## How Democratic Is Our Democracy?

 Using Math to Measure Fairness in PoliticsDR. BRAD FOX
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## Using Math to Measure Fairness in Politics

> Gerrymandering

$>$ Election methods


## What is Gerrymandering?

- Gerrymandering is the intentional practice of manipulating boundaries through redistricting to gain an advantage to a political party or group.
- Portmanteau for the last name of Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and the salamander based on the shape of a new voting district in 1812



## Gerrymandering Examples

- Democrats have done it in Maryland
- "broken-winged pterodactyl lying prostrate across the state"
- "blood spatter at a crime scene"


## Gerrymandering Examples

- Republicans have done it here in Tennessee



## Gerrymandering Examples

- Republicans have done it here in Tennessee
- The Nashville metropolitan area has been divided into 4 red districts



## Why is Gerrymandering Bad?

- Creates a discrepancy between partisan representation in government compared the political leanings of that state
- Can effectively disenfranchises minority groups
- "We have to end the practice of drawing our congressional districts so that politicians can pick their voters and not the other way around." - Barack Obama


## Gerrymandering 101

Three different ways to divide 50 people into five districts

- Packing concentrating the opposing party's voting power into one or a few districts
> Cracking - diluting the voting power of the opposing party's supporters across many districts


1. Perfect representation


3 blue districts,
2 red districts
BLUE WINS
2. Compact, but unfair


5 blue districts, 0 red districts BLUE WINS
3. Neither compact
nor fair


2 blue districts, 3 red districts RED WINS

## Using Math to Quantify Gerrymandering

- The Efficiency Gap is a measure to quantify the amount of packing and cracking by calculating the percentage of net wasted votes
- Over $7 \%$ is considered gerrymandered
- Based on 2022 votes: MD map - 8.1\% TN map - 10.9\%



## Using Math to Quantify Gerrymandering

- Ideally, districts should be compact
- The Roeck Method:

Draw the smallest circle that a given district will fit completely within. The Roeck score is the ratio between the area of the district and the area of the circle.


## Pop Quiz Time

- Which of the following district maps of Michigan are gerrymandered?


Pop Quiz Time



## Pop Quiz Time - Michigan 55 D/45 R



11 Dem, 2 Rep
5 Dem, 8 Rep
Actual - 7 Dem, 6 Rep

## Can Weird Districts Be Good?

- Illinois' $4^{\text {th }}$ Distric $\dagger$
- Connects two Hispanic neighborhoods
- Elected the first Latino member of Congress in the Midwest



## Voting Methods

- Plurality Method (Popular Vote)
> Vote for a single candidate, winner receives the most votes


## Voting Methods

- Plurality Method (Popular Vote)
- Vote for a single candidate, winner receives the most votes
- Elimination Method (Ranked Choice Voting)

1. All voters rank every candidate

## BALLOT


$>$ 2. If a candidate has a majority of first-place votes, they win
3. The candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated
4. Redistribute the eliminated candidate's ballots and return to step 2

## Ranked Choice Voting in the U.S.

- Two states - Maine and Alaska - use RCV for some statewide elections
- Alaska will use RCV in the 2024 Presidential election
- 47 cities use RCV for local elections such as NYC, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, and Minneapolis
> Five states including Tennessee have banned the use of RCV in any state or municipal elections


## Using Math to Measure Election Fairness

- Fairness Criteria - conditional scenarios where a specific outcome is expected
- Majority Criterion
- If a candidate receives a majority of first-place votes, then they should win the election
- Unfavorable Majority Criterion
- If a candidate receives a majority of last-place votes, then they should NOT win the election


## Fairness Criteria Violations?



## Using Math to Measure Election Fairness

- Condorcet Criterion

If a candidate is preferred by voters in pairwise competition over EVERY other candidate, then they should win the election

- Monotonicity Criterion
- If a candidate would win an election, then after changes in ballots are made that favor that candidate, they should still win the election.


## CoSTEM Dean Election

- Four candidates in a Dean election: Karen Meisch (M), Kallina Dunkle (D), Jackie Vogel (V), and Leong Lee (L)
- 80 CoSTEM faculty voters

| \# of voters | 25 | 22 | 17 | 16 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ choice | $M$ | V | L | D |

- Plurality Method - Dean Meisch wins the election


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

- Elimination Method
- Round 1: $\mathrm{M}-25, \mathrm{~V}-22, \mathrm{~L}-17, \mathrm{D}-16$, Dunkle is eliminated


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1}^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | M | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

- Elimination Method
- Round 1: $\mathrm{M}-25, \mathrm{~V}-22, \mathrm{~L}-17, \mathrm{D}-16$, Dunkle is eliminated
- Round 2: $M-25, V-22, L-33$, Vogel is eliminated


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| 2 $^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rdd }}$ choice | V | L | M | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

- Elimination Method
- Round 1: $\mathrm{M}-25, \mathrm{~V}-22, \mathrm{~L}-17, \mathrm{D}-16$, Dunkle is eliminated
- Round 2: $M-25, V-22, L-33$, Vogel is eliminated
- Final Round: $M-25, L-55$, Lee is the winner


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| 2 $^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

- Were either of these outcomes unfair?
- No candidate had a majority of first-place votes, so the Majority Criterion is satisfied
- Meisch has 45 last place votes, so the Plurality Method violated the Unfavorable Majority Criterion


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

$>$ Was the Elimination Method fair?
$>$ Condorcet Criterion?

## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1}^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | $L$ | M | M | V | M | D |

$>$ Was the Elimination Method fair?
D Dunkle wins 53 to 27 over Meisch

## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| 2 $^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

$>$ Was the Elimination Method fair?
> Dunkle wins 53 to 27 over Meisch
D Dunkle wins 41 to 39 over Vogel

## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

$\Rightarrow$ Was the Elimination Method fair?
> Dunkle wins 53 to 27 over Meisch
>Dunkle wins 41 to 39 over Vogel

- Dunkle wins 61 to 19 over Lee

D Dunkle is favored over all candidates, so the Condorcet Criterion was violated by BOTH methods

## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D |

- Elimination Method Revisited - Some Vogel supporters moved Lee up to their top choice


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | 9 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V | L |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L | V |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M | D |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D | M |

- Elimination Method Revisited - Some Vogel supporters moved Lee up to their top choice
$>$ Round 1: $M-25, V-13, L-26, D-16$, Vogel is eliminated


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | 9 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | M | V | L | D | D | V | L |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L | V |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M | D |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D | M |

- Elimination Method Revisited - Some Vogel supporters moved Lee up to their top choice
>Round 1: $M-25, V-13, L-26, D-16$, Vogel is eliminated
- Round 2: $M-25, L-28, D-27$, Meisch is eliminated


## CoSTEM Dean Election

| \# of voters | $\mathbf{2 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | 9 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 $^{\text {st }}$ choice | $M$ | V | L | D | D | V | L |
| 2 $^{\text {nd }}$ choice | D | D | V | L | L | L | V |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ choice | V | L | D | M | V | M | D |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ choice | L | M | M | V | M | D | M |

- Elimination Method Revisited - Some Vogel supporters moved Lee up to their top choice
Round 1: $M-25, V-13, L-26, D-16$, Vogel is eliminated
- Round 2: $M-25, L-28, D-27$, Meisch is eliminated
$>$ Final Round: L-28, D-52, Dunkle is the winner
- This violates the Monotonicity Criterion


## A Better Voting Method?

- Method of Pairwise Comparisons

Compare all candidates in head-to-head competition, winner is the candidate that wins the most matchups

- Would always satisfy the Majority, Unfavorable Majority, Condorcet, and Monotonicity Criteria


## A Better Voting Method?

| FCS Coaches Poll |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | team | trend | POINTS |
| 1 | 530 S. Dakota St. (26) 9-0 | - | 650 |
| 2 | 4. Furman 8-1 | - | 612 |
| 3 | G4\% Montana 8-1 | - | 603 |
| 4 | 䨘 Idaho 7 -2 | -1 | 575 |
| 5 | ( Montana St. $7-2$ | $\triangle 3$ | 533 |
| 6 | (5) South Dakota 7-2 | $\triangle 6$ | 492 |
| 7 | NC Central $8-1$ | $\triangle 2$ | 491 |
| 8 | 4. Delaware 7-2 | - 2 | 386 |
| 9 | (5) Forida A\&M 8-1 | -4 | 378 |
| 10 | - Incarnate Word 7-2 | * 6 | 368 |
| 11 | S. Sacramento St. 6-3 | $\checkmark 4$ | 355 |
| 12 | N3 North Dakota 6-3 | -3 | 346 |
| 13 | N. Dakota St. 6-3 | -3 | 324 |
| 14 | . ${ }^{\text {\% }}$ Austin Peay $7-2$ | - 3 | 304 |

## A Better Voting Method?

- Extended Borda Method
- Used in Mario Kart and NASCAR
$\checkmark$ Points difference between $1^{\text {st }}$ and $2^{\text {nd }}>2^{\text {nd }}$ and $3^{\text {rd }} \geq$ $3^{\text {rd }}$ and $4^{\text {th }} \ldots$
- Candidate who earns the most points wins
V Versions are used in Iceland, Kiribati, and Nauru


