sentencing, while aggravating factors are "real offense" characteristics that work against the defendant. The following table summarizes these factors:

    Lethal injection is the most popular form of execution today, and it goes like this. A room is prepared where the subject is strapped down on a stainless steel table. Eight syringes are prepared, two filled with saline solution (to mix with the other chemicals), two with Sodium Pentathol, two with Pancuronium Bromide, and two with Potassium Chloride. All the syringes are connected to a multiple inlet device which controls the mix and release of chemicals via an electronic control box which the executioner operates in an adjacent room. Manual pull rods are also available to release the chemicals if the electronic device fails to function. All tubes lead to one hyperdermic needle that sticks intravenously into the subject's arm. Although some states have special procedures, most states follow the 8-Step Unified Execution Protocol, which consists of the following:

1. an injection of 10cc antihistamine, one half hour prior to execution.
2. an injection of 8cc 2% Sodium Pentathol five minutes prior to transmittal of subject to death chamber.
3. an injection of 15cc Sodium Pentathol 2% Solution delivered over a ten second time period.
4. a one minute wait.
5. an injection of 15cc Pancuronium Bromide over a ten second time period.
6. a one minute wait.
7. an injection of 15cc Potassium Chloride.
8. a two minute wait (subject should be dead by this time).

    Lethal injections are a peaceful way to die, a lot better than the violent and messy method of electrocution. However, in some states that allow it, the subject can choose their own method of execution, and not all of them prefer lethal injection. Some prefer a firing squad, if that's available, perhaps because they can look their executioner(s) in the eye or perhaps because of a "live by the gun, die by the gun" ideology. Maybe lethal injection is too peaceful. Is it really modern? What precedent does it set? What does it say about the role of punishment in society? These are all questions we need to ask ourselves after knowing all we can about the methods of execution.

    If you'd like to know who is scheduled to receive the death penalty, and hear a little bit about what they did to receive their sentence, a good place to get that information is Pending Executions. To take it a step further and learn what life is like awaiting execution on death row, then visit the University of Alaska Justice Center's Focus on Death Row, which contains the web's one and only collection of death row links from various state department of correction web sites.

    All the various pro-con arguments can be classified as follows, however, there are some that defy classification.  For purposes of brevity, the arguments will be presented in tabular form.

INTERNET RESOURCES
1001+ Death Penalty Links
ACLU's 25th Anniversary Report on Furman v. Georgia (pdf)
Amnesty International's Gregg v. Georgia Guide
Backgrounder on Constitutionality of Juvenile Death Penalty
Capital Punishment U.K. Resources
Capital Punishment USA Resources
Cornell's LII Death Penalty Overview
Death Penalty Information Center
Death Penalty Links
FindLaw's Annotations on 8th Amendment
Guillotine History
Northern Illinois University's List of Anti-Death Penalty Arguments
Northern Illinois University's List of Pro-Death Penalty Arguments
Pro-Death Penalty.com
Prof. David's Death Penalty Resources
Review of the Academic Literature on Deterrence
Religion and the death penalty
International Links to Anti-Death Penalty Resources, including Amnesty International
Also See Death Penalty Links, a fairly comprehensive source, the Death Penalty Information Center for online reports, or Capital Punishment 101 for background information. For more, see Prof. David's Death Penalty Resources

PRINTED RESOURCES
Banner, Stuart. (2002). The Death Penalty: An American History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
Bedau, Hugo. (1997). The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Bedau, H. & Cassell, P. (2003). Debating the Death Penalty. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
del Carmen, R., Vollum, S., Cheeseman, K., Frantzen, D. & San Miguel, C. (2005). The Death Penalty: Constitutional Issues, Commentaries and Case Briefs. Cincinnati: LexisNexis Anderson.
Friedman, Lawrence. (1993). Crime and Punishment in American History. NY: Basic Books.
Garvey, S. (2002). Beyond Repair: America's Death Penalty. Durham: Duke Univ. Press.
Megivern, James. (1997). The Death Penalty: An Historical and Theological Survey. Paulist Press.
Rideau, W. & Wikberg, R. (1992). Life sentences: Rage and Survival behind Bars. NY: Random House.
Ross, J. & Richards, S. (2002). Behind Bars: Surviving Prison. NY: Macmillan.
Sarat, A. (Ed.) (1999). The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics and Culture. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Zimring, F. (2003). The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.

Last updated: June 11, 2007
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